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Introduction
This dissertation thesis consists of four academic papers. Each paper repre-
sents a single chapter.
Chapter 1
This chapter is based on my joint paper with Steffen Ahrens and Dennis J.
Snower entitled A Theory of Price Adjustment under Loss Aversion, Kiel Work-
ing Paper No. 1915, 2014 (updated in November 2015). My contribution to this
paper includes the mathematical formulation of large parts of the theoreti-
cal model. Moreover, I contributed substantially to the interpretation of the
theoretical results, the literature review and to writing the paper. The perma-
nent download link to the original working paper is:
https://www.ifw-members.ifw-kiel.de/publications/a-theory-of-
price-adjustment-under-loss-aversion
Chapter 2
This chapter is based on my joint paper with Steffen Ahrens and Dennis J.
Snower entitled Path-Dependent Wage Responsiveness, Kiel Working Paper No.
1977, 2014 (updated in November 2015). My contribution to this project lies
in the derivation of the theoretical model and in performing the numerical
simulation exercise. Moreover, I also contributed substantially to writing the
paper. The original working paper is available at:
https://www.ifw-members.ifw-kiel.de/publications/a-theory-of-
wage-adjustment-under-loss-aversion
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Chapter 3
This chapter is based on my joint paper with Maik H. Wolters entitled Fore-
casting with Large Datasets: Aggregating Before, During or After the Estimation?,
Kiel Working Paper No. 1925, 2014 (updated in November 2015). My contribu-
tion to this paper includes collecting and processing the data and performing
the empirical estimation of the different forecasting models, various testing
procedures and the forecast evaluation. Besides, I also contributed substan-
tially to writing the paper. The original working paper can be found under:
https://www.ifw-members.ifw-kiel.de/publications/forecasting-
german-key-macroeconomic-variables-using-large-dataset-methods
Chapter 4
This chapter is based on my single-authored paper published under the ti-
tle Forecasting Euro Area Recessions in Real-Time, Kiel Working Paper No. 2020,
2015. The original working paper can be downloaded at:
https://www.ifw-members.ifw-kiel.de/publications/forecasting-
euro-area-recessions-in-real-time-1
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Chapter 1
A Theory of Price Adjustment
under Loss Aversion∗
Abstract
We present a new partial equilibrium theory of price adjustment, based on
consumer loss aversion. In line with prospect theory, the consumers’ per-
ceived utility losses from price increases are weighted more heavily than
the perceived utility gains from price decreases of equal magnitude. Price
changes are evaluated relative to an endogenous reference price, which de-
pends on the consumers’ rational price expectations from the recent past. By
implication, demand responses are more elastic for price increases than for
price decreases and thus firms face a downward-sloping demand curve that
is kinked at the consumers’ reference price. Firms adjust their prices flexibly
in response to variations in this demand curve, in the context of an otherwise
standard dynamic neoclassical model of monopolistic competition. The re-
sulting theory of price adjustment is starkly at variance with past theories.
We find that - in line with the empirical evidence - prices are more sluggish
upwards than downwards in response to temporary demand shocks, while
they are more sluggish downwards than upwards in response to permanent
demand shocks.
Keywords: Price sluggishness, Loss aversion, State-dependent pricing.
JEL-Codes: D03, D21, E31, E50.
∗This chapter is based on my joint paper with Steffen Ahrens and Dennis J.
Snower entitled A Theory of Price Adjustment under Loss Aversion, Kiel Working
Paper No. 1915, 2014 (updated in November 2015).
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1.1 Introduction
This paper presents a theory of price sluggishness based on consumer loss
aversion, along the lines of prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).
The theory has distinctive implications, which are starkly at variance with
major existing theories of price adjustment. In particular, the theory implies
that prices are more sluggish upwards than downwards in response to tem-
porary demand shocks, while they are more sluggish downwards than up-
wards in response to permanent demand shocks.
These implications turn out to be consonant with recent empirical evi-
dence. Though this evidence has not thus far attracted much explicit at-
tention, it is clearly implicit in a range of influential empirical results. For
instance, Hall et al. (2000) document that firms mostly accommodate nega-
tive temporary demand shifts by temporary price cuts, yet they are reluctant
to temporarily increase their prices in response to positive temporary de-
mand shifts. Furthermore, the empirical evidence provided by Kehoe and
Midrigan (2008) indicates that temporary price reductions are - on average
- larger and much more frequent than temporary price increases, implying
that prices are relatively downward responsive.
By contrast, in the event of a permanent demand shock, the empirical evi-
dence points towards a stronger upward flexibility of prices for a wide vari-
ety of industrialized countries (Kandil, 1995, 1996, 1998, 2001, 2002b,a, 2010;
Weise, 1999; Karras, 1996; Karras and Stokes, 1999) as well as developing
countries (Kandil, 1998).
While current theories of price adjustment (e.g. Taylor, 1979; Rotemberg,
1982; Calvo, 1983, among many others) fail to account for these empirical
regularities, this paper offers a possible theoretical rationale.
The basic idea underlying our theory is simple. Price increases are associ-
ated with utility losses for consumers, whereas price decreases are associated
with utility gains. In the spirit of prospect theory, losses are weighted more
heavily than gains of equal magnitude. Consequently, demand responses are
more elastic to price increases than to price decreases. The result is a kinked
demand curve1, for which the kink depends on the consumers’ reference
1Modeling price sluggishness by means of a kinked demand curve is of course a well-
trodden path. Sweezy (1939) and Hall and Hitch (1939) modeled price rigidity in an
oligopolistic framework along these lines. In these models, oligopolistic firms do not change
their prices flexibly because of their expected asymmetric competitor’s reactions to their
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price. In the spirit of Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006), we model the reference price
as the consumers’ rational price expectations. We assume that consumers
know, with a one period lag, whether any given demand shock is temporary
or permanent. Permanent shocks induce changes in the consumers’ ratio-
nal price expectations and thereby in their reference price, while temporary
shocks do not.
Given the demand shock is temporary, the kink of the demand curve im-
plies that sufficiently small shocks do not affect the firm’s price. This is the
case of price rigidity. For larger shocks, the firm’s price will respond tem-
porarily, but the size of the response will be asymmetric for positive and neg-
ative shifts of equal magnitude. Since negative shocks move the firm along
the relatively steep portion of the demand curve, prices decline stronger to
negative shocks than they increase to equiproportionate positive shocks.
By contrast, given the demand shock is permanent, the firm can foresee
not only the change in demand following its immediate pricing decision, but
also the resulting change in the consumers’ reference price. A rise in the
reference price raises the firms’ long-run profits (since the reference price is
located at the kink of the demand curve), whereas a fall in the reference price
lowers long-run profits, a phenomenon which we term the reference-price
updating effect. On this account, firms are averse to initiating permanent
price reductions. By implication, prices are more sluggish downwards than
upwards for permanent demand shocks.
These results are extremely important for the conduct of monetary pol-
icy, since they imply that the sign of the asymmetry of price adjustment de-
pends on the persistence of the underlying demand shock. In particular, if
temporary demand shocks are interpreted as non-persistent and permanent
demand shocks as fully persistent, our analysis implies that there exists a bal-
ance point (i.e. an intermediate degree of persistence of the shock) at which
the asymmetry reverses. For shocks less persistent than the balance point
prices are more sluggish upwards than downwards, while they are more
sluggish downwards than upwards for more persistent shocks. Whether the
degree of persistence at the balance point is relatively high or low depends
on the adjustment speed of the reference price and on the firm’s discount fac-
tor. An increase in the adjustment speed of the reference price, as well as in
pricing decisions. A game theoretic foundation of such model is presented by Maskin and
Tirole (1988).
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the firm’s discount factor, strengthens the role of the reference-price updat-
ing effect, increasing upward flexibility and downward sluggishness at any
given positive persistence of the shock. Therefore, the balance point will be
associated with a lower level of persistence. To the best of our knowledge,
there is no other paper studying the ramifications of the persistence of the
demand shock for asymmetric price adjustment.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 1.2 reviews the relevant lit-
erature. Section 1.3 presents our general model setup and in Section 1.4 we
analyze the effects of various demand shocks on prices, both analytically and
numerically. Section 1.5 concludes.
1.2 Relation to the Literature
We now consider the empirical evidence suggesting that prices respond im-
perfectly and asymmetrically to exogenous positive and negative shocks of
equal magnitude, and that the implied asymmetry depends on whether the
shock is permanent or temporary.
There is much empirical evidence for the proposition that, with regard to
permanent demand shocks, prices are generally more responsive to positive
shocks than to negative ones. For example, in the context of monetary pol-
icy shocks, Kandil (1996, 2002a), Kandil (1995), and Weise (1999) find sup-
port for the United States over a large range of different samples. Moreover,
Kandil (1995) and Karras and Stokes (1999) supply evidence for large panels
of industrialized OECD countries, while Karras (1996) provides evidence for
developing countries. In the case of the United States, Kandil (2001, 2002b)
shows that the asymmetry also prevails in response to permanent govern-
ment spending shocks. Kandil (1999, 2006, 2010), on the other hand, looks
directly at permanent aggregate demand shocks and also confirms the asym-
metry for a large set of industrialized countries as well as for a sample of dis-
aggregated industries in the United States. Comparing a large set of indus-
trialized and developing countries, Kandil (1998) finds that the asymmetry
is even stronger for many developing countries compared to industrialized
ones.
In addition to the asymmetric price reaction in response to permanent de-
mand shocks, the above studies also find an asymmetric reaction of out-
put. They show that output responds significantly less to permanent pos-
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itive demand shocks relative to negative ones. This asymmetry – which is
also predicted by our model (as shown below) – is further documented by
a large body of empirical literature that explicitly focuses on output. For
example, DeLong and Summers (1988), Cover (1992), Thoma (1994), and
Ravn and Sola (2004) show for the United States that positive changes in the
rate of money growth induce much weaker output reductions than negative
changes in the rate ofmoney supply. Morgan (1993) andRavn and Sola (2004)
confirm this asymmetry, when monetary policy is conducted via changes in
the federal funds rate. Additional evidence is provided by Tan et al. (2010)
for Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand and by Mehrara and
Karsalari (2011) for Iran.
There is also significant empirical evidence for the proposition that, with
regard to temporary demand shocks, prices are generally less responsive to
positive shocks than to negative ones. For example, the survey by Hall et al.
(2000) indicates that firms regard price increases as response to temporary
increases in demand to be among the least favorable options. Instead, firms
rather employ more workers, extend overtime work, or increase capacities.
By contrast, managers of firms state that a temporary fall in demand is much
more likely to lead to a price cut. Further evidence for the asymmetry in
response to temporary demand shocks is provided by Kehoe and Midrigan
(2008), who analyze temporary price movements at Dominick’s Finer Foods
retail chain with weekly store-level data from 86 stores in the Chicago area.
They find that temporary price reductions are much more frequent than tem-
porary price increases and that, on average, temporary price cuts are larger
(by a factor of almost two) than temporary price increases. However nei-
ther of these studies empirically analyzes the asymmetry characteristics of
the output reaction in the face of temporary demand shocks.
Despite this broad evidence, asymmetric reactions to demand shocks have
been unexplored by current theories of price adjustment. Neither time-
dependent pricing models (Taylor, 1979; Calvo, 1983), nor state-dependent
adjustment cost models of (S, s) type (e.g., Sheshinski and Weiss, 1977;
Rotemberg, 1982; Caplin and Spulber, 1987; Caballero and Engel, 1993, 2007;
Golosov and Lucas Jr., 2007; Gertler and Leahy, 2008; Dotsey et al., 2009;
Midrigan, 2011) are able to account for the asymmetry properties in price
7
dynamics in response to positive and negative exogenous temporary and
permanent shifts in demand.2
In this paper we offer a new theory of firm price setting resting on con-
sumer loss aversion in an otherwise standard model of monopolistic compe-
tition. The resulting theory provides a novel rationale for the above empirical
evidence on asymmetric price sluggishness. Although there is no hard evi-
dence for a direct link from consumer loss aversion to price sluggishness, to
the best of our knowledge, there is ample evidence that firms do not adjust
their prices flexibly in order to avoid harming their customer relationships
(see, e.g., Fabiani et al. (2006) for a survey of euro area countries, Blinder et al.
(1998) for the United States3, and Hall et al. (2000) for the United Kingdom).4
Furthermore, there is extensive empirical evidence that customers are in-
deed loss averse in prices. Kalwani et al. (1990), Mayhew and Winer (1992),
Krishnamurthi et al. (1992), Putler (1992), Hardie et al. (1993), Kalyanaram
and Little (1994), Raman and Bass (2002), Dossche et al. (2010), and many
others find evidence for consumer loss aversion with respect to many differ-
ent product categories available in supermarkets. Furthermore, loss aversion
in prices is also well documented in diverse activities such as restaurant vis-
its (Morgan, 1993), vacation trips (Nicolau, 2008), real estate trade (Genesove
and Mayer, 2001), phone calls (Bidwell et al., 1995), and energy use (Griffin
and Schulman, 2005; Adeyemi and Hunt, 2007; Ryan and Plourde, 2007).
In our model, loss-averse consumers evaluate prices relative to a reference
price. Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006, 2007, 2009) and Heidhues and Ko˝szegi (2005,
2008, 2014) argue that reference points are determined by agents’ rational ex-
pectations about outcomes from the recent past. There is much empirical
evidence suggesting that reference points are determined by expectations, in
2Once trend inflation is considered, menu costs can generally explain that prices are
more downward sluggish than upwards (Ball and Mankiw (1994)). By contrast, our model
does not rely on the assumption of trend inflation.
3In their survey, Blinder et al. (1998) additionally find clear evidence that the pricing
of those firms for which the fear of antagonizing their customers through price changes
plays an important role is relatively upward sluggish. Unfortunately, the authors do no
distinguish between temporary and permanent shifts in demand in their survey questions.
4Further evidence for OECD countries is provided by, for example, Fabiani et al. (2004)
for Italy, Loupias and Ricart (2004) for France, Zbaracki et al. (2004) for the United States,
Alvarez and Hernando (2005) for Spain, Amirault et al. (2005) for Canada, Aucremanne
and Druant (2005) for Belgium, Stahl (2005) for Germany, Lünnemann and Mathä (2006) for
Luxembourg, Langbraaten et al. (2008) for Norway, Hoeberichts and Stokman (2010) for the
Netherlands, Kwapil et al. (2010) for Austria, Martins (2010) for Portugal, Ólafsson et al.
(2011) for Iceland, and Greenslade and Parker (2012) for the United Kingdom.
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concrete situations such as in police performance after final offer arbitration
(Mas, 2006), in the United States TV show “Deal or no Deal” (Post et al., 2008),
with respect to domestic violence (Card and Dahl, 2011), in cab drivers’ labor
supply decisions (Crawford and Meng, 2011), in the effort choices of profes-
sional golf players (Pope and Schweitzer, 2011), or in the aggressiveness of
professional soccer players (Bartling et al., forthcoming). In the context of
laboratory experiments, Knetsch and Wong (2009) and Marzilli Ericson and
Fuster (2011) find supporting evidence from exchange experiments, Abeler
et al. (2011) and Gill and Prowse (2012) from effort provision experiments,
Banerji and Gupta (2014)) from an auction experiment, and Karle et al. (2015)
from a consumption choice experiment. Endogenizing consumers’ reference
prices in this way allows our model to capture that current price changes
influence the consumers’ future reference price and thereby affect the de-
mand functions via what we call the “reference-price updating effect.” This
effect rests on the observation that firms tend to increase the demand for
their product by raising their consumers’ reference price through, for exam-
ple, setting a “suggested retail price” that is higher than the price actually
charged (Thaler, 1985; Putler, 1992). These pieces of evidence are consonant
with the assumptions underlying our analysis. Our analysis works out the
implications of these assumptions for state-dependent price sluggishness in
the form of asymmetric price adjustment for temporary and permanent de-
mand shocks.
There are only a few other papers that study the implications of consumer
loss aversion on firms’ pricing decisions. In an early account of price rigidity
in response to demand and cost shocks has been presented by Sibly (2002,
2007). In a static environment, Sibly (2002, 2007) shows that a monopolist
may not change prices if she faces loss averse consumers with fixed, exoge-
nously given reference prices. In their particularly insightful contributions,
Heidhues and Ko˝szegi (2008) and Spiegler (2012) analyze static monopolis-
tic pricing decisions to cost and demand shocks under the assumption that
the reference price is determined as a consumer’s recent rational expecta-
tions personal equilibrium in the spirit of Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006). Spiegler
(2012) shows that incentives for price rigidity are even stronger for demand
shocks compared to cost shocks. We followHeidhues and Ko˝szegi (2008) and
Spiegler (2012) and assume endogenous rational expectations reference price
formation, but, by contrast, consider a dynamic approach to the pricing de-
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cision of a monopolistically competitive firm facing loss averse consumers.
Our dynamic approach confirms earlier findings that consumer loss aversion
engenders price rigidity and allows us to study the asymmetry characteristics
of pricing reactions to temporary and permanent demand shocks of different
sign. Another study close to ours is Popescu and Wu (2007); although they
analyze optimal pricing strategies in repeated market interactions with loss
averse consumers and endogenous reference prices, they do not analyze the
model’s reaction to demand shocks.
Finally, this paper offers a newmicrofounded rationale for state-dependent
pricing. The importance of state-dependence for firms’ pricing decisions
is well documented. For instance, in the countries of the euro area (Fabi-
ani et al., 2006; Nicolitsas, 2013), Scandinavia (Apel et al., 2005; Langbraaten
et al., 2008; Ólafsson et al., 2011), the United States (Blinder et al., 1998), and
Turkey (S¸ahinöz and Saraçog˘lu, 2008), approximately two third of the firms’
pricing decisions are indeed driven by the current state of the environment.5
Menu costs, by contrast, are clearly rejected as a significant driver for de-
ferred price adjustments in each of the empirical studies above.
1.3 Model
We incorporate reference-dependent preferences and loss aversion into an
otherwise standardmodel of monopolistic competition. Consumers are price
takers and loss averse with respect to prices. They evaluate prices relative to
their reference prices, which depend on their lagged rational price expec-
tations from the recent past, i.e. consumers are backward-looking. For sim-
plicity, we abstract from saving, implying that workers become single-period
optimizers. Firms are monopolistic competitors, supplying non-durable dif-
ferentiated goods. Firms can change their prices freely in each period to max-
imize their total expected discounted profits. Firms’ price setting decision is
forward-looking, taking into account their influence on the consumers’ fu-
ture reference price. Thus, reference dependence in our model is obviously
an intertemporal phenomenon, linking the decisions in one period to the de-
cisions in the next. To analyse the firms’ price setting decision in response
5However in the United Kingdom (Hall et al., 2000) and Canada (Amirault et al., 2005)
state-dependence seems to be somewhat less important for firms’ pricing decision.
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to demand shocks in such an intertemporal context, we consider a dynamic
two-period analysis, for algebraic simplicity.6
1.3.1 Consumers
We follow (Sibly, 2007) and assume that the representative consumer’s
period-utility Ut depends positively on the consumption of n imperfectly
substitutable nondurable goods qi,t with i ∈ (1, . . . , n) and negatively on the
“loss-aversion ratio” (Pi,t/Ri,t), i.e. the ratio of the price Pi,t of good i to the
consumer’s respective reference price Ri,t of the good.7 The loss-aversion
ratio, which describes how the phenomenon of loss aversion enters the util-
ity function, may be rationalized in terms of (i) Thaler’s transaction utility
(whereby the total utility that the consumer derives from a good is in part de-
termined by how the consumer evaluates the quality of the financial terms of
the acquisition of the good (Thaler, 1991)), (ii) Okun’s implicit firm-customer
contracts (whereby firms and customers implicitly agree on fair and stable
prices despite fluctuations in demand (Okun, 1981)), or (iii) Rotemberg’s cus-
tomer anger or regret (Rotemberg, 2005, 2010). Further approaches that de-
scribe reference-dependence in the consumer’s utility function in terms of a
ratio of actual prices to references prices are McDonald and Sibly (2001, 2005)
and Ahrens et al. (2014) in the context of loss aversion with respect to wages
and Sibly (1996, 2002) in the context of loss aversion with respect to prices
and quality.8
The consumer’s preferences in period t are represented by the following
utility function:
Ut (q1,t, ..., qn,t) =
[
n
∑
i=1
((
Pi,t
Ri,t
)−µ
qi,t
)ρ] 1ρ
, (1.1)
6Amulti-period analysis with longer time horizons would not affect our qualitative con-
clusions.
7Throughout the model, capital letters denote nominal variables, while small letters de-
note real variables. Greek letters denote model parameters.
8Other examples in which prices directly enter the utility function are, for instance,
Rosenkranz (2003) and Rosenkranz and Schmitz (2007) in the context of auctions and
Popescu and Wu (2007), Nasiry and Popescu (2011), and Zhou (2011) in the context of cus-
tomer loss aversion.
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where 0 < ρ < 1 denotes the degree of substitutability between the different
goods. The parameter µ is an indicator function of the form
µ =
{
Γ for Pi,t < Ri,t, i.e. gain domain
∆ for Pi,t > Ri,t, i.e. loss domain
, (1.2)
which describes the degree of the consumer’s loss aversion. For loss averse
consumers, ∆ > Γ, i.e. the utility losses from price increases are larger than
the utility gains from price decreases of equal magnitude. The consumer’s
reference price Ri,t is formed at the beginning of each period. In the spirit of
Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006), we assume that the consumer’s reference price de-
pends on her lagged rational price expectation. Demand shocks, which may
or may not trigger price adjustment, materialize unexpectedly in the course
of the period and therefore do not enter the information set used by the con-
sumer at the beginning of the period to form the reference price. Therefore,
there is no instantaneous reaction of the reference price in the shock period
even if the firm immediately adjusts its price in response to the shock. At the
beginning of the next period, however, consumers update their information
set and adjust their price expectation accordingly (since they can now infer
about the nature of the demand shock and the corresponding price change).
While temporary price changes do not provoke a change in the consumer’s
reference price9, the reference price changes in the period after the occur-
rence of a permanent shock. Thus the consumer’s reference price is given by
Ri,t = E [Pi,t | It−1]. The consumer’s budget constraint is given by
n
∑
i=1
Pi,tqi,t = P˜tyt, (1.3)
where yt denotes the consumer’s real income in period t which is assumed
to be constant and P˜t is the aggregate price index. For simplicity, we abstract
from saving. This implies that consumers are completely myopic.10 In each
9Support for this assumption can be found in the example of sales, i.e. promotions,
characterized by non-permanent price decreases, used by firms to temporarily increase con-
sumers’ demand for their product (see e.g. Eichenbaum et al., 2011). Sales do not affect the
consumers’ reference price. Otherwise firms would not conduct sales because any down-
ward adjustment of the consumer’s reference price reduces long-run profits for the firm.
10Evidence to support this assumption is provided by Elmaghraby andKeskinocak (2003)
who show that many purchase decisions of non-durable goods take place in economic envi-
ronments which are characterized by myopic consumers.
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period the consumer maximizes her period-utility function (1.1) with respect
to her budget constraint (1.3). The result is the consumer’s period t demand
for the differentiated good i which is given by
qi,t(Pi,t, Ri,t, µ) = P˜
η
t
(
Pi,t
Ri,t
)−µ(η−1) yt
P
η
i,t
, (1.4)
where η = 11−ρ denotes the elasticity of substitution between the different
product varieties. The aggregate price index P˜t is given by
P˜t =
 n∑
i=1
(
Pi,t
/(
Pi,t
Ri,t
)−µ)1−η 11−η . (1.5)
We assume that the number of firms n is sufficiently large so that the pricing
decision of a single firm does not affect the aggregate price index. Defining
λ = η (1+ µ)− µ, we can simplify equation (1.4) to
qi,t(Pi,t, Ri,t, λ) = R
λ−η
i,t P
−λ
i,t P˜
η
t yt, (1.6)
where the parameter λ denotes the price elasticity of demand, which de-
pends on µ and therefore takes different values for losses and gains. To sim-
plify notation, we define
λ =
{
γ for Pi,t < Ri,t
δ for Pi,t > Ri,t
, (1.7)
with δ = η (1+ ∆)− ∆ > γ = η (1+ Γ)− Γ. Equation (1.6) indicates that the
consumer’s demand function for good i is kinked at the reference price Ri,t.
The kink, lying at the intersection of the two demand curves qi,t(Pi,t, Ri,t,γ)
and qi,t(Pi,t, Ri,t, δ), is given by the price-quantity combination
(P̂i,t, q̂i,t) =
(
Ri,t, R
−η
i,t P˜
η
t yt
)
, (1.8)
where “̂” denotes the value of a variable at the kink. Changes in the refer-
ence price Ri,t give rise to a change of the position of the kink and also shift
the demand curve as a whole. The direction of this shift depends on the sign
of the difference λ− η. We restrict our analysis to λ ≥ η, i.e. we assume that
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an increase in the reference price shifts the demand curve outwards and vice
versa.11
Needless to say, abstracting from reference-dependence and loss aversion
in the consumer’s preferences represented by utility function (1.1), restores
the standard textbook consumer demand function for a differentiated good
i, given by
qi,t(Pi,t) = P
−η
i,t P¯
η
t yt, (1.9)
where P¯t is the aggregate price index in an economy without loss averse con-
sumers. In what follows, we will use this standard model as a benchmark
case, against which we compare the pricing decisions of a monopolistic com-
petitive firm facing loss averse consumers.
1.3.2 Monopolistic Firms
Firms seek to maximize the discounted stream of current and future profits,
ΠTotalt,i = Πi,t + βΠi,t+1 (1.10)
where Πi,t = Pi,tqi,t − C(qi,t) are period t profits, β is the discount factor and
Ct(qt) are firm’s total costs. For simplicity, we assume a two period time hori-
zon. (This can serve as a rough approximation for forms of short-sightedness,
such as hyperbolic discounting, when the first-period discount rate exceeds
the second-period one.12) The firm takes into account its period t individual
downward-sloping demand function (1.6) and the implications of its current
pricing decision for the costumers’ reference price. The resulting first order
11The positive relationship between reference price and demand has become a common
feature in the marketing sciences (e.g., Thaler, 1985; Putler, 1992; Greenleaf, 1995). It mani-
fests itself, e.g., through the “suggested retail price,” by which raising the consumers’ refer-
ence price causes increases in demand (Thaler, 1985). Furthermore, Putler (1992) provides
evidence that an extensive use of promotional pricing in the late 80’s had lead to an erosion
in demand by lowering consumers’ reference prices.
12Many authors have shown that consumers’ discount rates are generally much higher in
the short run than in the long run (Loewenstein and Thaler, 1989; Ainslie, 1992; Loewenstein
and Prelec, 1992; Laibson, 1996, 1997). Firm behavior is also often found to be short-sighted
for the same reason. The theory of managerial myopia argues that managers often almost
exclusively focus on short-term earnings (either because they have to meet certain goals or
because their career advancement and compensation structure depends on the firm’s current
performance), even if this has adverse long-run effects (Jacobson and Aaker, 1993; Graham
et al., 2005; Mizik and Jacobson, 2007; Mizik, 2010). For a review of the early literature refer
to Grant et al. (1996).
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condition of the firm’s optimization problem reads as
∂ΠTotali,t
∂Pi,t
= qi,t + Pi,t
∂qi,t
∂Pi,t
−
∂C(qi,t)
∂Pi,t
+ β
∂Πi,t+1
∂Ri,t+1
∂Ri,t+1
∂Pi,t
= 0, (1.11)
which is equivalent to
qi,t + Pi,t
∂qi,t
∂Pi,t︸ ︷︷ ︸
MRt
−
∂C(qi,t)
∂Pi,t︸ ︷︷ ︸
MCt
= −β
∂Πi,t+1
∂Ri,t+1
∂Ri,t+1
∂Pi,t
. (1.12)
The term on the left hand side is the current period marginal revenue MRt
minus the current period marginal cost MCt. The term on the right hand side
measures the influence of the price setting decision on the reference price and
thereby future profits. Note that in the absence of reference-price-updating
the standard optimality condition of a firm holds, i.e. MRt = MCt. Only
if the firm’s price setting decision has an influence on the reference price
the firm faces a tradeoff between current period optimality (determined by
the left hand side of equation (1.12)) and future ramifications of the current
decision (determined by the right hand side of equation (1.12)).
All n firms are identical, enabling us to drop the subscript i. In what fol-
lows we assume that the firm’s total costs are given by Ct(qt) = c2q
2
t , where
c is a constant, implying that marginal costs are linear in output: MCt(qt) =
cqt. In the presence of loss aversion (δ > γ), the downward-sloping demand
curve has a concave kink at the current reference price: P̂t = Rt. Thus the
firm’s marginal revenue curve is discontinuous at the kink:
MRt (qt, Rt, λ) =
(
1−
1
λ
)(
qt
R
(λ−η)
t P˜
η
t yt
)− 1λ
, (1.13)
with λ = γ for the gain domain and λ = δ for the loss domain, respec-
tively. The interval [MRt (q̂t, Rt,γ) , MRt (q̂t, Rt, δ)], where MRt (q̂t, Rt,γ) <
MRt (q̂t, Rt, δ), we call “marginal revenue discontinuity” MRDt(q̂t, Rt,γ, δ).
We assume that in the initial steady state, the exogenously given reference
price is Rss. Furthermore, in the steady state the firm’s marginal cost curve
intersects the marginal revenue discontinuity, as depicted in Figure 1.1. To
fix ideas, we assume that initially the marginal cost curve crosses the mid-
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Figure 1.1: Initial steady state.
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point of the discontinuity in the marginal revenue curve.13 This assumption
permits us to derive the symmetry characteristics of the responses to posi-
tive and negative demand shocks. This implies that the firm’s optimal price
in the initial steady state P∗ss is equal to Rss.
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1.3.3 Demand Shocks
The demand for each product i is subject to exogenous shocks, which may
be temporary or permanent. These demand shocks, represented by εt, are
unexpected and enter the demand function multiplicatively:
qt(Pt, Rt, λ, εt) = R
(λ−η)
t P
−λ
t P˜
η
t ytεt. (1.14)
The corresponding marginal revenue functions of the firm are
MRt (qt, Rt, λ, εt) =
(
1−
1
λ
)(
qt
R
(λ−η)
t P˜
η
t ytεt
)− 1λ
. (1.15)
13To satisfy this condition, the slope parameter c of the marginal cost curve has to take
the value c = 12qss [MRt (qss, Rss, γ) + MRt (qss, Rss, δ)]
14The proof is straightforward: Let ν be an arbitrarily small number. Then for prices equal
to Rss + ν the firm faces a situation in which marginal revenue is higher than marginal costs
and decreasing the price would raise the firm’s profit, while for prices equal to Rss − ν the
firm faces a situation in which marginal revenue is lower than marginal costs and increasing
the price would raise the firm’s profit. Thus P∗ss = Rss has to be the profit maximizing price
in the initial steady state.
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Table 1.1: Base calibration.
Parameter Symbol Value
Discount rate β 0.99
Elasticity of substitution η 5
implying substitutability ρ 0.8
Price elasticity (gain domain) γ 6
Price elasticity (loss domain) δ 12
Loss aversion κ 2
Exogenous nominal income Y 1
Exogenous price index Pt 1
We consider the effects of a demand shock that hits the economy in period
t. The demand shock shifts the marginal revenue curve, along with the
marginal revenue discontinuity MRDt (q̂t, Rt,γ, δ, εt). We define a “small”
shock as one that leaves themarginal cost curve passing through themarginal
revenue discontinuity, and a “large” shock as one that shifts the marginal
revenue curve sufficiently so that the marginal cost curve no longer passes
through the marginal revenue discontinuity.
The maximum size of a small shock for the demand function (1.14) is
εt (λ) =
(
1−
1
λ
)
R
1+η
t
cP˜
η
t yt
, (1.16)
i.e. εt (λ) is the shock size for which the marginal cost curve lies ex-
actly on the boundaries of the shifted marginal revenue discontinuity
MRDt (q̂t, Rt,γ, δ, εt (λ)).15 In the analysis that follows, we will distinguish
both between small and large demand shocks and between temporary and
permanent demand shocks. To qualitatively and quantitatively assess the
price setting reaction of the firm we calibrate the model and simulate it nu-
merically.
1.3.4 Calibration
We calibrate the model for a quarterly frequency in accordance with standard
values in the literature. We assume an annual interest rate of 4 percent, which
yields a discount factor β = 0.99. We follow Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007)
15For ε (δ), the marginal cost curve intersects the marginal revenue gap on the upper
bound, whereas for ε (γ) it intersects it on the lower bound.
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and set the monopolistic markup to 25 percent, i.e. η = 5, which is also close
to the value supported by Erceg et al. (2000) and which implies that goods
are only little substitutable, i.e. ρ = 0.8. Loss aversion is measured by the
relative slopes of the demand curves in the gain and loss domain, i.e. κ = δγ .
The empirical literature on loss aversion in prices finds that losses induce
demand reactions approximately twice as large as gains (Tversky and Kah-
neman, 1991; Putler, 1992; Kalyanaram and Little, 1994; Griffin and Schul-
man, 2005; Adeyemi and Hunt, 2007). Therefore, we set κ = 2. The loss
aversion parameters from the utility function Γ and ∆ are chosen to match
specific price elasticities. Price elasticities are commonly values as low as 5
(e.g., Klenow andWillis, 2006) up to values as high as 11 (e.g., Kimball, 1995;
Chari et al., 2000; Eichenbaum and Fisher, 2004; Woodford, 2005). Therefore,
we set the price elasticity in the gain domain to γ = 5.5, which given κ = 2
implies a price elasticity in the loss domain of δ = 11. Furthermore, this
calibration satisfies the restriction that λ ≥ η. The exogenous nominal in-
come Y and price index Pt are normalized to unity.16 The base calibration is
summarized in Table 1.1.
1.4 Results
Figure 2.2 present the numerical results of our base calibration in the two-
period model. In the figure we show the shock-arc-elasticity of price(
η˜ε,P =
%∆P
%∆ε
)
in the period of the shock t for positive and negative tempo-
rary (left panel) and permanent (right panel) demand shocks. On the vertical
axis we show the shock-arc elasticities of price, which measure the relative
strength of the price reaction in response to demand shocks. The horizon-
tal axis measures the size of the shock in percent. The vertical, dotted lines
denote the thresholds between small and the large demand shocks.
Our numerical analysis finds that the firm’s price reaction in response to
demand shocks depends crucially on the size, the sign, and the persistence
(temporary vs. permanent) of the shock. The left panel of Figure 2.2 shows
that prices are completely rigid for small positive and negative temporary
demand shocks (to the left of the dotted lines), while they are relatively up-
ward sluggish for large shocks (to the right of the dotted lines). By contrast,
16All results are completely robust to variations of these numerical values.
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Figure 1.2: Shock-arc elasticities to temporary and permanent demand
shocks.
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the right panel of Figure 2.2 shows that in response to permanent positive de-
mand shocks prices are generally downward sluggish. The range of full price
rigidity is small, as even many small positive permanent demand shocks in-
duce a positive price reaction. By contrast, in response to permanent nega-
tive demand shocks, prices remain fully rigid also for a considerable range of
large shocks. In the following we will analyse the intuition for these results.
1.4.1 Intuition
Temporary demand shocks
For a temporary (one-period) demand shock, the consumers’ reference
price is not affected (since information reaches them with a one-period lag
and they have rational expectations). This implies that ∂Rt+1∂Pt = 0 and thus the
firm’s price response to the shock is the same as that of a myopic firm (which
maximizes its current period profit). According to the optimality condition
(1.12), the new profit-maximizing price is determined by the standard condi-
tion according to which MRt = MCt.
Result 1: In response to a small temporary shock, prices remain rigid.
As noted, for a sufficiently small demand shock εst ≤ εt (λ) the marginal
cost curve still intersects the marginal revenue discontinuity, i.e. MCt (q̂t) ∈
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MRDt (q̂t, Rss,γ, δ, εst). Therefore, the prevailing steady state price remains
the firm’s profit-maximizing price,17 i.e. P∗t = P
∗
ss, and we have complete
price rigidity. By contrast, the profit-maximizing quantity changes to q∗t =
R
−η
ss P˜
η
t ytε
s
t, thus the percentage change of quantity is given by
∆q∗t =
q∗t − q
∗
ss
q∗ss
=
εst − 1
1
= εst − 1 6= 0. (1.17)
This holds true irrespective of the sign of the small temporary demand shock.
Consequently, the quantity reaction is symmetric for positive and negative
demand shocks of equal magnitude.
Result 2: In response to a large temporary shock, prices are more sluggish upwards
than downwards.
For a large shock, i.e. εlt > εt (λ), the marginal cost curve intersects the
marginal revenue curve outside the discontinuity of the latter. Consequently
both, a price and a quantity reaction are induced. The new profit-maximizing
price of the firm is
P∗t =
(
R
(λ−η)
ss P˜
η
t ytε
l
t
q∗t
) 1
λ
, (1.18)
while its corresponding profit-maximizing quantity is
q∗t =
(
1
c
(
1−
1
λ
)) λ
λ+1 (
R
(λ−η)
ss P˜
η
t ytε
l
t
) 1
λ+1 , (1.19)
where λ = δ for positive and λ = γ for negative shocks, respectively.
In comparison to the standard firm the price reaction of the firm facing
loss-averse consumers in response to a large temporary demand shock is al-
ways smaller, whereas the quantity reaction is always larger. Additionally,
prices and quantities are less responsive to positive than to negative shocks.
The intuition is obvious once we decompose the demand shock into the max-
imum small shock and the remainder:
εlt = εt (λ) + ε
rem
t . (1.20)
17Compare the proof from Section 1.3.2.
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From our theoretical analysis above, the maximum small shock εt (λ) has no
price effects, but feeds one-to-one into demand. This holds true irrespective
of the sign of the shock. By contrast, the remaining shock εremt has asymmetric
effects. Let qt be the quantity corresponding to εt (λ). Then the percentage
change in quantity in response to εremt is given by
∆qremt =
q∗t − qt
qt
=
(
1+
εremt
εt (λ)
) 1λ+1
− 1. (1.21)
As can be seen from equation 1.21, the change of quantity in response to
εremt depends negatively on λ, the price elasticity of demand. Since by defi-
nition δ > γ, the quantity reaction of the firm facing loss-averse consumers
is smaller in response to large positive temporary demand shocks than to
large negative ones. This however implies that prices are also less respon-
sive to positive than to negative large temporary demand shocks, because
the former move the firm along the relatively flat portion of the demand
curve, whereas the latter move it along the relatively steep portion of the
demand curve. This asymmetric sluggishness in the reaction to positive and
negative large temporary demand shocks is a distinct feature of consumer
loss aversion and stands in obvious contrast to the standard textbook case of
monopoly pricing.
Permanent demand shocks
Now consider a permanent demand shock that occurs in period t. For a
permanent (two-period) demand shock, the consumers’ period t + 1 refer-
ence price is now affected by the firms’ period t pricing decision, i.e. ∂Rt+1∂Pt 6=
0. Thus the firm’s price response to the shock differs from that of a myopic
firm (which maximizes only its current period profit), as according to the
optimality condition (1.12) the effect of the pricing decision on the reference
price drives a wedge between MRt and MCt in optimality.
Result 3: For all permanent shocks, prices are less sluggish upwards than down-
wards.
The intuition for this result is as follows: Whereas the firm is assumed to
change its price immediately in response to this shock, consumers update
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Figure 1.3: Shock-arc elasticities to positive and negative demand shocks.
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their reference price in the following period t + 1, i.e. Rt+1 = Et[Pt+1|It].
Consequently, for price increases (decreases) the demand curve shifts out-
wards (inwards) and the kink moves to
(P̂t+1, q̂t+1) =
(
Rt+1,
(
P˜t+1/Rt+1
)η
yt+1εt+1
)
. (1.22)
An outward shift of the demand curve (initiated by an upward adjustment
in the reference price) increases the firm’s long-run profits, whereas an in-
ward shift (initiated by a downward adjustment of the reference price) low-
ers them. We term this phenomenon the “reference-price updating effect.”
The firm can anticipate this. Thus, it may have an incentive to set its price
above the level that maximizes its profits in the shock period P′t > P
∗
t , there-
with exploiting (dampening) the outward (inward) shift of the demand curve
resulting from the upward (downward) adjustment of the consumers’ refer-
ence price for positive (negative) permanent shocks.18 The firm exploits this
effect, as long as the gain from a price rise relative to P∗t in terms of future
profits (Πt+1(Rt+1 = P′t ) > Πt+1(Rt+1 = P
∗
t ), due to the relative rise in the
reference price) exceeds the firm’s loss in terms of present profits (Πt(P′t ) <
Πt(P∗t ), since the price P
′
t is not appropriate for maximizing current profit).
The extend, to which the firm exploits the reference-price-updating effect
can be seen in Figure 1.3. The figure shows the shock-arc elasticities of price
for temporary (solid lines) and permanent (dashed lines) shocks, given that
18Needless to say, setting a price lower than optimal in the shock period with the aim to
decrease the reference price permanently is not a preferable option for the firm.
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a shock is positive (left panel) and negative (right panel). The reference-
price-updating effect is measured by vertical difference between the dashed
lines and the solid lines. Figure 1.3 indicates that in response to a perma-
nent shock the firm significantly exploits the “reference-price updating ef-
fect” and thus generally sets a price that is higher than the price it would
optimally set in response to a temporary shock, i.e. P′t > P
∗
t . For positive
permanent demand shocks this implies that the pricing reaction of the firm is
always stronger than for positive temporary demand shocks for both, small
and large shocks19. This can be seen in the left panel of Figure 1.3, as the
dashed line is always on or above the solid line. By contrast, for negative
permanent demand shocks the firm adjust its price downward to a consider-
ably lower extent than for negative temporary shocks, as shown in the right
panel of Figure 1.3, where the dashed line is always on or below the solid
line.
As a consequence, price sluggishness is considerably less pronounced for
positive than for negative permanent demand shocks. The asymmetry of the
price reaction to positive and negative shocks therefore reverses, when mov-
ing from temporary to permanent shocks. While this result may seem sur-
prising at first glance, it is straightforward intuitively: As noted, for tempo-
rary shocks, consumers abstract from updating their reference price. There-
fore, the firm does not risk to suffer from a downward adjustment of the con-
sumers’ reference price, when encountering a temporary drop in demand
with a price reduction. On the other hand, for positive temporary shocks,
the firm cannot generate permanent increases in demand due to upward-
adjustments of the reference price. Since consumers react more sensitive to
price increases relative to price decreases, the price and quantity reactions are
smaller for positive temporary shocks compared to negative ones. By con-
trast, for permanent demand shocks, the firm exploits the positive “reference-
price updating effect” which follows from price increases in response to pos-
itive shocks, whereas it tries to avoid the negative “reference-price updating
effect” which follows from price decrease in response to negative shocks.20
19Our numerical analysis indicates, however, that the positive reference-price updating
effect is never strong enough to invalidate the general result that the pricing reaction of the
firm facing loss averse consumers is more sluggish compared to the standard firm.
20Since the firm avoids price reductions, which lead to downward-adjustments in the
reference price, but conducts price reductions, which do not influence the reference price,
loss aversion offers a simple rationale for the firm’s practice of “sales”(see e.g. Eichenbaum
et al., 2011).
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Figure 1.4: Sensitivity with respect to the loss aversion parameter.
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1.4.2 Sensitivities
Figure 2.5 shows the shock-arc elasticities of the price for the following values
of the loss aversion ratio: κ ∈ (1.6; 2; 4), where our base case is κ = 2. A loss
aversion ratio as low as approximately κ = 1.6 was estimated by Kalwani
et al. (1990), Hardie et al. (1993), and Kalyanaram and Little (1994), whereas
the higher value was estimated by Raman and Bass (2002). All estimates are
based on a wide variety of frequently used non-durable supermarket prod-
ucts.
Figure 2.5 shows that the higher the loss aversion ratio, ceteris paribus,
the more sluggish is price adjustment in response to demand shocks, both
upwards and downwards. The shock-arc elasticity curves for higher param-
eter values always lie below the curves from lower parameter values. This
result is independent of the persistence of the shock. The critical shocks, pos-
itive and negative, increase in the degree of loss aversion and thereby widen
the marginal revenue discontinuity. This implies that for both temporary de-
mand shocks (left panel) and permanent demand shocks (right panel), the
range of full price rigidity increases as consumers become more loss averse.
The right panel of Figure 2.5 shows that the firms incentive to avoid per-
manent price cuts increases substantially themore loss averse consumers are.
The intuition for this result is straightforward: The higher the price elasticity
of demand in the loss domain, the stronger is the resulting decrease of de-
mand due to a downward adjustment of the reference price. Consequently,
period t + 1 profits decrease. Therefore, the firm’s incentive to deviate up-
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wards in response to permanent negative demand shocks increases in the
degree of loss aversion. By contrast, for permanent positive demand shocks
the firm’s incentive to deviate upwards decreases. Because the reference-
price-updating effect is stronger, the firm does not necessitate to deviate by
as much in order to generate the profit maximizing quantity in period t+ 1.
These responses to permanent positive and negative demand shocks imply
that the degree of downward-sluggishness decreases in the degree of loss
aversion. This is also apparent from the right panel of Figure 2.5, where
the degree of downward sluggishness is measured by the vertical difference
between the shock-arc elasticity curves for positive demand shocks and for
negative demand shocks.
Our sensitivity analysis confirms that over the range of reasonable param-
eter values for the loss aversion parameter, our theory implies that - in line
with the empirical evidence - prices are more sluggish upwards than down-
wards in response to temporary demand shocks, while they are more slug-
gish downwards than upwards in response to permanent demand shocks.
1.5 Conclusion
In contrast to the standard time-dependent and state-dependent models of
price sluggishness, our theory of price adjustment is able to account for asym-
metric price and quantity responses to positive and negative temporary and
permanent shocks of equal magnitude. In contrast to the New Keynesian
literature, our explanation of price adjustment is thoroughly microfounded,
without recourse to ad hoc assumptions concerning the frequency of price
changes or physical costs of price adjustments.
There are many avenues of future research. Consideration of heteroge-
neous firms andmulti-product firms will enable this model to generate asyn-
chronous price changes, as well as the simultaneous occurrence of large and
small price changes, and heterogeneous frequency of price changes across
products. Extending the model to a stochastic environment will generate
testable implications concerning the variability of individual prices. Further-
more, our model needs to be incorporated into a general equilibrium setting
to validate the predictions of our theory.
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Chapter 2
Path-Dependent Wage
Responsiveness∗
Abstract
We present a theory of nominal wage adjustment based on worker loss
aversion, along the lines of prospect theory. Wage changes are evaluated
relative to an endogenous reference wage, which depends on the workers’
rational wage expectations from the recent past. By implication, firms face an
upward-sloping labor supply curve that is convexly kinked at the workers’
reference wage. Firms adjust wages flexibly in response to variations in labor
demand, incorporating the endogenous response of the reference wage. The
resulting theory of wage adjustment is starkly at variance with past theories.
In line with the empirical evidence, we find that (1) wages are completely
rigid in response to small labor demand shocks, (2) wages are downward
rigid but upward flexible for medium-sized labor demand shocks, and (3)
wages are relatively downward sluggish for large shocks.
Keywords: Downward wage sluggishness, Loss aversion, Endogenous refe-
rence points.
JEL-Codes: D03, D21, E24.
∗This chapter is based on my joint paper with Steffen Ahrens and Dennis
J. Snower entitled Path-Dependent Wage Responsiveness, Kiel Working Paper No.
1977, 2014 (updated in November 2015).
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2.1 Introduction
This paper presents a theory of nominal wage adjustment based on worker
loss aversion, along the lines of prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky,
1979). Workers evaluate nominal wage changes relative to an endogenous
reference wage, which depends on their rational wage expectations from the
recent past. Firms anticipate adjustments of the reference wage when they
make their wage setting decisions. The theory has distinctive implications
which are starkly at variance with major existing theories of nominal wage
adjustment but consonant with the empirical evidence. In particular, the the-
ory implies that (1) for small labor demand shocks, nominal wages are fully
rigid, (2) for medium-sized shocks there is upward nominal wage adjust-
ment for positive shocks, but complete downward nominal wage rigidity for
negative shocks and (3) for large shocks, nominal wages decline less strongly
to negative shocks than they increase to equiproportionate positive shocks.
In short, our theory can explain the empirically well documented occurrence
of nominal wage rigidity in the presence of small labor demand variations,
downward nominal wage rigidity but upward nominal wage adjustment
to intermediate labor demand variations, and relative downward nominal
wage sluggishness in the presence of large shocks. While current theories
of nominal wage adjustment fail to account for all three of these pieces of
empirical evidence, this paper offers a theoretical rationale.
The basic idea underlying our theory is simple. In the spirit of prospect
theory, the workers’ utility losses from nominal wage decreases are weighted
more heavily than the utility gains from nominal wage increases of equal
magnitude. Consequently, employment responses are more elastic to nom-
inal wage decreases than to nominal wage increases. The result is a kinked
labor supply curve, for which the kink depends on the workers’ nominal ref-
erence wage. The kink of the labor supply curve implies that nominal wages
are rigid in response to sufficiently small labor demand shocks, but nominal
wages adjust asymmetrically to larger shocks. While it is well-known that
wage loss aversion leads to kinked labor supply curves (e.g. Bhaskar, 1990),
our contribution lies in combining nominal wage loss aversion with endoge-
nous reference wage dynamics and in investigating the implications of these
dynamics for the firm’s wage and employment decisions. In the spirit of
Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006), wemodel the reference wage as the workers’ ratio-
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nal wage expectations from the recent past, which are adjusted through time.
The reference wage implicitly determines workers’ endogenous income tar-
get. An increase in the reference wage raises their implicit income target,
whereas a decrease in the expected nominal wage lowers it. Workers adjust
their labor supply accordingly. Consequently, there is a positive relationship
between the workers’ reference wage and their labor supply. Therefore, a la-
bor demand shock not only produces a change in employment following the
firm’s immediate wage setting decision, but also an adjustment in the work-
ers’ future reference wage. Firms foresee that their wage setting decision has
an effect on the workers’ future reference wage and thereby their future la-
bor supply. A rise in the reference wage raises the firms’ long-run profits
(since the reference wage is located at the kink of the labor supply curve),
whereas a fall in the reference wage lowers long-run profits. On this account,
medium-sized to large positive labor demand shocks lead to nominal wage
increases, while medium-sized to large negative labor demand shocks may
lead to relatively little if any downward nominal wage adjustment.1
From amethodological point of view, this paper is closely related toAhrens
et al. (2014) which considers how consumer loss aversion with endogenous
reference price dynamics affects firms’ price setting decision.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the
relevant literature. Section 2.3 presents our general model setup. In section
2.4 we analyze the effects of various demand shocks on nominal wages, both
numerically and analytically, and check our results for robustness. Section
2.5 concludes.
1Our theory may help shed light on asymmetric effects of monetary policy, though such
implications lie beyond the scope of this paper. First it is relevant to the literature on short-
run monetary policy, which has asymmetric effects under downward nominal wage rigidity
(e.g. McDonald and Sibly, 2001; Carlsson andWestermark, 2008; Fahr and Smets, 2010). Sec-
ond, while symmetric nominal rigidities give rise to a long-run Phillips curve which is vir-
tually vertical (e.g. Goodfriend and King, 1997; Khan et al., 2003), downward nominal wage
rigidity leads to a significantly non-vertical long-run Phillips curve, thereby generating sub-
stantial long-run real effects of monetary policy on output and employment for negative
shocks, as shown by Kim and Ruge-Murcia (2009, 2011), Fagan and Messina (2009), Fahr
and Smets (2010), Benigno and Ricci (2011) and Abo-Zaid (2013). In all of these latter con-
tributions, downward nominal wage rigidity is introduced in an ad-hoc way, using a linex
function as proposed by Varian (Varian). The only exception to this is Benigno and Ricci
(2011), who use a case sensitive approach. Consequently, these models exhibit permanent
downward nominal wage rigidity, independent of the size and the sign of the shock. How-
ever, since the degree of downward nominal wage rigidity varies with the size of the shock,
the short- and long-run Phillips curves are state-dependent, a feature not considered in the
studies above.
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2.2 Relation to the Literature
In this section, we review the empirical evidence suggesting that nominal
wages are (imperfectly) downward rigid, while they are upward flexible.
In particular, ample microeconomic evidence points towards three impor-
tant stylized facts, namely that (i) nominal wage rigidity is common in the
presence of minor labor market shocks, (ii) under mid-range shocks (such as
those in standard business cycle fluctuations), downward-wage rigidity and
upward wage adjustment are common, (iii) nominal wage cuts do take place
in severe downturns.
This evidence implies that the distribution of nominal wage changes spikes
at zero and contains much fewer observations below zero than above. Such
a distribution of nominal wage changes is documented for a wide variety of
industrialized countries. For the United States, McLaughlin (1994), Card and
Hyslop (1997), Kahn (1997), and Altonji and Devereux (1999) derive such ev-
idence from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, while Akerlof et al. (1996),
Lebow et al. (2003), Gottschalk (2005), and Dickens et al. (2007) find this dis-
tribution based on employer reports, social security files, and several dif-
ferent household surveys. Based on national wage and income surveys as
well as on employer reports, Smith (2000), Agell and Lundborg (2003), Nick-
ell and Quintini (2003), Fehr and Goette (2005), Bauer et al. (2007), Dickens
et al. (2007), Babecký et al. (2010), Böckerman et al. (2010), and Sigurdsson
and Sigurdardottir (2011) provide this evidence for a large sample of Euro-
pean economies, while Kimura and Ueda (2001), Cobb and Opazo (2008),
and Iregui et al. (2009) find this for Japan, Chile, and Colombia, respectively.
While all these studies find that nominal wage cuts are rare, they do hap-
pen and commonly take place in times of severe financial distress, such
as long lasting and deep recessions or any other sort of immanent risk of
bankruptcy for a firm (Kahneman et al., 1986; Bewley, 1995, 1999; Akerlof
et al., 1996; Campbell and Kamlani, 1997; Kimura and Ueda, 2001; Fehr and
Goette, 2005; Böckerman et al., 2010). Moreover, there is empirical evidence
that extremely large demand shocks induce responses of hours and hourly
wages, both for positive and negative shocks.
Furthermore, there is much macroeconomic empirical evidence pointing
towards relative downward nominal wage rigidity. Kandil (1995) shows for
a sample of 19 industrialized countries that in response to permanent mon-
40
etary policy shocks nominal wages generally respond stronger to positive
shocks than to negative shocks of equal magnitude. Similar evidence in re-
sponse to permanent aggregate demand shocks is provided by Kandil (2006)
for United States industries and Kandil (2010) for a large variety of industri-
alized countries.2
There is a variety of wage adjustment theories accounting for downward
nominal wage rigidity, the most prominent being contract theory (Fischer,
1977; Taylor, 1979), implicit contract theory (Baily, 1974; Azariadis, 1975; Gor-
don, 1976; Stiglitz, 1986), efficiency wage theory (Weiss, 1980; Akerlof, 1982;
Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984; Weiss, 1990), the fair wage hypothesis (Akerlof
and Yellen, 1990), and the insider-outsider theory (Lindbeck and Snower,
1988). These theories aim at explaining, why firms avoid nominal wage cuts
or, in the case of the (implicit) contract theory, why nominal wages are slug-
gish in general. However, none of these theories explain all three of the em-
pirical regularities on nominal wage adjustment as outlined above.
In this paper we offer a new theory of downward nominal wage rigidity
resting on worker loss aversion in the wage dimension, endogenous refer-
ence wage dynamics, and the implications of these dynamics for the firm’s
decision making. The resulting theory provides an account of asymmetric
nominal wage rigidity in line with the empirical evidence cited above. Al-
though, there is no hard evidence for a direct link of worker loss aversion
and downward nominal wage rigidity, there is ample indicative evidence
for the existence of such a link. Dunn (1996) presents survey evidence from
US labor markets and finds that the behavior of labor supply is consistent
with the notion of loss averse workers. Similar evidence is also presented by
Goette et al. (2004) and Fehr and Goette (2007).
Furthermore, there is a large literature that documents that relative pay
matters for subjective well-being (Clark and Oswald, 1996). Workers evalu-
2In addition to the asymmetric wage reaction in response to the permanent demand
shock, Kandil (1995, 2006, 2010) finds an asymmetric reaction of output. Output responds
much stronger to permanent negative demand shocks than to positive ones, a feature which
is implied by standard theories of downward nominal rigidities and, given standard pro-
duction technologies, also predicted by our model. This asymmetry in output is further
documented by a large empirical literature. While DeLong and Summers (1988) DeLong
and Summers (1988), Cover (1992), Kandil (2001), Ravn and Sola (2004) provide evidence
for the United States, Karras (1996), Lenz (1997), Kandil (1999), and Karras and Stokes (1999)
provide evidence for a wide variety of industrialized countries. Finally, evidence for de-
veloping countries is given by Kandil (1998), Tan et al. (2010), and Mehrara and Karsalari
(2011).
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ate their wages relative to a reference point, e.g. in the form of an implicit
wage norm (Jaques, 1956, 1961), past earnings (Clark, 1999; Grund and Sli-
wka, 2007; Kawaguchi and Ohtake, 2007), or the earnings of others (Clark
and Oswald, 1996; Clark et al., 2008). Falling behind reference points lowers
life satisfaction and gives rise to negative morale effects. Supportive evidence
for such morale effects is provided by, e.g. Kube et al. (2013) who docu-
ment in a field experiment that there is a highly asymmetric reaction of work
morale to positive and negative deviations from a reference wage. Similar
evidence is provided by a field experiment by Chemin and Kurmann (2014).
Survey evidence for the United States and various European economies sug-
gests that amongst the most important factors for why firms do not adjust
wages downward is the risk of negative effect to workers’ morale (Camp-
bell and Kamlani, 1997; Du Caju et al., 2015). However, Chen and Horton
(2015) show that the effect on work morale vanishes if the wage cut is justi-
fied by reasonable arguments such as severe financial stress of the firm. Fur-
thermore, Koch (2015) shows in an laboratory experiment that wage cuts in
recessions are stronger in the absence of reference wages. If reference wages
exist, wage cuts are smaller by approximately half the amount.
In our model, loss-averse workers evaluate wages relative to a reference
wage. Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006, 2007, 2009) andHeidhues andKo˝szegi (2005,
2008, 2014) argue that reference points are determined by agents’ rational ex-
pectations about outcomes from the recent past. There is much empirical
evidence suggesting that reference points are determined by expectations, in
concrete situations such as in police performance after final offer arbitration
(Mas, 2006), in the United States TV show “Deal or no Deal” (Post et al., 2008),
with respect to domestic violence (Card andDahl, 2011) , in cab drivers’ labor
supply decisions (Crawford and Meng, 2011), in the effort choices of profes-
sional golf players (Pope and Schweitzer, 2011), or in the aggressiveness of
professional soccer players (Bartling et al., forthcoming). In the context of
laboratory experiments, Knetsch and Wong (2009) and Marzilli Ericson and
Fuster (2011) find supporting evidence from exchange experiments, Abeler
et al. (2011) and Gill and Prowse (2012) from effort provision experiments,
Banerji and Gupta (2014) from an auction experiment, and Karle et al. (2015)
from a consumption choice experiment. Endogenizing workers’ reference
wages in this way allows our model to capture that current nominal wage
changes influence the workers’ future reference wage and thereby affect la-
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bor supply. That reference wages influence reservation wages via this effect
is supported by experimental evidence of Falk et al. (2006) who introduce a
minimumwage as reference point and show that this introduction leads to an
increase in the subjects’ reservation wage, whereas the removal of that min-
imum wage, only leads to a marginal reduction in reservation wage. These
pieces of evidence are consonant with the assumptions underlying our anal-
ysis. Our analysis works out the implications of these assumptions for state-
dependent nominal wage sluggishness in the form of asymmetric nominal
wage adjustment for positive and negative labor demand shocks.
While we are not of course the first to explain downward nominal wage
rigidity through workers’ loss aversion with respect to wages, our innova-
tion lies in accounting for all three of the empirical regularities above through
loss aversion. McDonald and Sibly (2001) set up an insider-outsider model
with wage bargaining, where workers are loss averse with respect to real
wages and where the reference wage equals last period’s wage, i.e. the status
quo, as suggested by Kahneman et al. (1991). They find that wages are rigid
with respect to the reference wage, giving rise to real effects of monetary
policy for expansionary monetary shocks. An analogous result is derived
by Bhaskar (1990) in a model of union bargaining, where workers are loss
averse with respect to their own wages relative to wages paid to members of
other unions. Finally, Eliaz and Spiegler (2014) analyze loss averse workers
in a restricted search and matching model. They follow Ko˝szegi and Rabin
(2006) and assume that reference points are determined by rational expecta-
tions from the recent past. Eliaz and Spiegler (2014) find that in response to
productivity shocks, wages of newly hired workers are (imperfectly) flexi-
ble, whereas they are downward rigid for existing workers. As noted, none
of these papers can explain all three pieces of evidence outlined above.
2.3 Model
We incorporate reference-dependent preferences and loss aversion into an
otherwise standard model of monopsony on the labor market. Workers are
loss averse with respect to nominal wages. They evaluate nominal wages rel-
ative to their reference wage, which depends on their lagged rational wage
expectations from the recent past, i.e. workers are backward-looking. For
simplicity, we abstract from saving, implying that workers become single-
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period optimizers. Firms are monopsonists and can set their wages freely
in each period to maximize their total expected discounted profits. Firms’
wage setting decision is forward-looking, taking into account their influence
on the workers’ future reference wage. Thus, reference dependence in our
model is obviously an intertemporal phenomenon, linking the decisions in
one period to the decisions in the next. To analyse the firms’ wage setting
decision in response to permanent labor demand shocks in such an intertem-
poral context we consider a dynamic two-period analysis, for algebraic sim-
plicity. (A multi-period analysis with longer time horizons would not affect
our qualitative conclusions.)
2.3.1 Labor Supply Curve of the Loss Averse Worker
We assume that workers are loss averse with respect to nominal wage
changes, i.e. the perceived utility losses from nominal wage decreases rel-
ative to the reference wage are weighted more heavily than the perceived
utility gains from nominal wage increases of equal magnitude. This gives
rise to a labor supply curve which is convexly kinked at the reference wage.
In what follows, we assume that this labor supply curve is upward sloping,
since the substitution effect of a nominal wage change dominates the income
effect.3 Consequently the employment increase associated with a nominal
wage increase is small relative to the employment decrease associated with a
wage decrease of equal magnitude.
The worker’s preferences in period t are represented by the following util-
ity function4
Ut(ct, nt) = Uct (ct)− θi
n
ϑi
t
ϑi
, (2.1)
where ct is consumption in period t, θi is a shifting parameter that ensures
continuity of the worker’s preferences at the nominal reference wage5 Wrt
3As long as labor is less responsive to nominal wage increases (relative to the reference
wage) than to nominal wage decreases, it can be shown that our model can explain the above
outlined three empirical regularities on nominal wage adjustment, irrespective of the sign of
the slope of the labor supply curve.
4In what follows, we normalize the worker’s marginal utility of consumption δU
c
t
δct
equal
to 1.
5Therefore, it must hold that θg = (Wr)
1−
λl
λg θ
λl
λg
l .
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and nt is hours worked in period t.6 The parameter ϑi is an indicator function
of the form
ϑi =
{
ϑg forWt >Wrt , i.e. gain domain
ϑl forWt <Wrt , i.e. loss domain
, (2.2)
which describes the degree of the worker’s loss aversion and where Wt and
Wrt are the workers current nominal wage and reference wage, respectively.
For loss averse workers ϑg > ϑl , which implies that the worker’s disutility
of labor Unt (nt) =
n
ϑi
t
ϑi
is steeper, i.e. the marginal disutility of labor is higher
in the gain domain than in the loss domain. Therefore, the workers willing-
ness to adjust hours is lower when the nominal wage is above the worker’s
reference wage thanwhen it is below. Since labor income is assumed to be the
only means to finance nominal consumption, the household’s budget con-
straint is Ptct = Wtnt. Without loss of generality, we normalize the price Pt to
unity so that real and nominal wages are the same. Maximization of the util-
ity function (2.1) subject to the budget constraint yields the following kinked
labor supply function
nt =

(
Wt
θg
)λg
forWt >Wrt , i.e. gain domain(
Wt
θl
)λl
forWt < Wrt , i.e. loss domain
, (2.3)
where λi = 1ϑi−1 denotes the Frisch elasticity of labor supply. Loss aversion
with respect to nominal wage changes implies that λg < λl , i.e. the worker
reacts stronger to wage decreases relative to the reference wage (by reduc-
ing employment) than to wage increases relative to the reference wage (by
increasing employment).7
The worker’s nominal reference wage Wrt is formed at the beginning of
each period. In the spirit of Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006), we assume that the
worker’s nominal reference wage depends on her rational nominal wage
6Throughout the model, capital letters denote nominal variables, while small letters de-
note real variables.
7While this point is crucial for the predictions of our theory, it is worth pointing out
that these results hold irrespective of the sign of the slope of the labor supply curve above
the kink as long as the ratio of the absolute slopes above and below the kink remains un-
changed (i.e. the labor supply curve is steeper above than below the kink). Thus, our theory
does cover the evidence that the substitution effect always outweighs the income effect (up-
ward sloping labor supply curve) as well as the evidence of, e.g., Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006)
and others according to which we have a backward bending labor supply curve above the
reference wage.
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expectation from the recent past. Shocks materialize unexpectedly in the
course of the period and therefore do not enter It, the information set avail-
able to the worker at the beginning of the period. In short, the worker ob-
serves the shock with a one-period lag. Thus, the worker’s nominal refer-
ence wage is defined asWrt = Et−1 [Wt | It−1]. Changes in the reference wage
Wrt change the position of the kink of the worker’s labor supply curve and
also shift the labor supply curve as a whole. We follow Ko˝szegi and Rabin
(2006) and assume that the worker’s expected nominal wage implicitly de-
termines the worker’s endogenous income target.8 Thus, an increase in the
expected nominal wage raises her implicit income target, whereas a decrease
in the expected nominal wage lowers it. If, at the beginning at the period, the
worker anticipates a higher (lower) nominal wage for the following period,
i.e. her reference wage increases (decreases), she will supply relatively more
(less) labor in order to reach her new higher (lower) implicit income target.
From this, it follows that the worker’s labor supply curve shifts outwards
(inwards) in response to an upward (downward) adjustment of the worker’s
reference wage.
The kink, lying at the intersection of the two labor supply curves
nt(Wt, λg, θg) and nt(Wt, λl, θl), is given by the wage-labor combination
(Ŵt, n̂t) =
(
Wrt ,
(
θg
θl
) 1
1
λl
− 1
λg
)
, (2.4)
where “̂” denotes the value of a variable at the kink.
2.3.2 The Firm’s optimization problem
The firm maximizes its expected discounted profits
ΠTotalt = Πt + βΠt+1 (2.5)
where Πt = yt −Wtnt are period t profits and β is the discount factor. The
firm takes into account its production function yt(nt), the workers’ kinked
labor supply function nt =
(
Wt
θi
)λi
, and the influence of its wage decision on
8If the labor demand curve is inelastic and the firm faces costs of labor adjustment (a
realistic scenario, certainly for the short run), so that the profit-maximizing employment can
take place in the inelastic portion of the labor demand curve, then increases in the reference
wage translate one-to-one into increases in the reference income.
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the workers’ future labor supply via changes in the workers’ reference wage.
The resulting first order condition of the firm’s optimization problem reads
as
∂ΠTotalt
∂Wt
=
[
∂yt(nt)
∂nt(Wt)
∂nt(Wt)
∂Wt
− nt(Wt)−Wt
∂nt(Wt)
∂Wt
]
+ β
[
∂Πt+1
∂Wrt+1
∂Wrt+1
∂Wt
]
= 0,
(2.6)
which is equivalent to
∂yt(nt)
∂nt︸ ︷︷ ︸
mplt
−
(
Wt(nt) +
∂Wt
∂nt
nt
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
mclt
= −β
∂Πt+1
∂Wrt+1
∂Wrt+1
∂Wt
∂Wt
∂nt
. (2.7)
The term on the left hand side is the current period marginal product of labor
mplt minus the current period marginal cost of labor mclt. The term on the
right hand side measures the influence of the wage setting decision in period
t on the workers’ next period reference wage and thereby the firm’s future
profits. For the partial derivatives, it holds that
∂Wrt+1
∂Wt
≥ 0 and ∂Wt∂nt > 0.
Thus, for ∂Πt+1∂Wrt+1
> 0, the reference-wage-updating effect drives a negative
wedge between the marginal product of labor and the marginal cost of labor,
i.e. mplt ≤ mclt. Note that in the absence of reference-wage-updating the
standard optimality condition of a firm holds, i.e. mplt = mclt. Only if the
firm’s wage setting decision has an influence on the future reference wage
the firm faces a tradeoff between current period optimality (determined by
the left hand side of equation (2.7)) and future ramifications of the current
decision (determined by the right hand side of equation (2.7)).
In what follows we assume that the firm’s production function is given by
yt(nt) = µnαt where µ > 0 and 0 < α < 1. The firm’s current period labor
demand function, given by its marginal product of labor (mpl), is downward
sloping: lDt = mplt = µαn
(α−1)
t . Since the labor supply function of the loss
averse worker is kinked at the reference wage Wr, the firm’s real marginal
cost of labor is discontinuous at the kink:
mclit(n̂t, λi, θi) =
(
1+
1
λi
)
θin̂t
1
λi for i = g, l. (2.8)
The interval
[
mcllt, mcl
g
t
]
we call “marginal cost discontinuity”.9
9Note that mclgt
(
n̂t, λg, θg
)
> mcllt (n̂t, λl , θl). See also Figure 2.1.
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Figure 2.1: Initial problem of the monopsonistic firm.
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We assume that in the initial steady state, the exogenously given reference
wage isWrss. Furthermore, in the steady state the firm’s labor demand curve
(mpl) intersects the marginal cost discontinuity. To fix ideas, we assume that
initially the labor supply curve crosses the midpoint of the discontinuity in
the marginal cost curve10, as depicted in Figure 2.1. This assumption per-
mits us to derive the symmetry characteristics of wage and employment re-
sponses to positive and negative labor demand shocks. It follows that the
firm’s optimal wage in the initial steady stateW∗ss is equal toW
r
ss.
11
2.3.3 Demand Shocks
For simplicity, we analyse the firm’s wage setting reaction in response to per-
manent labor demand shocks in a two-period context. These labor demand
shocks, represented by εt, are unexpected and enter the labor demand func-
tion multiplicatively:
lDt = µαn
(α−1)
t εt. (2.9)
10This implies that the slope parameter of the firm’s labor demand function has to fulfill
µ =
mclss(n̂ss,λg,θg)+mclss(n̂ss,λl ,θl)
2αn̂ss
(α−1) , evaluated at the initial steady state.
11The proof is straightforward: Let ν be an arbitrarily small number. Then for wages
equal to Wrss + ν the firm faces a situation in which marginal cost is higher than marginal
revenue product and decreasing the wage would raise the firm’s profit, while for wages
equal to Wrss − ν the firm faces a situation in which marginal cost is lower than marginal
revenue product and increasing the wage would raise the firm’s profit. ThusW∗ss = W
r
ss has
to be the profit maximizing wage in the initial steady state.
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We consider the effects of a shock that hits the economy in period t. We
define a “small” shock as one that leaves the labor demand curve passing
through themarginal cost discontinuity, and a “large” shock as one that shifts
the labor demand curve sufficiently so that it no longer passes through the
marginal cost discontinuity.
The maximum size of a small shock for the labor demand function (2.9) is
εt (λi, θi) =
(
1+ 1λi
)
θi
µα
n̂ss
1
λi
−(α−1)
, (2.10)
i.e. εt (λi, θi) is the shock size for which the shifted labor demand curve lies
exactly on the upper
(
for ε
(
λg, θg
))
or lower (for ε (λl , θl)) boundaries of the
marginal cost discontinuity. In the analysis that follows, we will distinguish
between small and large permanent labor demand shocks. We simulate our
model numerically in order to quantitatively assess the wage setting reaction
of the firm to small and large labor demand shocks.
2.3.4 Calibration
We calibrate the model for a quarterly frequency in accordance with standard
values in the literature. We assume an annual interest rate of 4 percent, which
yields a discount factor β = 0.99. Loss aversion is measured by the relative
slopes of the demand curves in the gain and loss domain, i.e. κ = λlλg . The
empirical literature finds that the loss aversion ratio is commonly around
2 (e.g. Bleichrodt et al., 2001; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992; Pennings and
Smidts, 2003; Booij and van de Kuilen, 2009). Therefore, we set κ = 2. Fol-
lowing Galí (2008), we set α = 2/3. The Frisch elasticity of labor supply is
set to λg = 1.5, which ensures that λg and λl are well between the estimates
of Prescott (2004), Chetty et al. (2011), and Fiorito and Zanella (2012), which
range from 1.1 to 3.12 The base calibration is summarized in Table 2.1.
12This calibration takes a macro point of view, as micro estimates of the Frisch labor sup-
ply elasticity are usually much lower, i.e. between 0 and 1 with a strong tendency towards
zero rather than one (for a survey see Fiorito and Zanella (2012)). In section 2.4.2, we show
that the results hold true also for a micro approach to our calibration.
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Table 2.1: Base calibration.
Parameter Symbol Value
Discount rate β 0.99
Frisch elasticity of labor supply (gain domain) λg 1.5
Frisch elasticity of labor supply (loss domain) λl 3
Loss aversion κ 2
Output elasticity of labor α 2/3
Shifting parameter θl 1/2
Figure 2.2: Shock-arc elasticities to positive and negative demand shocks.
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2.4 Results
Figure 2.2 presents the shock-arc elasticities of the wage
(
η˜ε,W =
%∆W
%∆ε
)
in
the period of the shock t for negative and positive labor demand shocks of
the two-period model, given the base calibration given in Table 2.1. On the
vertical axis we show the shock-arc elasticities of wage, which measure the
relative strength of the wage reaction in response to negative and positive
labor demand shocks. The horizontal axis measures the shock, where the
shock size increases from the left to the right. The vertical, dotted lines de-
note the thresholds between the small and the large labor demand shocks as
defined in section 2.3.3.
According to our numerical analysis the firm’s wage reaction in response
to permanent labor demand shocks depends crucially on the size and the
sign of the shock. Figure 2.2 indicates that wages are completely rigid for
small positive and small negative labor demand shocks (region left of the
dotted lines in both panels of Figure 2.2), while they are relatively downward
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sluggish for larger shocks. Moreover, for a certain range of large shocks,
wages are completely downward rigid but upwards flexible.
2.4.1 Intuition
Small labor demand shocks
As noted, for a sufficiently small demand shock εt (λl , θl) ≤ εst ≤ εt
(
λg, θg
)
the labor demand curve still intersects the marginal cost discontinuity, i.e.
lDt (n̂t) ∈
[
mcllt, mcl
g
t
]
.
Therefore, the prevailing nominal steady state wage, which is equal to
the worker’s current reference wage, remains the firm’s profit-maximizing
wage,13 i.e. W∗t = W
∗
ss = W
r
ss, and we have complete wage rigidity. With rigid
wages, labor supply is unaffected by the small labor demand shock. Accord-
ingly, the profit-maximizing amount of labor employed remains unchanged
as well: ∆n∗t = 0. This holds true irrespective of the sign of the small labor de-
mand shock.
Large labor demand shocks
In contrast to the small labor demand shock, for a large shock, i.e. εlt >
εt
(
λg, θg
)
or εlt < εt (λl, θl), generally both, a nominal wage and a labor reac-
tion are induced.
In our analysis, there are two channels whereby a large permanent labor
demand shock affects nominal wages and employment; a direct demand and
supply effect and an indirect reference-wage-updating effect.
The direct demand and supply effect: For the analysis of nominal wage
adjustment in response to large variations in labor demand it proves useful
to suppose, for the moment, that the worker’s reference wage is exogenously
fixed and does not change. This implies that
∂Wrt+1
∂Wt
= 0 and therefore the
firm’s profit maximization problem becomes a one-period problem. Accord-
ing to the optimality condition (2.7), the new profit-maximizing wage of the
firm is determined by the standard condition according to which mplt =
mclt. The new profit maximizing wage of the firm is
13Compare the proof from footnote 11.
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W∗t = θi
 µαεlt(
1+ 1λi
)
θi
 1λi(1−α)+1 , (2.11)
while its corresponding profit-maximizing amount of labor is
n∗t =
 µαεlt(
1+ 1λi
)
θi
 1(1−α)+ 1λi , (2.12)
where λi = λg, θi = θg for positive and λi = λl , θi = θl for negative shocks,
respectively.
Whether the new profit maximizing wage and employment reactions are
larger for positive or negative shocks depends on the relative slopes of the
demand and supply functions, which differ for negative and positive shocks
due to loss aversion. For the base calibration and reasonable shock sizes14,
equations (2.11) and (2.12) imply that abstracting from any adjustment in the
workers’ reference wage, nominal wages are relatively downward sluggish (i.e.
less responsive to large negative than to large positive shocks). Intuitively,
the change of quantity in response to a large labor demand shock depends
positively on λi, the Frisch elasticity of labor supply, whereas the change of
the wage in response to a large labor demand shock depends negatively on
λi. Since for the loss averse worker λg < λl , the labor reaction of the firm
facing loss-averse workers is relatively smaller in response to large positive
labor demand shocks than to large negative ones of equal magnitude. This
however implies that wages are relatively less responsive to negative than
to positive large labor demand shocks, since the former move the firm along
the relatively flat portion of the labor supply curve, whereas the latter move
it along the relatively steep portion of the labor supply curve.
The reference-wage-updating effect: Accounting for the adjustment of the
worker’s reference wage in response to large labor demand shocks changes
the wage setting decision of the firm dramatically. Now
∂Wrt+1
∂Wt
6= 0. The new
profit-maximizing wage of the firm is not only determined by the relation
between mplt and mclt, but also by the effect of the wage decision on the
reference wage.
14Refer to Section 2.4.2 for a sensitivity analysis concerning this condition.
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Figure 2.3: Classification of negative labor demand shocks.
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The threshold shocks in this figure are ε˜ = ε˜t (λl , θl) and ε = εt (λl , θl).
As discussed above, a large labor demand shock induces a nominal wage
and a labor reaction in the shock period t. Accordingly the worker’s refer-
ence wage adjusts at the beginning of the following period t + 1, i.e. Wrt+1
= Et [Wt+1 | It] = W
∗
t , which triggers an outward shift of the worker’s labor
supply curve for positive labor demand shocks and an inward shift for neg-
ative labor demand shocks. This phenomenon is the reference-wage-updating
effect. This effect implies that in period t+ 1 the firm’s profit is higher than in
the shock period t for positive permanent shocks, while it is lower for nega-
tive permanent shocks due to the worker’s labor supply reaction in response
to the change of her implicit income target15.
Since the firm anticipates this, the following incentives arise: In response
to a large positive labor demand shock, the firm could raise the nominal
wage above the optimal current period nominal wageW∗t in order to induce
a stronger outward shift of the worker’s labor supply curve in the follow-
ing period. By contrast, in response to a large negative labor demand shock,
the firm could try to dampen or even completely avoid the inward shift of
the worker’s labor supply curve in the next period by lowering the nominal
wage less than otherwise optimal or by not lowering the nominal wage at
all16.
15Intuitively, the firm can employ more labor for the same optimal nominal wageW∗t+1 =
W∗t in the case of a large positive labor demand shock, whereas it must employ less labor in
the case of a large negative labor demand shock.
16Note that setting a nominal wage below W∗t is never an option for the firm since it
negatively affects future profits.
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Whether or not this occurs, generally depends on whether the firm’s gain
from an upward deviation from the optimal nominal wage W∗t in terms of
future profits (due to the relative rise in the reference wage) exceeds the
firm’s loss in terms of present profits (due to not setting the profit max-
imizing wage), i.e. whether Πt(W ′t ) + βΠt+1(W
r
t+1 = W
′
t ) > Πt(W
∗
t ) +
βΠt+1(W
r
t+1 = W
∗
t ) whereW
′
t > W
∗
t . While period tmarginal losses (the left
hand side of equation (2.7)) strictly increase in an upward deviations from
W∗t , the discounted period t + 1 gains due to the reference-wage-updating
effect (the right hand side of equation (2.7)) feature an inverse u-shaped
function in an upward deviations from W∗t . Therefore, the firm exploits the
reference-wage-updating effect as long as the discounted marginal gain is
larger than its period t marginal loss. Hence, the optimal wage W ′t is set,
where marginal gains are equal to marginal losses.17
Figure 2.2 shows that for large negative labor demand shocks there is some
threshold value ε˜t (λl , θl) up to which there is still complete downward nom-
inal wage rigidity. For shocks larger than ε˜t (λl, θl) there is some downward
nominal wage adjustment. More precisely, we find that for εlt < ε˜t (λl, θl),
the firm sets the wage W ′t such that W
∗
ss > W
′
t > W
∗
t , while for ε˜t (λl , θl) <
εlt < εt (λl , θl) the firm does not adjust the wage, i.e. W
′
t = W
∗
ss. Due to these
qualitative differences in the response of wages to large negative demand
shocks, we divide the class of large shocks into two categories: The range
of large shocks which do not induce any downward wage reaction we clas-
sify as “medium-sized” shocks, whereas all other large shocks are considered
“very large” shocks. Figure 2.3 summarizes the full classification of negative
permanent labor demand shocks. These results suggest that the firm’s incen-
tive to dampen the inward shift of the worker’s labor supply curve due to
an adjustment in the worker’s reference wage in the following period is very
strong. The firm apparently always deviates upwards fromW∗t , the optimal
wage given by equation (2.11), and setsW ′t instead.
By contrast, for large positive labor demand shocks εlt > εt
(
λg, θg
)
, the
firm always adjusts the nominal wage upwards (see Figure 2.2). However,
our results also indicate that the firm’s incentive to induce a stronger out-
ward shift of the worker’s labor supply curve declines as the positive shock
17Note that the marginal gain from an upward deviation fromW∗t depends negatively on
the absolute value of the shock, i.e. the effect declines the larger the positive shock, while it
increases the larger the negative shock (the smaller the shock in absolute value).
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Figure 2.4: Classification of positive labor demand shocks.
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The threshold shocks in this figure are ε˜ = ε˜t
(
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.
increases. In particular, our numerical results suggest that the firm does not
always set a wageW ′t that is higher thanW
∗
t for large positive labor demand
shocks. If the shock exceeds a certain threshold, i.e. εlt > ε˜t
(
λg, θg
)
, the firm’s
loss in terms of present profits from not settingW∗t is not compensated by the
gain in terms of future profits. This is due to the effect that the marginal gain
from an upward deviation declines in the absolute size of the shock. Thus
only for medium-sized positive shocks ε˜t
(
λg, θg
)
> εlt > εt
(
λg, θg
)
the firm
set the wageW ′t such thatW
′
t > W
∗
t . Otherwise, for very large shocks, it just
sets W∗t . Figure 2.4 summarizes the full classification of positive permanent
labor demand shocks.
Finally, comparing the left hand panel and the right hand panel from Fig-
ure 2.2, our numerical results also confirm that for large labor demand shocks
nominal wages always adjust stronger upwards than downwards for equipro-
portionate shocks as predicted by our theory.
2.4.2 Sensitivities
Figure 2.5 shows the shock-arc elasticities of the wage for the following val-
ues of the loss aversion parameters: κ ∈ (1.43; 2; 4.8), where our base case
is κ = 2. The lower value was estimated by Schmidt and Traub (2002). The
higher value was estimated by Fishburn and Kochenberger (1979). Interme-
diate values are supported by Bleichrodt et al. (2001), Tversky andKahneman
(1992), Pennings and Smidts (2003), and Booij and van de Kuilen (2009).
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Figure 2.5: Sensitivity with respect to the loss aversion parameter.
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Figure 2.5 shows that the higher the loss aversion parameter, ceteris
paribus, the more sluggish is wage adjustment in response to labor demand
shocks, both upwards and downwards. The shock-arc elasticity curves stem-
ming from higher parameter values always lie below the curves stemming
from lower parameter values. Both critical shocks, positive and negative, in-
crease. This implies that the marginal cost discontinuity widens as the loss
aversion parameter increases, extending the range of full wage rigidity. The
range of medium-sized shocks (i.e. large shocks for which there is upward
flexibility but full downward rigidity) is shifted towards larger shocks, as
the loss aversion parameter increases. Finally, overall wage sluggishness in-
creases, as the positive and negative shock-arc elasticities are generally lower
the higher the loss aversion parameter. It is apparent from the left panel of
Figure 2.5 that the firms’ incentive to avoid wage cuts increases substantially
as the shock-arc elasticities are generally lower for higher loss aversion pa-
rameters compared to lower ones. Intuitively, the higher the Frisch elasticity
of labor supply for the loss domain, the stronger is the permanent loss in
profit due to a decrease in the reference wage. This stems from the fact that,
according to the labor supply function (2.3), the reference-wage-updating ef-
fect increases in loss aversion. For the positive shock it holds that the higher
the loss aversion parameter, the lower is the firm’s incentive to deviate up-
wards. Since the reference-wage-updating effect is stronger, the firm does not
necessitate to deviate by as much in order to produce the profit maximizing
amount of labor in period t+ 1.
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Figure 2.6: Sluggishness from the direct demand and supply effect.
Figure 2.5 shows another interesting fact. Due to the negative reference-
wage-updating effect, the firms’ wage responses are always downward slug-
gish. This implies that the reference-wage-updating effect always dominates
the direct demand and supply effect. Even though for the base calibration
the direct demand and supply effect produces downward sluggishness, the
direction of the direct demand and supply effect depends strongly on the cali-
bration of the model. Figure 2.6 shows a comparison of the relative shock arc
elasticities for positive and negative demand shocks for different combina-
tions of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply for the gain domain (i.e. λg) and
the loss aversion coefficient (i.e. κ) and for three different shock sizes. Black
shaded areas denote relative upward sluggishness (i.e. shock-arc elasticities
of the wage is larger for permanent negative labor demand shocks relative
to positive ones of equal magnitude), while gray shaded areas show relative
downward sluggishness. Areas in white are not considered, as the resulting
parameter value for λl exceeds reasonable values.18 The white dot indicates
our base calibration. As is apparent from Figure 2.6, for larger shocks (mid-
dle and right panel) the direct demand and supply effect generates upward
sluggishness.
From this it follows that in the absence of the reference-wage-updating
effect the shock-arc elasticities of wage in response to a permanent labor de-
mand shock should be higher than their positive shock counterparts over
a large range of the shocks. From the overall reaction (including both, the
18As indicated above, λ takes values between 0.5 and rarely above 4. The cutoff value for
consideration is set to λ¯ = 7.2, which is the highest value considered in Figure 2.5.
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Figure 2.7: Sensitivity with respect to the Frisch elasticity of labor supply.
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direct demand and supply effect and the reference-wage-updating effect) it
is apparent that the negative reference-wage-updating effect dominates the
demand and supply effect over the full range of shocks considered.
Figure 2.7 shows the sensitivity with respect to the following reasonable
values for the Frisch labor supply elasticity: λg ∈ (0.5; 2; 4), where λg = 1.5
is our base case. We contrast our base with a much lower value λg = 0.5
as often estimated in micro studies (for a survey refer to Chetty et al. (2011))
and a much higher value λg = 4, as estimated by Imai and Keane (2004).
From Figure 2.7 it is apparent that the larger the Frisch elasticity of labor
supply, the more sluggish are the responses of wages to positive and nega-
tive demand shocks. The intuition for this result is the same as for the loss
aversion parameter: According to the labor supply equation (2.3), the larger
Frisch elasticity of labor supply, the stronger is the reference-wage-updating
effect. Therefore, the firm’s incentive to avoid the negative reference-wage-
updating effect increases with λg, while the necessity to deviate from W∗0
decreases with λg. Additionally, the qualitative result that wages are rela-
tively downward sluggish carries over over the full range of elasticities con-
sidered. In contrast to the loss aversion parameter, however, the marginal
cost gap closes, ceteris paribus, the larger the Frisch labor supply elasticities.
Both, positive and negative critical shocks decrease and therewith the range
of full wage rigidity decreases.
Our sensitivity analysis confirms that over the wide range of reasonable
parameter values for the Frisch labor supply elasticity and the loss aversion
parameter, our theory implies that (1) for small labor demand shocks, nomi-
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nal wages are fully rigid, (2) for medium-sized shocks there is upward nom-
inal wage adjustment for positive shocks, but complete downward nominal
wage rigidity for negative shocks and (3) for large shocks, nominal wages de-
cline less strongly to negative shocks than they increase to equiproportionate
positive shocks.
2.5 Conclusion
With our theory of wage adjustment under loss aversion we are able to pro-
vide an integrated account of the three important empirical regularities con-
cerning wage adjustments to labor market shocks. In particular, we can ex-
plain wage rigidity in the face of minor labor market shocks, downward
nominal wage rigidity combined with upward wage adjustment in “normal”
times, and wage cuts in deep recessions.
In contrast to the New Keynesian literature, our explanation of wage ad-
justment is thoroughly microfounded, without recourse to ad hoc assump-
tions. As future work, our model needs to be incorporated into a general
equilibrium setting to validate the predictions of our theory.
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Chapter 3
Forecasting with Large Datasets:
Aggregating Before, During or
After the Estimation?∗
Abstract
We study the forecasting performance of three alternative large data forecast-
ing approaches. These three approaches handle the dimensionality problem
evoked by a large dataset by aggregating its informational content, yet on
different levels. We consider different factor models, a large Bayesian vec-
tor autoregression andmodel averaging techniques, where aggregation takes
place before, during and after the estimation of the different forecasting mod-
els, respectively. We use a dataset for Germany that consists of 123 variables
in quarterly frequency and find that overall the large Bayesian VAR and the
Bayesian factor augmented VAR provide the most precise forecasts for a set
of 11 core macroeconomic variables. Both considerably outperform the re-
maining large scale forecasting models in terms of joint forecasting accuracy
as measured by the multivariate MSE. Further, we find that the performance
of these two models is very robust to the exact specification of the forecasting
model.
Keywords: Large Bayesian VAR, Model Averaging, Factor Models, Great
Recession.
JEL-Codes: C53, C55, E31, E32, E37, E47.
∗This chapter is based on my joint paper with Maik H. Wolters entitled
Forecasting with Large Datasets: Aggregating Before, During or After the Estima-
tion?, Kiel Working Paper No. 1925, 2014 (updated in November 2015).
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3.1 Introduction
While forecasters may wish to use as much information as possible to in-
crease the accuracy of their forecasts, the estimation of models with a large
number of different time series causes huge technical difficulties as the num-
ber of parameters to be estimated quickly becomes very large and in-sample
overfitting occurs or estimation becomes even infeasible. To overcome this
curse of dimensionality several large scale time-series methods have been pro-
posed. The three most prominent of these approaches are factor models,
large Bayesian vector autoregressions and model averaging techniques. All
of these three approaches handle the dimensionality problem by aggregating
the informational content of the large dataset, yet the aggregation takes place
on different levels.1
In particular, with factor models (see e.g. Stock and Watson, 2002a,b;
Bernanke and Boivin, 2003; Forni et al., 2000, 2005) the aggregation of the
informational content of a large dataset into a small number of static or dy-
namic factors takes place prior to the estimation of small scale forecasting
models such as e.g. autoregressive distributed lag models, vector autore-
gressions or Bayesian vector autoregressions. These small forecasting models
then include the factor time series rather than all the time series of the large
dataset (see Banerjee, 2013, for an overview of the factor model approach and
a survey on recent papers using factor models for large dataset problems).
Large Bayesian vector autoregressions (De Mol et al., 2008; Ban´bura et al.,
2010), on the other hand, can be estimated with a large number of time series
by applying shrinkage to aggregate the information contained in the large
dataset during the estimation process. The degree of shrinkage thereby in-
creases with the number of times series included in the respective model.
By contrast, when using model averaging techniques (see e.g. Bates and
Granger, 1969; Stock and Watson, 2003; Timmermann, 2006; Wright, 2009;
Faust and Wright, 2009) the aggregation of the informational content of the
large dataset takes place after the estimation of a large number of small scale
forecasting models. Here, the final forecast is computed as a weighted aver-
age over the individual forecasts of all the small scale forecasting models.
1An alternative approach to solving this problem are variable selection methods such as
targeted predictors (Bai and Ng, 2007), Bayesian variable selection (Korobilis, 2013) or the
LASSO approach (Tibshirani, 1996).
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While De Mol et al. (2008) show that there is a theoretical connection be-
tween the factor and the shrinkage approach, it is not clear which method to
aggregate the informational content of a large dataset performs best from an
empirical perspective. In this paper, we therefore systematically study the
performance of all three of these alternative large scale approaches using a
dataset for Germany that consists of 123 variables in quarterly frequency.
Previous literature has so far only focused on evaluating the forecasting
performance of one or two of these large scale approaches relative to several
small benchmarkmodels, to the Federal Reserve’s Greenbook projections (for
US data) or to each other. For example, Bernanke and Boivin (2003) study
the performance of a factor augmented autoregressions and vector autore-
gression relative to the Greenbook forecasts, Faust and Wright (2009) eval-
uate static factor models as well as model averaging models relative to a
number of benchmark models and the Greenbook projections, Ban´bura et al.
(2010) study a large Bayesian vector autoregression and a Bayesian factor
augmented vector autoregression and Berg and Henzel (2013) focus on the
same models, but study euro area instead of US data and additionally evalu-
ate the different models’ density forecasts.2
By contrast, our analysis includes all three large scale approaches outlined
above. It focuses on Germany, the largest economy in the euro area, which
is considerably smaller but also much more open than the US or the euro
area. For Germany, several authors have investigated the forecasting perfor-
mance of factor models estimated on large datasets relative to small bench-
mark models (see e.g. Schumacher and Dreger, 2004; Kholodilin and Siliver-
stovs, 2006; Schumacher, 2007, 2010, 2011). However, so far no comparison
of the forecasting performance of factor models to alternative large scale ap-
proaches has been provided. Moreover, most existing empirical forecasting
applications for Germany focus almost exclusively on forecasting real GDP
(see e.g. Drechsel and Scheufele, 2012a,b) rather than a set of key macroeco-
nomic variables as is the case in this study. To our knowledge, the only two
exceptions to this are Müller-Dröge et al. (2014) and Buchen and Wohlrabe
(2014) who evaluate the forecasts for a larger set of German key macroeco-
2Beyond pure reduced form forecasting models, Wolters (2014) compares the forecasting
accuracy of a large Bayesian vector autoregression to Dynamic Stochastic General Equilib-
rium (DSGE) models and the Fed’s Greenbook projections.
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nomic variables as well. However, both papers have a different methodolog-
ical focus than this paper.
With our comprehensive analysis we provide an assessment of the relative
joint and also univariate forecasting performance of the different large scale
forecasting methods for GDP growth, CPI and PPI inflation, a short- and a
long-term interest rate, the unemployment rate, industrial production, real
wages, consumption, investment and the current account balance. We deem
these 11 variables of special interest to forecasters and policy makers because
they are covered, for example, in the monthly survey of Consensus Economics
among professional forecasters. Moreover, we test whether the forecasts ob-
tained with the different models are unbiased and check whether the relative
performance of the different forecasting models is robust against various al-
ternative model specifications.
Our dataset consists of 123 variables in quarterly frequency covering a
sample period from 1978 until 2013. We include indicators from the fol-
lowing categories: composition of GDP and gross value added by sectors,
prices, labor market, financial market, industry, construction and surveys.
Different variants of the three large scale forecasting models as well as a num-
ber of small benchmark models are estimated using a moving window of 15
years of data, while the forecasts obtained by the different models are eval-
uated from 1994 through 2013. To assess the relative (joint) forecasting per-
formance of the different models we compare (multivariate) mean squared
forecast errors, while we compute Mincer-Zarnowitz regressions (see Min-
cer and Zarnowitz, 1969) to test for forecast bias. All forecasting models are
specified according to various information criteria. As a robustness check we
also specify the models based on their ex post best forecasting performance
and implement forecast pooling over a variety of specifications.
Our results indicate that the large Bayesian vector autoregression and the
Bayesian factor augmented vector autoregression deliver forecasts that are
more precise than those obtained by a univariate autoregressive benchmark
or the remaining large scale forecasting models. This holds for both, mea-
sures for the joint forecasting performance for the set of 11 variables as well
as univariate performance measures for the individual series. We find that
in contrast to the remaining factor approaches and the model averaging ap-
proaches bothmodels can efficiently exploit the correlation structure between
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the series of the large dataset to provide relatively accurate forecasts, even for
longer forecasting horizons.
With respect to the robustness of the relative forecasting performance of
the different models our findings indicate that the forecasting performance of
the large Bayesian vector autoregression and the Bayesian factor augmented
vector autoregression is very robust to the specific model specification, i.e.
the number of lags or factors and the degree of shrinkage. By contrast, the
dynamic factor model outperforms all other forecasting models by far if one
chooses the ex-post optimal specification. However, in the quasi real-time
exercise, where the number of lags and factors is chosen based on informa-
tion criteria, on past forecasting accuracy or where the forecasts are obtained
by pooling over a large set models with different specifications, we find that
this performance is unattainable.
Finally, our results indicate that overall the gains in forecasting accuracy
obtained by the large scale approaches relative to an autoregressive bench-
mark are only modest for most variables considered and are in many cases
statistically insignificant. We also find that using a large amount of data
would not have helped in forecasting the great slump of GermanGDP growth
in 2008 and that a small forecasting model that only includes the ifo business
climate index, which is often cited by professional forecasters as the single
most important predictor for German GDP growth,3 clearly dominates even
the best large scale approaches in terms of short-term GDP growth forecast-
ing performance.
The moderate gains of the large scale approaches can be explained with
the extremely low persistence of some of the time series. Moreover, many
of the time series seem to be characterized by common components which
implies that parsimonious univariate models are often sufficient to capture
the most important information contained in the data. Efficient multivari-
ate modelling therefore becomes a hard task so that improvements of the
large data forecasting methods are rather small (see also Carriero et al., 2011;
Bernardini and Cubadda, 2014).
3The ifo business climate index is based on a monthly survey among about 7000 firms
which report their assessments of the current business situation and their expectations for
the next six months. From these two assessments the overall ifo index is calculated. The out-
of-sample predictive ability of the ifo index for German GDP has been widely studied, see
for example Dreger and Schumacher (2005), Kholodilin and Siliverstovs (2006), Abberger
(2007), Drechsel and Scheufele (2012b) or Henzel and Rast (2013).
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Still, when forecasters are interested in simultaneously predicting a larger
number of variables, large-scale forecasting models have the advantage that
they can be used to coherently forecast many variables at the same time. This
might be an advantage when it comes to the interpretation of forecasts.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In section 3.2 we out-
line the different forecasting models. In section 3.3 we describe the dataset
that we use, while in section 3.4 we describe our forecasting approach. In sec-
tion 3.5 we evaluate the absolute and relative (joint) forecasting performance
of the different models and check for robustness against model misspecifica-
tion. Finally, in section 3.6 we conclude.
3.2 Forecasting Models
In the following, we provide a brief overview of the different forecasting
models.4 Let {yi,t}ni=1 denote the set of variables to be forecast in log-levels
and {xj,t}mj=1 the set of possible predictors in log-levels. Variables expressed
in rates such as the unemployment rate or interest rates are included in
{yi,t}
n
i=1 and {xj,t}
m
j=1 in levels rather than log-levels. The total number of
variables in our dataset is given by n + m = k. We compute annualized
quarter-on-quarter growth rates of all variables, denoted by {∆yi,t}ni=1 and
{∆xj,t}
m
j=1, respectively. To avoid overly complicated notation, variables ex-
pressed in rates are included in levels in the respective ∆ terms as well. Given
the information available at time t, we estimate all forecasting models and
construct forecasts {∆yi,t+h}ni=1 with h being the forecast horizon ranging
from one to eight quarters ahead. While some of the forecasting models di-
rectly yield growth rate forecasts, we obtain log-level forecasts from the other
models and use these to compute implied quarter-on-quarter growth rate
forecasts. For forecasting models that include lags of the dependent variable
the number of lags p included in the estimation of each model is obtained via
the Bayesian information criterion unless otherwise stated.
4For a more detailed description of the different forecasting models we refer the reader
to the working paper version Pirschel and Wolters (2014).
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3.2.1 Large Bayesian VAR (LBVAR)
Consider the following VAR Zt = c+ A1Zt−1 + ...+ ApZt−p + ǫt, where the
vector Zt = (y1,t, ..., yn,t, x1,t, ..., xm,t)′ contains all the k time series in the
dataset. Following Ban´bura et al. (2010) we include the variables in log-
levels rather than growth rates to not lose information that might possibly
be contained in the trends. c is a (kx1) vector of constants, A1, ..., Ap are (kxk)-
dimensional parameter matrices and ǫt is a (kx1) vector of independently
identically distributed white noise error terms with zero mean and covari-
ance matrix Ψ.
We use Bayesian techniques to estimate the large VAR outlined above.
Since the number of variables that we want to include in the estimation is
fairly large (k = 123), we follow Ban´bura et al. (2010) and implement a prior
that shrinks the parameters of the VAR. This allows for the aggregation of the
information contained in the large dataset during the estimation process. The
degree of shrinkage thereby increases with the size of the cross-section, thus
allowing the estimation of a model where the number of parameters exceeds
the number of observations by far.
We implement the Bayesian shrinkage approach by using a version of the
Normal inverse Wishart prior (see e.g. Kadiyala and Karlsson, 1997) that
retains the main principles of the widely used Minnesota prior (Litterman,
1986). According to this prior specification each equation of the VAR is cen-
tered around a random walk with drift or an autoregressive process, respec-
tively. In contrast to Ban´bura et al. (2010), we do not set δi, the prior coef-
ficient means for the first lag of each variable, equal to zero for stationary
variables. Instead, we run a univariate autoregression of order p for each of
the k elements in Zi,t and set δi equal to the sum of the therewith obtained co-
efficient estimates defined as µi = ∑
p
ℓ=1 βℓ if µi < 1. For µi ≥ 1 we set δi = 1.
This approach allows us to capture the different degrees of persistence in the
dataset.
The shrinkage of the VAR coefficients towards the prior is achieved through
the hyperparameter λ which enters the prior variance of each coefficient.
Ban´bura et al. (2010) suggest to set the tightness of the prior, so that the LB-
VAR achieves the same in-sample fit as an unrestricted small VAR without
shrinkage.5 We slightly depart from this approach and set λ such that the LB-
5Of course, this approach is merely an ad-hoc rule of thumb. Alternatively, λ could also
be chosen to maximize the out-of sample forecasting performance over a pre-sample as for
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VAR achieves the same in-sample fit as a small BVAR containing GDP, prices,
the unemployment rate and a short-term interest rate, because the respective
unrestricted VAR seems to be severely overparameterized.
We set the lag length p = 4, however the forecasting performance of the
LBVAR proves to be remarkably robust with respect to the number of lags
included in the estimation (see section 3.5.3). Following Ban´bura et al. (2010)
we implement the prior using dummy variables and augment it to constrain
the sum of coefficients of the VAR (see e.g. Sims and Zha, 1998).
3.2.2 Factor Models (FAAR, FAVAR, BFAVAR, DF)
Assume that ∆X∗i,t, the standardized set of potential predictors for each vari-
able of interest, can be represented by two components which are mutually
orthogonal to each other and unobservable. These are the common com-
ponent χi,t and the idiosyncratic component ξi,t, so that we have ∆X∗i,t =
χi,t + ξi,t.
The basic idea of factor models is that the information contained in the
common component χi,t can be aggregated into a vector of factors Fi,t of di-
mension κ ≤ (k − 1) which are able to explain most of the variance of the
predictor matrix ∆X∗i,t. With these factors the dimension of a large dataset
can thus be reduced prior to the estimation of the forecasting model.
In general the common component relates to the factors as χi,t =
∑
s
l=0 ηlFi,t−l. Depending on the lag structure that is assumed we can distin-
guish twomodel variants: the static factor model with s = 0 and the dynamic
factor model with s > 0.
Static Factor Models (FAAR, FAVAR, BFAVAR)
From the standardized set of predictors ∆X∗i,t we extract the (rx1)-dimensional
vector of factors Fi,t = ( f 1i,t, ..., f
r
i,t)
′ via static principal component analysis.
example in Litterman (1986). Giannone et al. (2012) suggest amore sophisticated hierarchical
approach to specifying λwhich relies onmaximizing the marginal likelihood, i.e. the density
of the data conditional on λ after integrating out the uncertainty about the parameters of the
VAR. However, since we find that the forecasting performance of the large BVAR is very
robust to the exact specification of λ, we do stick to the rule of thumb.
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Following Stock and Watson (2002a) we use these static factors to estimate a
factor augmented direct autoregression (FAAR).6
Moreover, we implement a factor augmented vector autoregression as pro-
posed by Bernanke et al. (2005) which allows for a more dynamic structure.
Following Faust andWright (2009) we include the variable to be predicted in
log-levels and the factors extracted from the set of predictors in the estima-
tion.7
We estimate the factor augmented vector autoregression via ordinary least
squares (FAVAR) aswell as with Bayesian techniques (BFAVAR), however the
FAVAR performs very poorly so we do not report the results for this model.
For the BFAVAR, the prior is set in a manner analogous to the large Bayesian
VAR with the following two exceptions. First, we set the prior coefficient
mean for the first lag of the factors δ = 0 to account for the fact that the factors
have been extracted from the standardized predictor matrix ∆X∗i,t. Second,
we set the hyperparameter λ = 0.2. For the determination of the optimal
number of factors r we use the information criterion ICp2 proposed by Bai
and Ng (2002).
Dynamic Factor Models (DF)
We set up a dynamic factor model in the spirit of Forni et al. (2003, 2005). This
implies extracting the (qx1)-dimensional vector of dynamic factors F˜i,t from
the standardized set of predictors ∆X∗i,t via dynamic principal component
analysis in the frequency domain. Defining F˜∗i,t = (F˜
′
i,t, F˜
′
i,t−1, ..., F˜
′
i,t−s)
′ as a
vector of contemporaneous and lagged factors with dimension r = q(s + 1),
the dynamic factor model can be rewritten as a static factor model χi,t = ηF˜∗i,t.
The factors F˜∗i,t are used to augment a direct autoregression, analogously
to the FAAR outlined above. For the determination of the optimal number
of dynamic factors qwe apply the information criterion proposed by Bai and
Ng (2007).
6According to common practice, we chose the direct version of the autoregressive model
because the iterated model variant would require the specification of a subsidiary model for
the factors Fj,t in order to compute forecasts for horizons h > 1.
7We also estimate a FAVAR that includes a small set of core variables (including the
variable to be predicted) and the factors (see e.g. Bernanke and Boivin, 2003; Ban´bura et al.,
2010). The forecasting performance of this alternative, however, is considerably worse, so
that we do not include this model in the main results.
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3.2.3 Model Averaging (EWA, BMA)
For each of the n variables of interest ∆yi,t we set up (k − 1) direct autore-
gressive distributed lag models ∆yi,t = ρ0 + ρ1∆yi,t−h + ...+ ρp∆yi,t−h+1−p +
β j∆xj,t−h + ǫj,t, where ∆xj,t−h is an element of the (k− 1)-dimensional set of
potential predictors ∆Xi,t.
The general idea of model averaging is to compute a forecast ∆yji,t+h with
each of the (k − 1) models and aggregate the model-specific forecasts after-
wards into one final forecast, i.e. ∆yi,t+h = ∑
(k−1)
j=1 ωj∆y
j
i,t+h, where ωj denotes
the weight given to the model-specific forecast ∆yji,t+h.
According to the specification of ωj we distinguish two model averaging
approaches. The first approach is Equal Weighted Averaging (EWA) as in
Stock and Watson (2003, 2004), where the (k − 1) models are estimated via
OLS and ωj = ω = 1(k−1) .
Alternatively, we consider BayesianModel Averaging (BMA) as laid out in
Wright (2009), where each of the model-specific forecasts ∆yji,t+h is weighted
with the posterior probability of the respective model P(Mj), i.e. ωj =
P(Mj).8
3.2.4 Benchmark Model (AR)
In order to evaluate the relative forecasting performance of the three large
scale approaches described above we implement a univariate autoregression
(AR) ∆yi,t = c+ ∑
p
j=1 ρj∆yi,t−j + ǫt for each of the variables to be forecast as
benchmark.
3.3 Data
Our dataset builds on the one used in Schumacher (2007) which we have
slightly modified and updated to cover a sample from 1978Q1 to 2013Q3.
Overall, our dataset consists of 123macroeconomic variables in quarterly fre-
quency. Series that are available at a higher frequency, e.g. monthly, are con-
verted into quarterly frequency by computing the average over the respective
quarter. The data can be grouped into the following categories: composition
8The model-specific posterior probability P(Mj) is calculated in each estimation period
t for each forecasting horizon h. For simplicity however, we omit the respective subscripts.
78
of GDP and gross value added by sectors, prices, labor market, financial mar-
ket, industry, construction, surveys and miscellaneous. A detailed list of the
different series can be found in Appendix A.
Most of the data is obtained via Thomson Reuters Datastream, while the
remaining data is directly obtained from the German Federal Statistical Of-
fice. We do not account for data revisions in our quasi real-time forecasting
exercise, but use the most recent vintage of the data available in December
2013. The data is seasonally adjusted. Natural logarithms are taken and an-
nualized quarter-on-quarter growth rates are computed for time series not
expressed in rates. Following Schumacher (2007) we rescale data which is
only available for West Germany prior to 1991 to the pan-German series to
avoid regime shifts.
3.4 Forecasting Approach
We estimate the various forecasting models on a moving window consisting
of 60 observations to account for possible structural breaks in the estimation
sample. For the majority of forecasting models, the forecasts are computed
by iterating the forecasting models forward, while for the FAAR, DFM and
the two model averaging approaches direct forecasts are computed.
The evaluation sample for our pseudo out-of-sample forecasting exercise,
denoted by T = T0 + 1, ..., T1, ranges from 1994Q4 until 2013Q3, thus it con-
tains 76 forecasts for each horizon. Forecast errors are computed as ei,T|T−h =
∆yri,T−∆y
f
i,T|T−h, where ∆y
r
i,T denotes the realized quarter-on-quarter growth
rate of variable i in period T and ∆y f
i,T|T−h denotes the quarter-on-quarter pe-
riod T growth rate forecast of variable i computed h quarters earlier.
For the evaluation of the absolute and relative forecasting performance
of the different models we focus on two measures. First, we run Mincer-
Zarnowitz regressions (see Mincer and Zarnowitz, 1969) ∆yri,T = αi,h +
βi,h∆y
f
i,T|T−h + ǫi,T|T−h and conduct F-tests of the joint null hypothesis αˆi,h =
0 and βˆi,h = 1 to check whether the forecasts are unbiased and efficient. This
allows us to assess the absolute forecasting accuracy of each model.
Secondly, we compute and analyze (multivariate) mean squared forecast-
ing errors (MSE) to evaluate the relative (joint) predictive ability of the dif-
ferent forecasting models. We report the absolute MSE for the AR forecast
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which we use as a benchmark, while for the remaining models we report
the MSEs relative to this benchmark. Thus a relative MSE smaller than 1 in-
dicates that the forecasting performance of a specific model is more precise
than that of the AR benchmark and vice-versa.
To assess the statistical significance of the forecasting performance of the
different models for each individual variable relative to the AR benchmark
we implement the test of equal unconditional finite-sample predictive ability
(see Giacomini and White, 2006) using a symmetric loss function. This test
can be applied to nested models, meaning that one model can be obtained
from another model by imposing certain parameter restrictions, as well as
non-nested models. It thus provides a coherent framework for comparing
a large number of different forecasting models as is the case in this paper.
Asymptotic p-values are computed using Newey-West standard errors to ac-
count for serial correlation of the forecast errors.
Finally, the multivariate root mean squared forecast error, as proposed by
Christoffersen and Diebold (1998), is computed as
multMSEh =
1
T1 − T0 − 1
∑
T1
T=T0+1
e′T|T−hWeT|T−h, (3.1)
where the (1xn)-dimensional vector e
T|T−h contains the forecast errors ei,T|T−h
for all n variables of interest andW is an (nxn)-dimensional diagonal weight-
ing matrix.
We follow Carriero et al. (2011) as well as Buchen and Wohlrabe (2014)
and specify W = WD as diagonal matrix with entries being equal to the
inverse of the variances of the variables to be forecast. Müller-Dröge et al.
(2014) propose to specify W = WC as the inverse of the sample variance-
covariance matrix and we consider this alternative as well. Both versions
of the multivariate MSE aim at assessing the joint predictive ability of the
different forecasting models, i.e. their suitability to simultaneously forecast
a larger set of variables. In the first version the measure has the advantage
that it accounts for the fact that variables with a large variance are generally
harder to forecast by attributing them a smaller weight. In addition to that,
the second version of the measure compensates for possible correlation of the
different series.9
9The underlying idea is to account for the linear dependence between the different vari-
ables that might simultaneously drive their MSEs and thus inflate the measure of joint pre-
dictive ability. In principle, this is comparable to the approach of computing the variance of
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As for the univariate MSE we report the absolute multivariate MSE for the
ARmodel, while for all remaining models we compute the multivariate MSE
relative to this benchmark.
3.5 Results
In this section we report the results of our forecasting exercise. We first fo-
cus on the joint forecasting performance of each large scale approach for our
set of 11 German key variables. Afterwards, we extend the analysis to the
performance for the individual variables, with an emphasis on GDP growth.
Finally, we check the robustness of our results.
3.5.1 Forecasting 11 German Key Macroeconomic Variables
Jointly
Figure 3.1 displays the 11 variables that we consider. It can be seen very
clearly that there is considerable variation in the degree of persistence of the
different variables. For example, German GDP growth shows extremely little
persistence and can thus be expected to be very hard to predict. A compar-
ison of the autocorrelation functions of US and German GDP growth for a
sample covering 1978-2013 shows that there is significant autocorrelation of
up to two lags for US GDP growth, while there is no significant autocorrela-
tion at all for German GDP growth. The persistence of industrial production,
investment and consumption growth is comparable to that of German GDP
growth. Thus, we can expect the different forecasting models to have simi-
lar problems in predicting these variables. By contrast, CPI inflation is more
persistent than GDP growth, but still shows many spikes, which will pre-
sumably be hard to predict as well. The persistence of the unemployment
rate series is very high, similar to that of the short- and long-term interest
rate and the current account balance. The German unemployment rate does
not show a clear overall trend, but instead increases until 1998, decreases
until 2001, increases again until 2005 and falls from there until the end of
the sum of several random variables where a correction term accounting for the covariance
of the pairs of variables is needed as well. Note however, that since we use the inverse of the
covariance matrix as correction, the multivariate MSE decreases for positive correlation and
increases for negative correlation between the pairs of variables in the dataset.
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Figure 3.1: German key macro variables.
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Notes: The graph shows the 11 German key macroeconomic variables that we con-
sider from 1990 until 2013. For all variables, except those expressed in rates, annualized
quarter-on-quarter growth rates are shown. Data sources are listed in Appendix A and
Appendix B contains an exact definition of the different variables.
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the sample. Predicting these trend changes might pose another difficulty for
most forecasting models.
In Table 3.1, we display both versions of the multivariate MSEs of the
different large scale approaches relative to the AR benchmark for horizons
h = 1, 4, 8 as well as the absolute multivariate MSE for the AR. Both mea-
sures indicate that the BFAVAR and to a slightly lesser extent the LBVAR pro-
vide the most accurate forecasts for all the variables over all forecasting hori-
zons. For short horizons also the remaining large scale approaches are able
to improve upon the AR benchmark, though to a different degree. While the
FAAR and the DFM perform almost as good as the BFAVAR and the LBVAR,
the model averaging techniques do worse. For h = 8, the relative perfor-
mance of the large scale approaches deteriorates considerably. The BFAVAR
is the only model that can clearly outperform the AR benchmark according
to both multivariate measures considered here.
Table 3.1: Forecasting a Set of 11 German Key Variables.
(a) Multivariate MSE,W = WD
horizon AR LBVAR FAAR BFAVAR DFM EWA BMA
1 8.03 0.84 0.85 0.80 0.87 0.95 0.94
4 11.16 0.86 1.02 0.82 1.00 0.89 0.91
8 13.52 0.90 1.35 0.86 1.28 1.09 1.10
(b) Multivariate MSE,W = WC
horizon AR LBVAR FAAR BFAVAR DFM EWA BMA
1 11.61 0.79 0.83 0.76 0.82 0.91 0.92
4 15.81 0.86 1.01 0.79 1.06 0.87 0.96
8 18.42 1.00 1.51 0.86 1.46 1.01 1.12
Notes: All forecasting models are estimated over a rolling window of 60 quarters. The
forecasts obtained by the different models are evaluated over the sample ranging from
1994Q4 until 2013Q3, thus for each horizon a total of 76 forecasts is computed. The sec-
ond column shows the absolute multivariate MSEs for the AR benchmark model, while
all other MSEs are computed relative to this benchmark. The two measures differ with
respect to the weighting matrixW which is a diagonal matrix with the inverse of the se-
ries variance as entries (WD upper panel) and the inverse of the sample covariance matrix
(WC lower panel).
The entries in the lower part of Table 3.1 indicate to what extend the dif-
ferent forecasting models are able to account for possible correlation of the
different series. The absolute multivariate MSE of the AR benchmark is con-
siderably higher for the second version of the measure for all horizons in-
dicating that there is negative correlation in the data that could be useful
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for forecasting. Interestingly, the relative performance of the large scale ap-
proaches generally improves for short horizons and deteriorates for longer
horizons when comparing the upper and the lower part of the table. This
indicates that for short horizons the models are able to make use of the corre-
lation structure in the dataset to provide better forecasts than the AR bench-
mark. For large horizons, however, this seems no longer to be the case. Es-
pecially the factor models, FAAR and DFM, display a very poor longer term
joint forecasting performance. A notable exception is the BFAVARwhich per-
forms equally well under both versions of the multivariate MSE for all hori-
zons. Apparently, the combination of aggregation information of the large
dataset into factors and shrinkage enables the model to efficiently use all the
information contained in the dataset, even for longer forecasting horizons.
Overall, our results indicate that for short forecast horizons it does not
seem to make a very big difference for the joint forecasting performance of
our large scale approaches, whether the information of the large dataset is ag-
gregated before or during the estimation process of the forecastingmodels, as
the factor models and the shrinkage approaches perform similarly well. Ag-
gregation after the estimation process (model averaging approach), however,
yields somewhat less precise short-horizon forecasts. For obtaining accurate
forecasts for longer horizons using a shrinkage approach seems to be essen-
tial to extract the relevant information on the longer-run dynamics of the dif-
ferent variables as evidenced by the very good performance of the BFAVAR
and, to a slightly lesser extent, the LBVAR for longer forecast horizons.
3.5.2 Forecasting Performance for the Individual Variables
In Table 3.2, panels (a) - (k), we display the univariate MSEs of the different
models for the 11 key variables for horizons h = 1, 4, 8.Table entries in bold
indicate that the null hypothesis of unbiasedness based on the F-test for the
coefficients in the Mincer-Zarnowitz regression cannot be rejected at the 5
% level. The symbols •, •, •, indicate that the relative MSE is significantly
different from one at the 1, 5, or 10% level, respectively.
As can be seen very clearly from the entries in Table 3.2, the BFAVAR and
the LBVAR are the best performing models in most cases. However, the size
of the gains in accuracy over the AR benchmark as well as the absolute fore-
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casting performance of the different models apparently depend heavily on
the specific variable and the respective forecasting horizon.
ForGDP growth (panel (a) of Table 3.2), the absolute MSEs of the AR bench-
mark are quite large and flat over the different forecast horizons which is in
line with what can be expected for forecasts of a time series with low persis-
tence, (see Del Negro and Schorfheide, 2013, for a detailed exposition). More-
over, the entries in Table 3.2, panel (a) reveal that the gains in forecasting ac-
curacy for German GDP growth obtained by the three large scale approaches
are at best moderate and insignificant, while the differences in the relative
MSEs between the various forecasting models are rather small. Among the
three large scale approaches, the BFAVAR and (to a slightly lesser extend)
the LBVAR yield the most accurate forecasts, though for h = 8 EWA per-
forms best. In the short-run, the gains of the BFAVAR and the LBVAR over
the AR benchmark amount to more than 10%. Yet, for longer horizons, there
is almost no improvement upon the AR, which confirms the results of Schu-
macher (2007, 2010) for factor models and Kholodilin and Siliverstovs (2006)
for various alternative leading indicators. Thus, adding more information by
using a large dataset for the forecasting process of German GDP growth ap-
parently only leads to marginal improvements in forecasting accuracy over
the AR benchmark. The results of the Mincer-Zarnowitz regressions reveal
that none of the forecasting models is able to provide unbiased forecasts for
all forecasting horizons. With the exception of the LBVAR for h = 1, the
AR and the BFAVAR for h = 8 and the EWA for h = 1, 8, for the remaining
models, the estimated constant αˆi,h is larger than zero, but the estimate of the
slope parameter and βˆi,h is smaller than one (and in some cases even neg-
ative). This indicates that the forecasts systematically predict less variation
than the GDP growth series actually shows.
For the German CPI inflation rate (panel (b) in Table 3.2), the absolute MSEs
for the AR model are much smaller than those for GDP growth. Still the per-
sistence of quarterly CPI inflation is quite low and thus the MSE does not
increase much with the forecast horizon h. In terms of relative forecasting
performance for the CPI inflation rate, only the BFAVAR significantly out-
performs the AR benchmark over all forecasting horizons with gains in ac-
curacy ranging between 15% to 20%. For h = 1 also the LBVAR and the two
model averaging approaches significantly beat the AR benchmark. However,
none of the forecasting models is able to yield unbiased forecasts. The esti-
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Table 3.2: Univariate MSEs.
(a) GDP growth
horizon AR LBVAR FAAR BFAVAR DFM EWA BMA
1 12.09 0.88 0.95 0.86 0.95 0.98 1.03
4 12.64 1.00 1.27• 0.98 1.09 1.01 1.07
8 12.12 1.04 1.42• 0.98 1.22 0.94 1.10
(b) CPI Inflation Rate
horizon AR LBVAR FAAR BFAVAR DFM EWA BMA
1 1.94 0.78• 0.89 0.80• 0.92 0.93• 0.87•
4 1.86 0.95 1.18 0.85• 1.21 0.93 0.92
8 2.07 0.89 1.33 0.82• 1.33 0.92 0.93
(c) Unemployment Rate
horizon AR LBVAR FAAR BFAVAR DFM EWA BMA
1 0.06 0.98 0.98 0.94 0.99 0.95• 0.95•
4 0.76 0.85 1.14 0.81 1.27 1.06 1.07
8 2.17 0.95 1.18 0.83 1.37 1.67 1.79
(d) Industrial Production
horizon AR LBVAR FAAR BFAVAR DFM EWA BMA
1 173.25 0.71 0.64• 0.76• 0.72 0.95 0.97
4 224.63 0.66 0.59 0.64 0.57 0.66 0.63
8 140.27 1.02 1.06 1.00 0.97 1.01 1.07
(e) Private Consumption
horizon AR LBVAR FAAR BFAVAR DFM EWA BMA
1 7.06 0.86 1.04 0.91 1.05 0.99 0.97
4 7.37 0.84• 1.21 0.85• 1.20• 0.96 0.94
8 6.78 0.93 2.27• 0.95 2.02• 1.04 1.03
(f) Machinery and Equipment Investment
horizon AR LBVAR FAAR BFAVAR DFM EWA BMA
1 167.63 0.86 0.86 0.76 0.93 0.95 0.97
4 221.91 0.84 0.85 0.80 0.85 0.80 0.76
8 196.33 0.95 1.04 0.89 1.03 0.95 1.16
(g) Wages
horizon AR LBVAR FAAR BFAVAR DFM EWA BMA
1 5.99 0.76• 0.71 0.56• 0.64• 0.91• 0.83•
4 7.19 0.87• 1.16 0.84• 1.10 0.88• 0.94
8 8.75 0.85 1.39• 0.86• 1.33• 1.10 1.06
(h) PPI Inflation Rate
horizon AR LBVAR FAAR BFAVAR DFM EWA BMA
1 9.22 1.20 0.82 1.03 0.85 0.91• 0.96
4 15.79 1.02 0.98 0.96 1.04 0.94 0.96
8 14.13 1.05 1.21 1.02 1.02 1.10• 1.22•
(i) Short Term Interest Rate
horizon AR LBVAR FAAR BFAVAR DFM EWA BMA
1 0.14 0.83• 0.88 0.73• 0.92 0.91 0.94
4 1.64 0.77 0.94 0.72• 0.98 1.00 1.07
8 4.58 0.77 1.21 0.72• 1.10 1.18 0.97
(j) Long Term Interest Rate
horizon AR LBVAR FAAR BFAVAR DFM EWA BMA
1 0.10 0.90 1.12 0.96 1.11 0.94 0.68
4 0.84 0.73• 1.02 0.74• 1.01 0.93 0.98•
8 1.94 0.62• 1.49 0.63• 1.46 1.07 0.94
(k) Current Account
horizon AR LBVAR FAAR BFAVAR DFM EWA BMA
1 15.31 0.98 1.15 1.03 1.12 0.99 1.00
4 60.89 1.01 1.22 0.99 1.11 0.95 1.07
8 114.59 1.05 1.33 0.96 1.39 1.09 1.25
Notes: See notes on Table 3.1, first part. The symbols •, •, •, indicate that the relative MSE is significantly
different from one at the 1, 5, or 10% level, respectively, while bold numbers imply that the null hypothesis of
unbiasedness cannot be rejected at the 5 % level.
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mated constant in the Mincer-Zarnowitz regressions for all models is larger
than zero, while the slope parameter is smaller than one (smaller than zero
in most cases). This indicates that the forecasts are systematically larger than
the actual data which may be attributed to the higher trend inflation in the
first part of the estimation sample compared to the evaluation sample. While
CPI inflation is more persistent than GDP growth, the informational content
of the CPI forecasts obtained by all models is even smaller. The R2 from
Mincer-Zarnowitz regressions (not shown in the table) never exceeds 5%.
In contrast to that, for the German unemployment rate (panel (c) in Table 3.2)
the explanatory power of all forecasts is extremely high, especially for short
forecasting horizons. For h = 1 the R2 from Mincer-Zarnowitz regressions
(not shown in the table) for all forecasting models amounts to 95% or more,
while for h = 4 it still ranges between 66% and 76%. This must certainly be
attributed to the high persistence in the German unemployment rate series,
which is also reflected in the small absolute MSE for the AR which increases
with the forecasting horizon. Due to the various trend changes in the German
unemployment rate series, no model systematically over- or underestimates
the unemployment rate. With a few exceptions for h = 8, all forecasts are un-
biased. However, except for the two model averaging approaches for h = 1,
no model can significantly outperform the AR benchmark for the prediction
of the German unemployment rate.
With some exceptions this also holds for private consumption and the PPI
inflation rate (panel (e) and (h) in Table 3.2). However, while no model is able
to yield unbiased forecast for consumption, the forecasts for PPI inflation are
unbiased in many cases.
A similar result regarding the relative forecasting performance of the dif-
ferent models can be observed for the German current account balance (panel
(k) in Table 3.2) and German machinery and equipment investment (panel (f) in
Table 3.2). We find that for these variables none of the large scale approaches
considered can significantly improve upon the AR benchmark which is sur-
prising given the different degrees of persistence of the series.
By contrast, for the short- and long-term interest rates (panel (i) and (j) in
Table 3.2) as well as for wages (panel (g) in Table 3.2) the best performing
large scale model, the BFAVAR, almost always significantly outperforms the
AR benchmark with sizeable gains in accuracy (45% for wages for h = 1).
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For industrial production, there are big and significant gains in accuracy for
the BFAVAR and the FAAR, but only for h = 1. For higher horizons the
large scale approaches can not significantly improve upon the AR bench-
mark, though in most cases the forecasts are unbiased.
To sum up, we find that over all variables considered the best performing
large scale approaches, namely the LBVAR and the BFAVAR, can clearly im-
prove upon the AR benchmark, especially in the short run. However, the size
of the gains in accuracy for each individual variable is highly heterogenous.
Moreover, the BFAVAR, the LBVAR and the EWA approach provide gener-
ally more often unbiased forecasts compared to the AR benchmark, the two
factor models and the BMA.
Forecasting the Great Recession. Several studies, for example Kuzin et al.
(2013) and Timmermann and van Dijk (2013), indicate that the performance
based ranking of different forecasting models may change considerably dur-
ing the period of the Great Recession of 2008/2009. Therefore, in what fol-
lows, we take a closer look at whether the three large scale forecasting meth-
ods would have been able to forecast the slump of German GDP growth dur-
ing the Great Recession.
In addition to the large scale approaches and the small benchmark mod-
els outlined in section 3.2, we analyze the predictive content of the ifo busi-
ness climate index for German GDP growth during the Great Recession. As
pointed out before, the ifo index is a leading indicator and often referenced
to as the most important benchmark when forecasting German GDP growth
(see also Dreger and Schumacher, 2005; Kholodilin and Siliverstovs, 2006;
Abberger, 2007; Drechsel and Scheufele, 2012b; Henzel and Rast, 2013). We
use the ifo business climate index and the subindex covering business ex-
pectations for the next six months and regress GDP growth on a constant
and the respective lagged indicator as in Henzel and Rast (2013): ∆yt =
αh + βhifot−h + ǫt,h.
Figure 3.2 shows the forecasts of the annualized quarter-on-quarter GDP
growth rate obtained by the AR, the LBVAR, the BFAVAR, the BMA and
the two ifo indicators considered above computed for the subsample rang-
ing from 2008Q1 to 2009Q2. Generally, the forecasts of all six models look
roughly similar and none of them is able to predict the downturn in GDP
growth in 2008. Once the recession hits, the models also fail to predict a fur-
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ther deepening of the recession, but indicate a relatively quick recovery in-
stead. The only notable exceptions are the one quarter ahead forecasts based
Figure 3.2: Great Recession GDP growth forecasts.
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on the ifo expectation index and those obtained with the BFAVAR computed
in 2008Q4. As business expectations in Germany already dropped largely in
2008Q3, the ifo expectation index predicts a negative GDP growth rate of -
3.17% for 2009Q1.10 The BFAVAR GDP growth forecast is even slightly more
pessimistic and amounts to -4.40%. Still, none of the forecasting models is
able to predict the turning point of the Great Recession in 2009Q1. Moreover,
once the turning point is reached, the models also considerably underpredict
the speed of the recovery for the following quarters.
Given that the performance of the different forecasting models during the
Great Recession was more or less equally disappointing, we would not ex-
pect that the Great Recession period strongly drives the results reported in
Table 3.2, panel (a). Surprisingly, the entries in Table 3.3 which display the
MSEs of the different forecastingmodels relative to the AR benchmark for the
pre-Great Recession subsample ranging from 1994Q1 until 2007Q4 indicate
that this is not the case. Especially for horizons h = 4, 8 the relative per-
formance of the LBVAR and the BFAVAR improves considerably when the
10However, by construction this model can hardly predict a further deepening of the
recession. Since the forecast is computed as ∆yt+h = αˆh + βˆhifot, the coefficient βˆh would
need to increase strongly with the forecasting horizon h to predict the further deepening of
the recession.
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Great Recession is excluded from the evaluation sample. In this case both
models are able to significantly reduce the relative MSE by approximately
10%. Moreover, the null hypothesis of unbiasedness based on the F-test for
the two coefficients in the Mincer-Zarnowitz regression can no longer be re-
jected for all forecasts obtained by the LBVAR and the BFAVAR.
Table 3.3: Forecasting German GDP growth, excluding the Great Recession
of 2008/2009.
Univariate MSE for GDP growth (column 2: absolute; others: relative to AR)
horizon AR LBVAR FAAR BFAVAR DFM EWA BMA
1 6.64 0.86 0.97 0.91 0.96 0.91 0.95
4 7.29 0.87• 1.36• 0.88 1.10 0.92 1.03
8 7.07 0.90• 1.42 0.91• 1.54• 0.99 1.21
Notes: See notes on Table 3.2. In this table the evaluation sample has been adjusted to
cover the period from 1994Q4 until 2007Q4.
The ifo business climate index, which performs slightly better than the ex-
pectations based index for h = 1 (the relative MSEs are equal to 0.84 and
0.94, respectively), yields the most accurate short-run predictions for Ger-
man GDP growth when we exclude the Great Recession from the evaluation
sample. However, the gains upon the best performing large scale approaches
are only very small. For h = 8 the LBVAR and the BFAVAR clearly beat this
important benchmark for the prediction of German GDP growth (the rela-
tive MSEs are equal to 1.00 for the ifo business climate and 0.98 for the ifo
expectations index, respectively).
3.5.3 Robustness with Respect to Alternative Model
Specifications
Next, we want to check the robustness of our results reported thus far with
respect to alternative specifications of the different forecastingmodels. There-
fore, we repeat the forecasting exercise of the previous section with an opti-
mized specification of each model that is obtained by computing a variety of
different specifications for each model and choosing the one that yields ex
post the best forecasting performance. For an indication of how robust the
model’s forecasting performance is against various alternative model specifi-
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cations, we then check which of the forecasting models yield similarly accu-
rate forecasts with the information criteria based specification and with the
ex post optimized specification.
Table 3.4 shows the ranges of the various parameters of the different fore-
casting models that we consider for this exercise. For example, for the FAAR
Table 3.4: Parameter range to determine ex post optimized specification of
forecasting models.
parameter range forecasting model
number of lags p 1, 2, ..., 4 all forecasting
models
degree of shrinkage λ 0.01, 0.02, ..., 0.1 LBVAR
degree of shrinkage φ 1, 1.1, ..., 2 BMA
number of static factors r 1, 2, ..., 10 FAAR, FAVAR,
BFAVAR
number of dynamic factors q 1, 2, ..., 10 DFM
number of lags of the dynamic factors s 1, 2, ..., 4 DFM
the number of static factors r as well as the number of lags p have to be spec-
ified. After defining a range for each of these parameters, i.e. r = 1, ..., rmax
and p = 1, ..., pmax, we estimate the FAAR and compute forecasts for each
possible combination of these two parameters. We then choose the specifica-
tion with the ex post highest forecasting accuracy as the optimized specifica-
tion for the FAARmodel.
We follow Schumacher (2007) and distinguish the following two ap-
proaches: performance based model selection, time-varying model (PBTV) and per-
formance based model selection, constant model (PBC). With PBTV we divide the
evaluation sample into subsamples covering 4 quarters each. For each of
these subsamples we select the specification for each forecasting model and
for each forecasting horizon that minimizes the respective subsample MSE.
By contrast, with PBC we choose the specification for each model that mini-
mizes the MSE over the whole evaluation sample for each horizon.
In Table 3.5 we report the results of this exercise for horizons h = 1, 4
and 8. Specifically, we display the absolute multivariate MSEs (first version,
W = WD) for all 11 key variables for each of the different forecasting models
obtained when specified according to the various information criteria (IC) as
well as under PBC and PBTV.
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Table 3.5: Absolute multivariate MSEs with IC, PBC and PBTV.
(a) IC: Information criteria based model selection (quasi real-time forecasting)
horizon AR LBVAR FAAR BFAVAR DFM EWA BMA
1 8.03 6.74 6.82 6.41 7.01 7.59 7.51
4 11.16 9.60 11.39 9.20 11.18 9.92 10.10
8 13.52 12.14 18.26 11.62 17.32 14.76 14.89
(b) PBC: Performance based model selection, constant model
horizon AR LBVAR FAAR BFAVAR DFM EWA BMA
1 7.39 6.06 6.16 5.86 6.03 7.01 6.74
4 9.71 9.12 9.70 8.83 9.61 9.86 9.64
8 11.96 11.22 13.61 11.08 13.86 14.19 13.63
(c) PBTV: Performance based model selection, time-varying model
horizon AR LBVAR FAAR BFAVAR DFM EWA BMA
1 6.80 5.15 4.19 4.59 2.53 6.50 6.12
4 8.85 7.15 6.99 7.59 4.48 8.78 8.54
8 10.83 8.39 9.13 9.75 5.78 12.82 11.90
Notes: All forecasting models are estimated over a rolling window of 60 quarters. The
forecasts obtained by the different models are evaluated over the sample ranging from
1994Q4 until 2013Q3, thus for each horizon a total of 76 forecasts is computed. The differ-
ent specification strategies are described in the text.
Comparing the absolute MSEs reported in Table 3.5 panel (b) and (c) to
those reported in panel (a) gives rise to the following observations. First, both
ex post performance basedmodel selection approaches generally increase the
precision of all forecasting models—which of course is not surprising given
that these approaches rely on out-of-sample information. However, while
overall PBC leads only to modest gains over the quasi real-time forecasts,
the gains obtained with PBTV are very large. This indicates that the optimal
specification of the various forecasting models changes over time.
Regarding the relative performance of the different forecastingmodelswith
PBC the entries in panel (b) indicate that the LBVAR and the BFAVAR again
provide the most accurate forecasts for most horizons. However, especially
for higher horizons the gains in accuracy of these two models over the AR
benchmark are less pronounced with PBC (6% and 7% respectively for h = 8)
than with IC (10% and 14% respectively for h = 8). By contrast, as the en-
tries in panel (c) reveal with PBTV the best performing large scale methods
can improve considerably upon the AR benchmark for all forecasting hori-
zons. The DFM, which now clearly outperforms all remaining models by far,
achieves a reduction in the absolute multivariate MSE upon the AR bench-
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mark amounting to 60% for h = 1 and roughly 50% for higher horizons. The
LBVAR and the BFAVAR, which rank lower than the FAAR with PBTV, out-
perform the AR by 25% and 32%, respectively, for h = 1 and 22% and 10%,
respectively, for h = 8.
Overall the results documented in Table 3.5 allow us to divide the differ-
ent models into three groups according to the degree of robustness of their
forecasting performance against alternative model specifications. First, for
the AR benchmark, both model averaging techniques, EWA and BMA, the
BFAVAR and (to a slightly lesser extend) the LBVAR we find that the specific
model specification does not have a large impact on the models’ forecasting
performance. For the LBVAR we find that with PBTV the degree of shrink-
age λ varies strongly over time, while in our quasi real-time specification λ
is very stable over time. This also applies to the number of lags p included in
the estimation. However, the optimally specified model reduces the respec-
tive MSEs only very little. This finding is in line with Andrea Carriero and
Marcellino (2011) who document the robustness of the LBVAR’s forecasting
performance against the specific choice of λ and p.
Second, according to our results the forecasting performance of the FAAR
depends to amoderate degree on the precise model specification. The FAAR’s
forecasting performance would improve moderately if one could optimally
specify the model in real-time. We find that in the PBTV specification the op-
timal number of static factors r for the FAAR varies largely over time, while
the number of factors chosen via the information criterion of Bai and Ng
(2002) in the quasi real-time exercise is rather stable (see also Schumacher
(2007), p. 288).
Third, we show that the accuracy of the quasi real-time forecasts of the
DFM depends to a very large degree on the specific model specification.
Choosing the optimal specification and allowing for time heterogeneity rather
than specifying the model based on information criteria leads to a consider-
able improvement in the model’s forecasting performance. This confirms
the findings of Schumacher (2007) who conducts the same analysis for static
and dynamic factor models. One reason for the low degree of robustness
of the forecasting performance of the DFM to alternative model specifica-
tions is certainly that the optimal number of dynamic factors q seems to vary
substantially for different forecasting horizons. Further, it turns out that the
number of dynamic factors q chosen according to the Bai and Ng (2007) in-
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formation criterion is always considerably smaller than the ex post optimal
number of dynamic factors.
Real-Time Performance Based Model Specification and Forecast Pooling
To check whether the principle of performance based model selection can
also increase the accuracy of the different forecasting models when applied
in a quasi real-time exercise, we specify the models based on past forecast-
ing performance rather than on the various information criteria. We call this
approach performance based model selection, real time (PBRT). With PBRT, we
evaluate the performance of the various specifications of the different fore-
casting models over a subevaluation sample ranging from T − seval + 1 un-
til T. The best specification of each forecasting model, i.e. the specification
that yields the smallest MSE over the subevaluation sample, is then used to
estimate the respective model with information up to T and to compute fore-
casts for T+ h. We set the length of the subevaluation sample seval equal to 4
quarters. To be consistent, the various specifications of the different forecast-
ing models for the subsample evaluation as well as for the final forecast are
estimated over a rolling window of 60 quarters. This implies that our first
subevaluation sample ranges from 1994Q4 until 1995Q3, while the forecasts
of the different models for the exercise in this paragraph are evaluated from
1997Q3 until 2013Q3.
Alternatively, we implement forecast pooling, an approach that has been
proposed in the literature to overcome the uncertainty related to the selection
of the best performing specification of a forecasting model (see or example
Kuzin et al., 2013). The basic idea here is, similar to model averaging, to
pool over the forecasts obtained with a large set of different specifications
of a forecasting model to obtain the final forecast of a variable of interest.11
We implement two versions of forecast pooling: unweighted pooling andMSE-
weighted pooling. According to the first variant, the final forecast of a variable
is obtained by averaging over the various forecasts computed with differ-
ent specifications of a certain forecasting model. By contrast, with the second
variant we use a weightedmean to obtain the final forecast, where the weight
11Conceptually, the difference between model averaging and pooling lies in the source
of uncertainty. While with model averaging there is uncertainty about the predictor vari-
able to include in the estimation, with pooling there is uncertainty with respect to the best
performing specification of a model given a set of predictors.
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is the inverse of the MSE of the respective model specification over the sube-
valuation sample ranging from T− seval + 1 until T.
In Table 3.6, panel (b) - (d) we report the absolute multivariate MSEs that
result from this exercise. To facilitate the direct comparison we addition-
ally show the absolute MSEs of the different forecasting models with IC for
the same evaluation sample in panel (a). The entries indicate that we can
Table 3.6: Multivariate MSEs with IC, PBRT and Pooling.
(a) IC: Information criteria based model selection
horizon AR LBVAR FAAR BFAVAR DFM EWA BMA
1 7.63 6.56 6.78 6.36 7.01 7.30 7.27
4 11.10 9.68 11.36 9.25 11.40 10.04 10.26
8 13.84 12.64 17.71 11.71 16.79 15.09 15.01
(b) PBRT: Performance based model selection, real time
horizon AR LBVAR FAAR BFAVAR DFM EWA BMA
1 7.57 7.12 7.37 5.85 9.91 7.27 7.17
4 10.24 14.77 12.54 10.82 17.00 10.18 10.35
8 12.96 33.26 14.89 14.40 22.20 14.12 13.97
(c) Forecast pooling, unweighted mean
horizon AR LBVAR FAAR BFAVAR DFM EWA BMA
1 7.43 6.18 6.76 6.17 6.48 7.07 6.87
4 10.89 10.11 11.29 9.47 12.25 9.89 10.17
8 13.79 13.47 17.07 11.80 19.55 14.91 14.39
(d) Forecast Pooling, MSE-based mean
horizon AR LBVAR FAAR BFAVAR DFM EWA BMA
1 7.45 6.18 6.79 6.19 6.52 7.09 6.88
4 10.95 10.16 11.24 9.48 11.90 9.90 10.17
8 13.74 13.37 16.78 11.81 18.32 14.91 14.40
Notes: All forecasting models are estimated over a rolling window of 60 quarters. The
forecasts obtained by the different models are evaluated over the sample ranging from
1997Q3 until 2013Q3, thus for each horizon a total of 65 forecasts is computed. The differ-
ent specification strategies are described in the text.
increase the accuracy of all forecasting models for h = 1 with either PBRT
or forecast pooling compared to IC, though in most cases only by very lit-
tle. Moreover, for higher horizons there is no improvement upon IC for the
LBVAR, the BFAVAR and the DFM with either alternative specification ap-
proach.
When comparing the entries in panel (b) - (d), we find that, with the ex-
ception of the BFAVAR, in the short-run either unweighted or MSE-weighted
forecast pooling works best for all models. This confirms previous findings
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that pooling is indeed a good alternative to avoid choosing a model speci-
fication in real time that does not forecast well (see Kuzin et al. (2013)). By
contrast, for h = 8 all models for which we find an improvement upon IC
perform best with PBRT.
The overall lowest multivariate MSEs for all forecasting horizons are again
obtained by the BFAVAR, with PBRT for h = 1 and with IC for higher hori-
zons. The gains in accuracy upon the lowest multivariate MSE of the AR
benchmark amount to roughly 20% for h = 1 and 10% for higher horizons.
Our results also indicate that the extremely good performance of the DFM
with the optimized specification cannot be achieved with any model in real
time. Therefore, relying on a single forecasting model that delivers a good
performance and is not prone to the pitfall of choosing a specification that
does not deliver the most precise forecasts, such as the BFAVAR or the LB-
VAR, seems to be a good choice for applied forecasters who cannot rely on
out-of sample information to specify their forecasting models. Whether or
not the small gains in forecasting accuracy over information criteria based
model specification obtained with PBRT or forecast pooling justify the addi-
tional computational burden that comes with these approaches depends of
course on the specific forecasting context at hand.
3.6 Conclusion
We have studied three different approaches to aggregating the informational
content of a large dataset for forecasting key macroeconomic variables. We
find that, overall, the Bayesian factor augmented vector autoregression and
the large Bayesian vector autoregression perform best and generally yield
more accurate forecasts than a simple AR benchmark model and other large
scale approaches. This holds for both, measures for the joint forecasting per-
formance for a set of 11 core variables as well as univariate performance mea-
sures for the individual series.
Our assessment of the joint predictive performance of the large scale ap-
proaches reveals that in general for short horizons all large scale approaches
are able to efficiently use the correlation structure in the dataset to provide
better forecasts than the AR benchmark, while for large horizons this is no
longer the case. Here, the combination of aggregating the informational con-
tent of the large dataset into factors and shrinkage seems to be the most effi-
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cient approach to use all the information in the dataset. We also find that the
joint forecasting performance of the BFAVAR and the LBVAR is very robust
with respect to the precise model specification, e.g. the number of lags of the
dependent variable or the degree of shrinkage.
Regarding the size of the gains in forecasting accuracy over the AR bench-
mark for the individual series of our set of 11 variables, we find considerable
differences for the different variables. While there are large increases in fore-
casting performance for few variables, the gains in accuracy rarely exceed
10% in most cases. One reason for this might be that some time series show
very little persistence and are thus very hard to predict by univariate as well
as multivariate forecasting models. Yet, even for time series with more per-
sistence, the high collinearity in the large dataset seems to prevent large gains
from the large-scale multivariate forecasting models over the AR benchmark.
Still, when forecasters are interested in simultaneously predicting a larger
number of variables, large-scale forecasting models have the advantage that
they can be used to coherently forecast many variables. Finally, this might
also be an advantage when it comes to the interpretation of the forecasts.
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Chapter 4
Forecasting Euro Area Recessions
in Real-Time∗
Abstract
I present evidence that the linear mixed-frequency Bayesian VAR provides
very sharp and well-calibrated monthly real-time recession probabilities for
the euro area for the period from 2004 until 2013. The model outperforms not
only the univariate regime-switching models for a number of hard and soft
economic indicators and their optimal linear combinations, but also a real-
time recession index obtained with Google Trends data. This result holds
irrespective of whether the joint predictive distribution of several economic
indicators or the marginal distribution of real GDP growth is evaluated to
extract the real-time recession probabilities of the mixed-frequency Bayesian
VAR. The inclusion of the confidence index in industry proves to be crucial
for the performance of the model.
Keywords: Density nowcasting, Real-time recession forecasting, Mixed-
frequency data, Bayesian VAR, Regime-switching models,
Linear opinion pool, Google Trends
JEL-Codes: C53, E32, E37.
∗This chapter is based onmy paper entitled Forecasting Euro Area Recessions
in Real-Time, Kiel Working Paper No. 2020, 2016.
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4.1 Introduction
Forecasts of macroeconomic activity are highly important for economic poli-
cymakers’ decision making processes. In addition to precise point forecasts,
a reliable and timely prediction of business cycle turning points can be ex-
tremely useful for the design of appropriate economic policy, since the effec-
tiveness of monetary and fiscal policy measures can depend heavily on the
current phase of the business cycle.1 In practice, however, there are many
problems associated with the real-time availability of many macroeconomic
time series. These include mixed data frequencies, the irregular and some-
times varying publication lags of various macroeconomic indicators (often
referred to as ragged edges) and data revisions. They pose huge challenges to
professional forecasters (see Giannone et al., 2008, for a detailed discussion)
and should therefore be taken into account when assessing the accuracy of
alternative forecasting approaches.2
Researchers looking to separate periods of economic expansion from reces-
sions typically turn to non-linear regime-switching models (for recent appli-
cations see Chauvet and Piger, 2008; Nalewaik, 2012; Camacho et al., 2014).
As an alternative, Bayesian density forecasting approaches (overviews are
provided, for example, in Karlsson, 2013; Geweke and Whiteman, 2006) can
be used to compute the probability that the economy is in a specific business
cycle phase at a certain point in time. This has been documented, for exam-
ple, by Österholm (2012), who estimates the probability of a recession in the
US in the third and fourth quarter of 2008 with a quarterly linear Bayesian
vector autoregression. Dovern and Huber (2015) estimate a linear Bayesian
global vector autoregression and show that the model delivers probabilistic
recession forecasts that are more precise than those obtained with country-
specific models. However, the analyses in both of these papers are not con-
1Lo and Piger (2005) provide supporting empirical evidence for monetary policy and
Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012) for fiscal policy.
2Recently, the success of different econometric forecasting methods in providing a reli-
able assessment of the prevailing economic conditions in terms of GDP growth point fore-
casts, while at the same time coping with the outlined difficulties, has been demonstrated.
These methods include bridge equation models (Baffigi et al., 2004; ECB, 2008), MIDAS-
models (Kuzin et al., 2011; Schumacher, 2014) and factor models (Schumacher and Breitung,
2008; Ba´nbura and Rünstler, 2011) as well as combinations of the aforementioned meth-
ods (Angelini et al., 2011; Marcellino and Schumacher, 2010). The relative accuracy of these
methods has been studied, for example, in Foroni and Marcellino (2014).
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ducted in a real-time setting since the models used there do not account ex-
plicitly for the aforementioned features of real-time data.
By contrast, the linear mixed-frequency Bayesian vector autoregression
(MFBVAR) proposed by Schorfheide and Song (2015) is well-suited to iden-
tifying business cycle turning points in real-time, since it can be estimated
on mixed-frequency data with ragged edges. The model has been proven to
increase the accuracy of short-term point and density forecasts for a num-
ber of variables (Schorfheide and Song, 2015), yet it is still an open question
whether it can also achieve forecast gains for the real-time detection of busi-
ness cycle phases.
With this paper, I fill this gap and provide evidence that the MFBVAR pro-
vides very accurate monthly real-time recession probabilities for the euro
area for the period from 2004 until 2013. The risks of a recession are de-
fined here as the probability that current-quarter GDP growth is part of a
sequence of two consecutive quarters, both displaying negative GDP growth
rates. They are obtained from the joint predictive distribution of the back-,
now- and forecasts for euro area real GDP growth in a real-time forecasting
setting. I compare the accuracy of the MFBVAR real-time recession signals
with those obtained with univariate regime-switching models for a number
of hard and soft economic indicators as well as their optimal linear combi-
nations. Moreover, I consider a real-time recession index based on Google
Trends data that is constructed as a population-weighted mean of the In-
ternet query shares for the word "recession" in the eleven largest euro area
countries.
Related papers that focus on the real-time detection of recessions (see
Hamilton, 2011, for a comprehensive overview) often rely on monthly vari-
ables such as industrial production as a proxy of overall economic activ-
ity (Chauvet and Piger, 2008; Anas et al., 2008; Bellégo and Ferrara, 2009;
Schreiber, 2014). Exceptions to this are Aastveit et al. (2014) and Camacho
et al. (2014), who estimate models that account for many of the outlined fea-
tures of real-time data. In particular, Aastveit et al. (2014) solve the mixed-
frequency data issue by applying the Bry-Boschan rule (Bry and Boschan,
1971), an algorithm that detects recessions, to a bridge equation model now-
cast and compare the accuracy of the real-time recession probabilities thus
obtained to those obtained with an autoregressive Markov-switching model
for Norwegian GDP. Camacho et al. (2014) estimate a mixed-frequency
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Markov-switching dynamic factor model for the euro area which captures
not only co-movements across various economic indicators through a com-
mon business cycle factor, but also shifts in the business cycle regime.
In all these studies, the real-time recession signals are compared with an
official business cycle chronology such as, for example, that established by
the CEPR Euro Area Business Cycle Dating Committee or that of the NBER
for the US. Accordingly, in this paper, I use the CEPR euro area business
cycle turning points as a benchmark to evaluate the alternative forecasting
approaches. However, while most of the aforementioned papers confine
their analysis to a comparison of the official business cycle turning points
to those obtained with their respective econometric models, I compute for-
mal measures that explicitly assess the calibration as well as the sharpness
of the probabilistic recession forecasts obtained with the different methods.
An approach is said to deliver well-calibrated probability forecasts if the em-
pirical event probability conditional on a forecast is close to that probability
forecast, i.e. that it actually rains in 70% of the times rain was announced
with a probability of 70%. Sharpness, on the other hand, refers to the ques-
tion of whether the probability forecasts are clear-cut, i.e. whether they are
clustered around the confident values of zero and one, rather than the am-
biguous value of 0.5. The ideal probabilistic forecast maximizes sharpness
subject to calibration (Ranjan and Gneiting, 2010). This implies that the real-
time recession signals need to be not only very timely but also clear-cut.
Beyond that, I investigate the discriminatory skill of the different ap-
proaches. That is to say I explore the extend to which the real-time recession
probabilities obtained with the alternative models are useful signals when
binary forecasts for the occurrence or non-occurrence of a recession have to
be issued. The ad-hoc binary event classifier typically used in related papers
is 0.5, and a recession is announced if the recession probability exceeds this
threshold (see, for example, Hamilton, 1989; Chauvet and Piger, 2008). How-
ever, as it turns out, this threshold is not always optimal in the sense that it
maximizes the number of correct recession predictions and, simultaneously,
minimizes the number of false alarms. Lahiri andWang (2013) present a sur-
vey of different measures to evaluate probabilistic recession forecasts which
take this aspect into account and I apply the receiver operating characteris-
tic and the Peirce skill score to assess the different models’ discriminatory
skill. Note that these evaluation approaches are closely related to the litera-
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ture on the signals approach, where potential indicators for economic crises
are analyzed with respect to their early warning properties (see, for example,
Reinhart and Kaminsky, 1999; Boysen-Hogrefe et al., 2015).
My findings show that the MFBVAR real-time recession probabilities are
very sharp and well-calibrated and that only a univariate Markov-switching
model for the confidence index in industry yields probabilistic recession fore-
casts that perform equally well. Both models also have the highest skill to
discriminate between recessions and expansions in real-time, although the
optimal binary event classifier used to translate the probabilistic forecasts
into binary recession signals varies for both models. By contrast, the real-
time recession signals obtained from other soft indicators such as the Eco-
nomic Sentiment Indicator or the confidence index in retail sales are much
less well-calibrated. In fact, these methods deliver many recession signals in
non-recession periods, which would suggest that they are potentially driven
by more than economic fundamentals. The probabilistic forecasts obtained
with the models for the hard economic indicators, in particular for indus-
trial production and real GDP, on the other hand, lack sharpness due to the
long publication lag of the respective data. As a consequence, they have no
discriminatory skill to distinguish between recession and expansion periods
in real-time. The combinations of the probabilistic forecasts of the univari-
ate regime-switching models improve upon most of their components in all
dimensions considered here. However, even when an optimal combination
scheme is applied, the pooled real-time recession probabilities are outper-
formed by those of the MFBVAR. The Google Trends real-time recession in-
dicator performs better than most univariate regime-switching models and
pools, but it is clearly worse than the MFBVAR in terms of calibration, sharp-
ness and discriminatory skill. The index delivers very ambiguous real-time
recession signals particularly between the two recession periods in the sam-
ple and proves to be of very limited use.
Finally, in the robustness analysis, I provide evidence that the inclusion
of the confidence index in industry is crucial for the good performance of
the MFBVAR. Moreover, I investigate the extent to which the MFBVAR real-
time recession signals can be improved upon by simultaneously assessing the
joint development of several economic indicators through the multivariate
predictive distribution of these variables, rather than just the path of GDP
growth alone. My findings indicate that no significant gains in accuracy are
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obtained compared to the benchmark, where the real-time risks of a recession
are defined as the probability that current-quarter GDP growth is part of a
sequence of two consecutive quarters both displaying negative GDP growth.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In section 4.2 I give an
overview of the euro area business cycle since 2000, while in section 4.3 I de-
scribe the dataset used for the empirical application in this paper. In section
4.4 I set out the alternative forecasting approaches, which are evaluated us-
ing the formal measures described in section 4.5. In section 4.6 I present the
main results, while the results of the robustness checks are shown in section
4.7. Finally, in section 4.8 I conclude.
4.2 The Euro Area Business Cycle
The CEPR Euro Area Business Cycle Dating Committee has been publishing
business cycle turning points for the euro area since 2003.3 Table 4.1 displays
the euro area business cycle phases since 2000 as stated by the CEPR.
Table 4.1: CEPR euro area business cycle phases since 2000.
Dates Business cycle phase
Until January 2008 Expansion
February 2008 - April 2009 Recession
May 2009 - July 20114 Expansion
August 2011 - January 2013 Recession
Since February 2013 Expansion
The committee defines a recession as "... a significant decline in the level
of economic activity, spread across the economy of the euro area, usually
3The publication lag for the CEPR business cycle turning points is quite substantial. For
example, the euro area business cycle peak that occurred in January 2008was not announced
until 31 March 2009 only. Similarly, the trough in April 2009 was identified with a delay of
more than 12 months.
4The CEPR has recently abandoned its practice of announcing the month of the business
cycle turning point. Hence, from July 2011 onwards, I set the first month of the quarter
announced as being a business cycle turning point as the month of the respective peak or
trough. This assumption is quite conservative and requires the real-time recession signals of
the alternative approaches to be very timely. The results of an evaluation where the second
or third month of a quarter is set as the turning point are very similar to those presented in
section 2.4 and are available upon request.
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visible in two or more consecutive quarters of negative growth in GDP, em-
ployment and other measures of aggregate economic activity for the euro
area as a whole, and reflecting similar developments in most countries. A
recession begins just after the economy reaches a peak of activity and ends
when the economy reaches its trough." (Artis et al., 2003). In total, the com-
mittee has identified two recessions since 2000, namely the Great Recession
of 2008-09 and the recession in connection with the European debt crisis of
2011-13. These are marked by the shaded areas in panel (a) of Figure 4.1,
which displays quarter-on-quarter euro area real GDP growth since 2000.
While the first recession period lasted for 15 months, the second recession
in the sample persisted for 18 months in total. During the Great Recession,
euro area real GDP growth turned negative in the second quarter of 2008 and
remained so until the second quarter of 2009. The strongest decrease in real
GDP amounted to −2.5% and occurred in the first quarter of 2009. The Eu-
ropean debt crisis, by contrast, was much milder, with real GDP growth dip-
ping by a maximum of −0.6% in the fourth quarter of 2012. In this recession,
real GDP growth rates were negative from the fourth quarter of 2011 until
the first quarter of 2013. Panel (b) of Figure 4.1 plots the course of euro area
real GDP over as many as 10 quarters after all CEPR-dated peaks since 1970
(normalized to one). It can be seen that compared to earlier recessions in the
euro area, the Great Recession was by far the most severe in terms of depth,
while the recession in connection with the European debt crisis was charac-
terized by a decline in economic activity that was comparably prolonged but
only moderate overall.
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Figure 4.1: Euro area economic activity.
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(b) Euro area recessions since 1970
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In addition to the CEPR, other authors have attempted to establish a
monthly business cycle chronology for the euro area (see Anas et al., 2008;
Billio et al., 2012, for recent examples that also cover the Great Recession
of 2008/2009). Their assessment of the Great Recession, which Billio et al.
(2012) date from September 2008 until July 2009, differs slightly from that
of the CEPR committee. Moreover, there is also disagreement as to whether
there was another recession in the euro area between 2000 and 2005. Bil-
lio et al. (2012) point to an industrial recession from September 2001 until
May 2006, which Anas et al. (2008) date from December 2000 until Novem-
ber 2001. However, the view of the CEPR is that the overall evidence did
not support a "fully-fledged recession but rather a prolonged pause in the
growth of economic activity" (Artis et al., 2003). This is also confirmed in
Panel (b) of Figure 4.1, which includes not only the official CEPR recessions
since 1970 but also two periods between 2000 and 2005 with weak real GDP
growth rates of less than 0.2%.
Note that there are other formal approaches to identifying business cycle
turning points such as the well-known Bry-Broschan rule (Bry and Boschan,
1971; Harding and Pagan, 2002). For the period from 2000 onwards, however,
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this rule delivers the same business cycle chronology for the euro area as the
CEPR Euro Area Business Cycle Dating Committee.
4.3 Data
For the empirical application in this paper I use a real-time dataset that con-
sists of 123 monthly data vintages for October 2003 until December 2014, all
of which start in January 1991.5 Each of these data vintages provides a histor-
ical snapshot of the data at the beginning of each month, as it was available
at the time. This implies that the dataset reflects not only the publication lag
of each variable with respect to the reference date, i.e. the date at which the
snapshot was taken, but also changes in the data flow over time driven by
recent improvements in the timeliness of various indicators. The dataset was
obtained from the real-time database of the European Central Bank’s Statis-
tical Data Warehouse in early December 2014. A detailed description of the
database, the variables included as well as the treatment of issues such as
data revisions, changing variable definitions and the composition of the euro
area over time can be found in Giannone et al. (2010). All series are season-
ally adjusted, and natural logarithms are taken for all variables not expressed
in rates.
The dataset includes eleven monthly indicators for the euro area which
are summarized in Table 4.2. The reporting lag for each indicator, which is
displayed in the second column of the table, illustrates the heterogeneity in
the timeliness of the publication of different series. For example, in early
January 2008, the most recently available observation for industrial produc-
tion excluding construction was dated October 2007, while for the Economic
Sentiment indicator, the figure for December 2007 was already available.
For quarterly euro area real GDP, which is also included in the analysis,
the first official release is usually published about 45 days after the end of the
reference quarter. Hence, the respective observation is included for the first
time in the data vintage of the third month of the following quarter. This im-
plies not only that the figure for current-quarter GDP is unknown throughout
the quarter, but also that the figure for previous-quarter GDP is not available
5The very small number of vintages that were unavailable for some variables, were re-
placed by the data vintage for the previous month. Moreover, since the data vintages for the
unemployment rate only start after 1991, all vintages were augmented with data taken from
the OECD database.
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Table 4.2: Euro area monthly indicators with respective reporting lag in early
January 2008.
Euro area monthly indicators Reporting lag in January 2008
Industrial production excluding construction 3 months
CPI 2 months
Unemployment 2 months
New passenger car registrations 2 months
Money supply M1 2 months
Money supply M3 2 months
Economic sentiment indicator 1 month
Stock market index 1 month
Oil price 1 month
Confidence index industry 1 month
Confidence index retail sales 1 month
in the first and second month of a given quarter. Hence, in each quarter„
an estimate of current-quarter GDP (referred to as the nowcast) and in some
cases of previous-quarter GDP (referred to as the backcast) as well have to
be computed. To increase the estimation sample for the univariate quarterly
Markov-switching model for real GDP growth (see section 4.4.3), each of the
data vintages for GDP is augmented with data from the 14th update of the
area-wide model database (Fagan et al., 2001) covering the period from 1970
Q1 until 1990 Q4.
4.4 Forecasting Approaches
To assess the real-time probabilities of a recession in the euro area, I imple-
ment a number of different econometric models which are described below
in sections 4.4.1 to 4.4.3. In addition, I consider a real-time recession indicator
based on Internet search data that is described in section 4.4.4.
4.4.1 The Bayesian Mixed-Frequency VAR
Consider the following monthly VAR
Xt = C+ A1Xt−1 + ...+ ApXt−p + ǫt, (4.1)
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where the vector Xt = (xm1,t, ..., x
m
11,t, x
q
t )
′ contains the 11 observable monthly
indicators listed in Table 4.2 and latent monthly real GDP xqt . Following
Ban´bura et al. (2010) I include the variables in log-levels rather than growth
rates so as to not lose information that might possibly be contained in the
trends. p denotes the number of lags included in the estimation and is set to
p = 6. C is a vector of constants, A1, ..., Ap are parameter matrices, and ǫt is a
vector of independently identically distributed white noise error terms with
zero mean and covariance matrix Σ.
To account for the mixed frequencies and the ragged edges of the dataset,
the VAR outlined in equation (4.1) is rewritten in state-space form with a
time-varying measurement equation (Schorfheide and Song, 2015) that reads
Yt = StΛZt. (4.2)
The corresponding transition equation for the states Zt = (X′t, ...,X
′
t−p+1)
′
is simply the companion form of the monthly VAR described in equation
(4.1). In equation (4.2) the time-varying diagonal selection matrix St governs
that the states contained in Zt are included in the observation vector Yt only
if they are truly observable, while the matrix Λ aggregates latent monthly
real GDP into its observed quarterly counterpart. In particular, following
Schorfheide and Song (2015) the log of quarterly real GDP is assumed to be
observable every third month only and to be equal to the average over the
three unobserved monthly GDP figures in the respective quarter, i.e. yqt =
1
3
(
x
q
t + x
q
t−1 + x
q
t−2
)
. Hence, for t = 3, 6, 9, ..., Tb, where Tb is the last month
in which a quarterly GDP figure is observable, the observation vector reads
Yt = (ym1,t, ..., y
m
11,t, y
q
t )
′, where ymj,t are the j = 1, ..., 11 monthly indicators and
y
q
t denotes observed quarterly real GDP. By contrast, in the first and second
month of each quarter yqt is dropped from Yt. Moreover, at the current edge,
e.g. for t > Tb, yqt is never included and depending on their publication lags
some of the ymj,t are dropped from Yt as well.
The mixed-frequency state-space model outlined above is estimated with
Bayesian techniques using data up to month T > Tb. This involves the esti-
mation of the marginal posterior distributions of the unknown VAR parame-
ters A1, ..., Ap,C and Σ as well as the estimation of the unknown state vector
Z1:T. Following Schorfheide and Song (2015), I rely on a version of the nor-
mal inverse Wishart prior that retains the main principles of the widely used
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Minnesota prior (Litterman, 1986; Kadiyala and Karlsson, 1997). The prior
is augmented to constrain the sum of coefficients of the VAR (Sims and Zha,
1998) as well as to incorporate the belief that the variables in the VAR follow
a common stochastic trend. I implement this prior using the dummy variable
approach outlined in Ban´bura et al. (2010).6
The initial values of the state vector Z0 are sampled conditional on a pre-
sample ranging from April 1991 until December 1994. A Gibbs sampler then
iteratively samples the VAR parameters A1, ..., Ap,C and Σ as well as the un-
known states Z1:T from their respective conditional posterior distributions.
For each of the retainedGibbs draws of the VAR coefficients Ai1, ..., A
i
p,C
i,Σi
and the vector of states Zi1:T a shock vector ǫ
i
T+h is drawn from N(0,Σ
i) and
equation (4.1) is iterated forward to compute forecasts for the monthly ob-
servable and unobservable variables in XˆiT+h with h = 1, ..., 12. The forecasts
for unobservable monthly GDP are transformed into their quarterly counter-
parts based on equation (4.2). From these I compute the implied forecasts for
quarterly GDP growth ∆yˆi
TB+h˜
, where TB denotes the last quarter for which
GDP was observable and h˜ = 1, ..., 3. The set of
{
∆yˆi
TB+h˜
}N
i=1 approximates
the predictive distribution of the back-, now- and forecasts of quarterly euro
area GDP growth that can be used to compute pointforecasts as the mean or
median of the distribution and real-time recession probabilities.
Note that depending on the current information set, i.e. the month of the
quarter in which the prediction is made, ∆yˆTB+1 could either denote a back-
cast (implying that we are in the first or second month of a quarter when
last quarter GDP is not available yet) or a nowcast. Correspondingly, ∆yˆTB+2
refers to a nowcast if it is computed in the first twomonths of a quarter and to
a 1-quarter ahead forecast in every third month of a quarter, and so on. For
example, in January 2008 the most recently available observation for GDP
refers to the third quarter of 2007 (TB = 2007Q3) and TB + 1 denotes the
backcast for the fourth quarter of 2007, while TB + 2 refers to the nowcast for
the first quarter of 2008. By contrast, two months later, in March 2008, the
figure for the fourth quarter of 2007 has been released (TB = 2007Q4), and
the nowcast for the first quarter of 2008 is denoted as TB + 1. This has to be
taken into account in the following when computing the MFBVAR real-time
recession probabilities.
6A detailed outline of the prior is provided in the appendix.
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According to a widely used (approximate) definition, the economy is in a
recession if real GDP growth is negative for at least two consecutive quarters.
I will therefore define the real-time risks of a recession as the probability that
the nowcast for current-quarter GDP growth (i.e. either ∆yˆTB+1 or ∆yˆTB+2,
depending on the current information set) is part of a sequence of two con-
secutive quarters, both displaying negative GDP growth rates. This criterion
implies that the GDP growth nowcast could be either the first or the second
period of a two-quarter recession sequence. Hence, taking into account the
data availability in month T, the real-time recession probabilities implied by
the MF-BVAR can be computed as πMFBVART ={
Pr
(
∆yˆTB < 0, ∆yˆTB+1 < 0
⋂
∆yˆTB+1 < 0, ∆yˆTB+2 < 0 |YT
)
for T = 3, 6, ...
Pr
(
∆yˆTB+1 < 0, ∆yˆTB+2 < 0
⋂
∆yˆTB+2 < 0, ∆yˆTB+3 < 0 |YT
)
otherwise.
(4.3)
From the Gibbs sampler output πMFBVART can be easily obtained as
πMFBVART = N
−1
N
∑
i=1
I
(
∆yˆiTB :TB+3
)
, (4.4)
where I(.) denotes an indicator function that is equal to one if, and only
if, the GDP growth nowcast for the current quarter is part of a consecutive
sequence of two quarters both displaying negative GDP growth. Note that in
section 4.7 I consider alternative recession definitions to extract the real-time
recession probabilities from the predictive distribution of the MFBVAR to see
how far the model’s performance is robust to the definition in equation (4.3).
4.4.2 A Quarterly Bayesian VAR
As a benchmark, I estimate a quarterly version of the model outlined in sec-
tion 4.4.1 for each of the monthly data vintages. This implies that all monthly
observations beyond Tb, i.e. the last month for which real GDP is available,
are dropped and that all monthly indicators are aggregated to a quarterly
frequency. Since the quarterly BVAR does not include any latent variables,
there is no need to set up a state-space system as described above. However,
apart from that the estimation procedure, the prior specification and the com-
putation of the predictive densities and real-time recession probabilities are
equivalent to those of the MFBVAR.
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4.4.3 Markov-Switching Models
Univariate Markov-Switching Models
For selected indicators in the dataset, I set up the following univariate model:
∆yt = µst + ψst∆yt−1 + ǫt with ǫt ∼ N(0, σst), (4.5)
where ∆yt denotes the first difference of the respective indicator.7 The latent
discrete variable st is assumed to evolve as a two-state, 1st order Markov-
switching process, i.e. st = {E, R}, with transition probabilities
P(st = j|st−1 = i) = pij, i, j = E, R. (4.6)
This model implies that the dynamics of the process described in equation
(4.5) may differ between the two regimes E and R, thus allowing for struc-
tural breaks in the time series which can be estimated. Assuming that µE >
µR and that E are expansionary business cycle phases, while R stands for
recession periods, the model can be used to identify business cycle turning
points and to compute recession probabilities. In particular, the probability
that the economy is in a recession in period t given the observations y1:t can
be obtained as
P(st = R|y1:t) =
P(yt|st = R) P(st = R|y1:t−1)
∑
R
j=E P(yt|st = j) P(st = j|y1:t−1)
(4.7)
where P(st = j|y1:t) j = E, R are referred to as filtered probabilities and
P(yt|st = j) is the likelihood of the data in period t conditional on state j.
I estimate the model in equation (4.5) for all monthly indicators listed in
Table 4.2, except the price indices and the monetary aggregates.8 In particu-
lar, following Anas et al. (2008) I consider industrial production, the unem-
ployment rate and new passenger car registrations. In addition, I include the
sentiment indices in the dataset, i.e. the Economic Sentiment indicator and
the indices for confidence in industry and retail sales, and the stock market
index, since these could potentially provide even timelier recession signals
7For the sake of simplicity I use the subscript t for both, the model in monthly frequency
for the monthly indicators and the model in quarterly frequency for real GDP growth.
8For these variables, it is not intuitively clear that the assumption µE > µR identifies a
”high” state E and a ”low” state R which correspond to phases of economic expansion and
recession, respectively.
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than the aforementioned hard economic indicators. For quarterly real GDP
growth I estimate the well-establishedmodified version of equation (4.5) pro-
posed by Hamilton (1989), which only allows for regime shifts in the mean
µst but not in the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable or the variance.
I estimate the univariate Markov-Switching models for the selected in-
dicators with Bayesian techniques as described in Kim and Nelson (1999).
This involves setting up a Gibbs sampler that iteratively draws the states
S1:T, the probabilities pEE and pRR and the remaining unknown parameters
{µj,ψj, σj, } for j = E, R from their respective conditional posterior distribu-
tions using the filter proposed by Hamilton (1989) and the multi-move sam-
pler suggested by Carter and Kohn (1994). A normal inverse Wishart prior,
that is assumed to be symmetrical across the two states, is used for the coeffi-
cients and the variance in equation (4.5), while the probabilities pEE and pRR
are assumed to a priori follow a beta distribution.
In this real-time application, I estimate the univariate Markov-switching
models for each indicator m with data up to period T∗m, i.e. the period for
which the most recent observation for that indicator is available. The real-
time recession probability for the current period T = T∗m + km can thus be
obtained as
πmT = P(sT = R|y1:T∗m) = P
km
(
P(sT∗m = R|y1:T∗m) P(sT∗m = E|y1:T∗m)
)′, (4.8)
where km is the publication lag of indicatorm and the (2 x 2)matrix P contains
the estimated transition probabilities pij, i, j = E, R.
Markov-Switching Linear Opinion Pool
The combination of forecasts from different sources is a very popular way
of increasing the accuracy of point forecasts (see, for example, Bates and
Granger, 1969; Stock and Watson, 2003; Kuzin et al., 2011; Schwarzmüller,
2015). As shown by Clements and Harvey (2011) and Ranjan and Gneiting
(2010), among many others, the concept of forecast pooling can also be ex-
tended to probabilistic forecasts.
Following Anas et al. (2008), who construct a business cycle coincident in-
dicator (BCCI) as a linear opinion pool of the probabilistic forecasts obtained
with several univariate Markov-switching models to assess recession risks
in the euro area, I implement a Markov-switching linear opinion pool with
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equal weights as
π
pool
T = M
−1
M
∑
m=1
πmT . (4.9)
While Anas et al. (2008) chose their pooling weights to minimize first and
second order forecast errors, I opt for an equal-weight pool. The main rea-
son for this is technical, because in this real-time application, where the re-
alized business cycle phases are observed with a substantial delay, it would
be very hard to compute meaningful pooling weights based on the recent
forecast performance of the alternative forecast approaches. In addition, the
limited sample size impedes the calculation of performance-based weights
over a presample. Moreover, for point forecasts, equally weighted forecast
pools have proven to be extremely competitive in comparison to pools with
performance-based pooling weights (see, for example, Stock and Watson,
2004; Timmermann, 2006).
However, Ranjan and Gneiting (2010) show that for probabilistic forecasts,
in general, the linear opinion approach is suboptimal, since it yields pools
that are uncalibrated and lack sharpness. They propose to recalibrate the
linear opinion pool by applying a beta transform which is given as
π
pool,opt
T = Hα,β
(
M−1
M
∑
m=1
πmT
)
, (4.10)
where Hα,β is the cumulative distribution function of a beta density with pa-
rameters α and β for which α = β ≥ 1. I apply the beta transform in the
robustness analysis in section 4.7 to assess ex post the degree to which the
performance of the linear equal-weight pool is inferior to that of the optimal
pool.
In total, I implement three linear equal-weight pools. The first combines
the probabilistic forecasts of all considered univariateMarkov-switching mod-
els, while the second combines only the real-time recession probabilities ob-
tained with the models for the soft indicators, i.e. the two confidence indices
in industry and retail sales, the Economic Sentiment indicator and the stock
market index. Finally, in the spirit of the BCCI proposed by Anas et al. (2008),
I implement a pool that aggregates the predictions of the univariate Markov-
switching models for industrial production, the unemployment rate and new
passenger car registrations.
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4.4.4 A Google Trends Real-Time Recession Indicator for
the Euro Area
Google Trends (https://www.google.de/trends/) provides real-time indices
of the relative volume of Internet search queries for specific terms in a prede-
fined geographic area starting from January 2004.9 A growing body of liter-
ature has documented the usefulness of these data to predict variables such
as unemployment (Choi and Varian, 2009a; Askitas and Zimmermann, 2009),
consumer demand and sales (Vosen and Schmidt, 2011; Yan and Labbé, 2013;
Fantazzini and Toktamysova, 2015) as well as tourism flows (Concha and
Galán, 2012) and influenza outbreaks Ginsberg and Brilliant (2009).
As an alternative to the econometric real-time recession indices discussed
above, I construct a euro area real-time recession indicator based on Google
Trends data for the search query share of the word recession. In particular,
the indicator is built as a population-weighted mean over the indices for
the eleven largest euro area countries for which a query series is available.
The list of countries includes Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain.
The idea behind this approach is very similar to the R-word index intro-
duced by The Economistmagazine in the early 1990s, which tracks the number
of newspaper articles that use the word recession in a given quarter. The R-
word index has been found to be a reliable source of early signals for pending
recessions in the US (Doms andMorin, 2004), Germany (Mayr andGrossarth-
Maticek, 2008) and Switzerland (Iselin and Siliverstovs, 2013).
4.5 Evaluation of Probabilistic Recession Forecasts
I evaluate the real-time recession probabilities of the alternative approaches
outlined in section 4.4 with formal scoring rules for the period ranging from
January 2004 until December 2013, i.e. a total of 120 recession predictions are
considered for the evaluation. In particular, the recession probability fore-
casts πt are compared to a binary indicator variable bct that is equal to one
for periods that were declared recessions by the CEPR and zero otherwise
(see Table 4.1).
9See Choi and Varian (2009b) for a description of the Google Trends interface and poten-
tial uses of the data.
118
The first scoring rule that I compute to assess the accuracy of the alternative
approaches is the widely used quadratic probability score (QPS) which is
given as
QPS = T−1
T
∑
t=1
(
πt − bct
)2
. (4.11)
Gneiting et al. (2007) show that this score is proper, meaning that the fore-
caster has no incentive to state anything but his or her true beliefs. The QPS
corresponds to the common notion of mean squared error loss that is typi-
cally used to evaluate point forecasts. That implies that the score explicitly
accounts for the strength of false signals, meaning that a recession probability
π1t = 0.8 in a month where bct = 0 is considered to be worse than π
2
t = 0.6.
The QPS simultaneously addresses the sharpness and calibration of the
probabilistic forecasts πt. It can be decomposed to make the performance in
both dimensions visible. The negatively-oriented component that assesses
the calibration of the probabilistic forecast is given as
CAL = T−1
J
∑
j=1
Tj
−1
(
π j − bc j
)2
, (4.12)
while the positively-oriented sharpness component reads
SHARP = T−1
J
∑
j=1
Tj
−1
(
bc j − bct
)2
. (4.13)
π j ∈ [0, 1] are j = 1, ..., J discrete probability values used to define probability
bins. Tj is the number of timesπt falls into bin j. bc j is the respective empirical
conditional event frequency and bct is the unconditional mean of bct (Ranjan
and Gneiting, 2010). It holds that
QPS = CAL− SHARP+Var(bct). (4.14)
I assess the statistical significance of the difference between the QPS scores
for the alternative forecasting approaches with a version of the Diebold- Mar-
iano test (Diebold and Mariano, 1995) that accounts for serial correlation of
the forecast errors using Newey-West standard errors as proposed by Lopez
(2001).
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Lahiri and Wang (2013) survey a number of alternative methods that are
well-suited to evaluating probabilistic forecasts for a decline in GDP. Unlike
global measures of forecast quality such as the QPS, these measures explic-
itly take into account the ability of a forecasting approach to assess the odds
for the occurrence of an event against its non-occurrence. This could be par-
ticularly important, for example, in the policy process when clear signals for
the predicted occurrence or non-occurrence of an event have to be issued.
I apply two of the evaluation methods outlined in Lahiri andWang (2013),
namely the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) and the Peirce skill (PS)
score. Both of these measures are based on (2x2) contingency tables which
classify
{
b̂ct
}T
t=1, the binary forecasts for the occurrence or non-occurrence
of an event, into Hits (b̂ct = bct = 1), False Alarms (b̂ct = 1, bct = 0), Misses
(b̂ct = 0, bct = 1) and Correct rejections (b̂ct = bct = 0) for a given period of
observations
{
bct
}T
t=1. These binary event forecasts b̂ct can be obtained from
the probabilistic forecasts πt via a binary event classifier w, such that b̂ct = 1
if πt > w and b̂ct = 0 otherwise.
The ROC is calculated for a range of thresholds w and thus explicitly ac-
counts for the role of the binary event classifier for the accuracy of the binary
forecast signal. The ROC is commonly depicted as a curve of the rates ofHits
against the corresponding rates of False alarms over a range of thresholds w
for a given period of observations
{
bct
}T
t=1. Ideally, for high values of w, the
rate of Hits should increase monotonically from zero to one as w decreases,
while the rate of False alarms should remain constant at zero. For further de-
creases in w, the ideal ROC curve would indicate increasing False alarm rates
but a constantHit rate of one (see Figure 4.2). By contrast, a ROC curve along
the 45 degree line in the unit square indicates no discriminatory skill for the
occurrence and non-occurrence of an event.
Alternatively, the ROC score can also be expressed as the area above the
ROC curve. From the description of the ideal ROC curve, it is clear the ROC
score ∈ {0, 1} and that it is zero for the ideal forecasting method which per-
fectly discriminates between the occurrence and non-occurrence of an event.
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Figure 4.2: Ideal ROC curve.
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Finally, the PS score is computed as the difference between the rate of Hits
(H) and the rate of False alarms (F) for a given threshold w, i.e.
PS(w) =
∑
T
t=1(bct b̂ct)
∑
T
t=1 bct
−
∑
T
t=1 b̂ct −∑
T
t=1(bct b̂ct)
T −∑Tt=1 bct
= H − F. (4.15)
For an ideal forecasting approach PS(w) = 1 or PS(w) = −1, whereby the
latter value indicates that the binary signals are perfectly mislabeled. By con-
trast, PS(w) = 0 indicates no discriminatory skill at all. Following Lahiri and
Wang (2013), I assess the statistical significance of the PS scores for the alter-
native forecasting approaches using the following standard error formula:
SE(w) =
√
H(1− H)
∑
T
t=1 bct
+
F(1− F)
T− ∑Tt=1 bct
(4.16)
4.6 Results
The monthly real-time recession signals obtained with the different meth-
ods described in section 4.4 are depicted in Figure 4.3. Since the original
real-time recession probabilities obtained with the alternative approaches
are very noisy, the real-time signals displayed are obtained as three-month
weighted moving averages over the original probabilities.10 The two reces-
sions in the evaluation period from January 2004 until December 2013, as
10In particular, the real-time recession signals are obtained as π˜t = 16πt−2 +
2
6πt−2 +
3
6πt,
where πt is the original recession probability for period t.
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dated by the CEPR (see Table 4.1), are again indicated by the shaded areas in
each of the panels.
In general, all the approaches shown in Figure 4.3, show increased real-
time recession signals during the Great Recession and the recession related
to the European debt crisis. However, there are considerable differences be-
tween the alternative approaches with respect to the timeliness of recession
signals as well as the amount of False alarms, i.e. recession signals in non-
recession periods. This is also reflected in Table 4.3, which contains the QPS
for the alternative models in the first column as well as the results of the for-
mal assessment carried out to measure the calibration (CAL) and sharpness
(SHARP) of the probabilistic forecasts of the different approaches in the sec-
ond and third column. Small values for QPS and CAL reflect a high overall
level of accuracy and a good calibration, respectively, while high values for
SHARP indicate that the probabilistic forecasts of the alternative approaches
are sharp.
Table 4.3: Evaluation of real-time recession probabilities, QPS.
QPS CAL SHARP
MFBVAR 0.108 0.028 0.108
QFBVAR 0.211*** 0.046 0.048
MS-ESI 0.231*** 0.123 0.040
MS-INDCONF 0.110 0.074 0.114
MS-RSCONF 0.317*** 0.161 0.005
MS-STOXX 0.148 0.075 0.087
MS-GDP 0.228*** 0.033 0.006
MS-IP 0.227*** 0.059 0.006
MS-CARS 0.188*** 0.022 0.016
MS-UN 0.315*** 0.173 0.009
MSP-All 0.168** 0.057 0.056
MSP-SI 0.154 0.100 0.090
MSP-BICC 0.215*** 0.053 0.002
Google Trends 0.148 0.021 0.047
Notes: The real-time recession signals of the alternative approaches are
evaluated over the sample from January 2004 until December 2013 using the
CEPR business cycle chronology as a benchmark. QPS: quadratic probabil-
ity score, CAL: calibration score, SHARP: sharpness score. ***(**,*) denote
that the QPS is significantly different from the QPS of the MFBVAR at the
1% (5%,10%) level. For the model abbreviations see the notes to Figure 4.3.
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Figure 4.3: Real-time recession signals for the euro area.
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Notes: The monthly real-time recession signals displayed are computed as three-month
weighted moving averages over the original probabilities obtained with the alterna-
tive approaches (see footnote 10). The shaded areas indicate euro area recessions as
dated by the CEPR Euro Area Business Cycle Dating Committee. MFBVAR: mixed-
frequency Bayesian vector autoregression, QFBVAR: quarterly BVAR. MS: univariate
Markov-switching model for ESI: the Economic Sentiment indicator, INDCONF: index
for confidence in industry, RSCONF: index for confidence in retail sales, STOXX: stock
market indicator, GDP: real gross domestic product, IP: industrial production, CARS: new
passenger car registrations, UN: unemployment rate. MSP: combination of probabilistic
forecasts from univariate Markov-switching models for ALL: all univariate MS models,
SI: the Economic Sentiment index, the confidence indices in industry and retail sale and
the stock market index, BCCI: industrial production, the unemployment rate and new
passenger car registrations.
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Overall, the results presented in Table 4.3 suggest that MFBVAR performs
best, as it achieves the lowestQPS among all the approaches considered here.
However, the improvements of the MFBVAR over the univariate Markov-
switching models for industry confidence, the stock market, the pool of mod-
els for the sentiment indices and the Google Trends real-time recession index
are not statistically significant, as indicated by the results of the respective
pairwise Diebold-Mariano tests.
The Markov-switching models for industry confidence achieves a QPS
that is only slightly higher than that of the MFBVAR, although its real-time
recession signals are less well-calibrated. This is confirmed in Figure 4.3,
which shows that the small number of False alarms produced by the MFB-
VAR in panel (a) are considerably less pronounced than those of the model
for the industry confidence index in panel (d). On the other hand, the latter
model performs better than the MFBVAR in terms of sharpness, reflecting
the fact that the real-time recession signals of the MFBVAR at the onset of the
Great Recession are only very muted.
The univariate Markov-switching models for the stock market index, the
pool of all sentiment indices and the Google Trends real-time recession in-
dicator perform more or less equally well in terms of QPS. However, for
the former two, this is due to the high sharpness of their forecasts, while the
Google Trends real-time recession signals are better calibrated. Again, this
is confirmed in Figure 4.3, which shows that the real-time recession signals
obtained with the models for the stock market index in panel (f) and the sen-
timent pool in panel (k) are concentrated at the confident values of zero and
one. On the other hand, both models issue many False alarms, pushing down
their relative performance in terms of calibration. By contrast, the Google
Trends indicator depicted in panel (n) is almost always equal to zero in the
non-recession period prior to 2008 and also very low after the end of the
second recession in the sample. This improves the calibration score of the
index considerably. Its moderate performance in terms of sharpness can be
explained by the fact that, apart from two drastic increases in euro area Inter-
net users’ interest in the word recession in early 2008 and in September 2008,
the signals were mostly not very clear-cut, especially for the period between
the two recessions in the sample. One reason for the latter observation could
be the general high level of uncertainty in that period about the sustainability
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of early signs of economic relief and fears of a double-dip recession (Cama-
cho et al., 2014).
The results for the univariate Markov-switching models for real GDP
growth, industrial production and new passenger car registrations (panels
(g) - (i) in Figure 4.3) illustrate that a well-calibrated probabilistic forecast
can be of minimal use in practice if it lacks sharpness. The QPS for these
models is very high. To a lesser extent, this also applies to the QFBVAR in
panel (b), the pool of all Markov-switching models in panel (k) and the BCCI
pool considered in Anas et al. (2008) in panel (m). What all these models
have in common is that they deliver real-time recession signals that are not
very clear-cut and are, for the most part, also heavily delayed. However,
given that these models are estimated with the series that have the highest
publication lag (see Table 4.2) this result is not particularly surprising.
By contrast, the poor performance of the two sentiment indices, namely
the Economic Sentiment indicator and the confidence index in retail sales,
might come as something of a surprise. Both models apparently not only
lack sharpness but are also very poorly calibrated. Indeed, from panel (c) and
(e) in Figure 4.3 it can be seen that these two sentiment indices deliver many
pronounced False alarms. One possible reason for this could be that these sen-
timent indices might not only be driven by hard economic fundamentals, but
also by other factors. These could possibly be unrelated contagious waves
of optimism and pessimism which are often referred to as animal spirits or
noise shocks (Akerlof and Shiller, 2008; De Grauwe, 2011).
Finally, the univariate Markov-switching model for the unemployment
rate achieves by far the highest QPS of all models considered here. The pat-
tern of the model’s real-time recession signals depicted in panel (j) suggests
that the unemployment rate is likely to increase only with a certain lag after
the beginning of a recession. In fact, this confirms that this variable is typi-
cally regarded as a lagging rather than a contemporaneous or even leading
indicator for the state of the economy. In addition, the model also clearly re-
flects the steady increase in euro area unemployment until early 2005, which
was not accompanied by a recession. On closer inspection, panel (j) and panel
(c) of Figure 4.3 reveal some similarities between the real-time recession sig-
nals obtained with the unemployment rate and those delivered by the model
for the Economic Sentiment indicator. This could suggest that the latter is
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driven by news about the former. However, much more research would be
needed to establish a solid causal link here, of course.
Figure 4.4 depicts the ROC curves for the alternative approaches as well
as the respective ROC scores, i.e. the areas above the ROC curve in the unit
square. It is plain to see that the ROC curves for theMFBVAR in panel (a) and
for the model used for the confidence index in industry in panel (d) are far
away from the 45-degree line and that they achieve the lowest ROC scores.
This supports the notion that the discriminatory skill of the two approaches
is very high overall, independent of the selected binary event classifier w.
The ROC scores for the model used for the stock market index in panel (f),
the Markov-switching pool of sentiment indices in panel (l) and, to a slightly
lesser extent, the pool of all univariate models in panel (k) and the Google
Trends indicator in panel (n) are moderately higher but still considerably
lower than those for the remaining models. In particular, the models for
the hard indicators depicted in panels (g) - (j) and the BCCI pool considered
by Anas et al. (2008) in panel (m) produce very flat ROC curves, which indi-
cates that the models’ real-time recession signals are unable to discriminate
between recession and non-recession periods.
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Figure 4.4: ROC curves and scores.
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Notes: The curves displayed show the rate of Hits and the corresponding rate of False
alarms for varying thresholds used to transform the monthly real-time recession probabil-
ities displayed in Figure 4.3 into binary signals for the occurrence and non-occurrence of
a recession. The evaluation sample ranges from January 2004 until December 2013. ROC:
receiver operating characteristic (area above the depicted curve). A small ROC denotes
high discriminatory skill. For the model abbreviations see the notes to Figure 4.3.
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Table 4.4: Evaluation of real-time recession probabilities, PS.
PS
w = 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
MFBVAR 0.75*** 0.66*** 0.71*** 0.66*** 0.60***
QFBVAR 0.43*** 0.35*** 0.32*** 0.09 -0.03
MS-ESI 0.03* 0.22*** 0.28*** 0.26** 0.39***
MS-
INDCONF
0.09*** 0.38*** 0.67*** 0.73*** 0.82***
MS-RSCONF 0.06 0.11 0.18 0.11 0.10
MS-STOXX 0.00 0.21*** 0.48*** 0.70*** 0.72***
MS-GDP -0.04 -0.12 -0.02 -0.07 -0.02
MS-IP 0.05** 0.15* 0.19* 0.08 0.04
MS-CARS 0.13*** 0.20*** 0.25*** 0.24*** 0.09
MS-UN 0.06** -0.00 0.05 0.11 0.03
MSP-All 0.00 0.10 0.39*** 0.58*** 0.28***
MSP-SI 0.00 0.15 0.38*** 0.48* 0.68***
MSP-BICC 0.05 -0.02 0.03 0.08 0.13*
Google
Trends
0.64*** 0.58*** 0.41*** 0.15* 0.17**
Notes: The Peirce skill score (PS) is calculated as the difference between the rate of Hits
and the corresponding rate of False alarms for the binary event classifier w. The evaluation
sample ranges from January 2004 until December 2013. For the model abbreviations see
the notes to Figure 4.3.
The entries in Table 4.4 reveal the usefulness of the alternative recession
signals for selected binary event classifiers w and could give valuable guid-
ance to practitioners. For example, the MFBVAR achieves the highest signif-
icant PS score for a very small threshold, while the other high-performing
models, i.e. those for the indices of the stock market and industry confi-
dence and the pool of models for the sentiment indices, perform best for the
common threshold of w = 0.5. By contrast, the PS score for the Markov-
switching models for the confidence index in retail sales, real GDP, indus-
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trial production and the unemployment rate is not statistically different from
zero, indicating that these models do not have any discriminatory skill for
the real-time detection of recession periods. For the remaining approaches,
the threshold for which they are most useful varies. For the QFBVAR and
the Google Trends indicator, a low threshold works best, while the Markov-
switching pools and the univariate models for new passenger car registra-
tions yield the highest PS score for an intermediate threshold. Overall, these
results illustrate that the absolute values of the real-time recession signals is-
sued by the alternative approaches should be interpreted very carefully. In
particular, signals obtained with different approaches which are equal in ab-
solute value cannot necessarily be interpreted as being equally strong.
Table 4.5: Contingency table, MFBVAR and INDCONF.
a) MFBVAR, w = 0.1
bct = 1 bct = 0
b̂ct = 1 30 14
b̂ct = 0 3 73
b) INDCONF, w = 0.5
bct = 1 bct = 0
b̂ct = 1 32 13
b̂ct = 0 1 74
Notes: The entries display the number of Hits (b̂ct = bct = 1), False Alarms (b̂ct = 1,
bct = 0), Misses (b̂ct = 0, bct = 1) and Correct rejections (b̂ct = bct = 0) over the
period from January 2004 until December 2013. bct = 1 (bct = 0) denotes a recession
(expansion) month. b̂ct = 1 (b̂ct = 0) denotes a recession (expansion) forecast. For
the model abbreviations see the notes to Figure 4.3.
According to the entries in Table 4.4 the MFBVAR achieves a maximum
PS score that is slightly lower than that of the univariate Markov-switching
model for the industry confidence index. To understand the significance of
this difference, it might be warranted to take a closer look at the contingency
table for both models. Table 4.5 shows the contingency table for the thresh-
old value w that maximizes the PS scores of the two models. The columns
contain the number of months in which a recession did and did not occur
in the period from January 2004 until December 2013, and the rows display
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the number of times these events were forecast. Out of a total of 33 recession
months in the sample, the MFBVARmisses three months, while the industry
confidence index model misses only one. Moreover, for the 87 non-recession
months the MFBVAR issues one more False Alarm than the model for the
industry confidence index. Given the high uncertainty surrounding any at-
tempt to precisely determine the start and end months of a recession, these
differences seem to be rather small.
It should nonetheless be noted that, depending on the purpose of the fore-
cast and the forecaster’s loss function, missed recessions and False Alarms
could actually be very costly and even small differences between alterna-
tive approaches might be very relevant in practice. It is also important to
be aware of the characteristics of the alternative evaluation procedures. For
example, all formal measures used above treat Misses and False Alarms sym-
metrically, which might be inappropriate when the economic costs of the two
differ (see Knedlik, 2014, for an application with asymmetric weights). As
pointed out by Lahiri and Wang (2013), for known economic costs of these
two types of errors, decision theoretic frameworks could be used to derive
binary real-time recession signals. However, this goes beyond the scope of
this paper.
In summary, the results of the formal evaluation presented in this section
indicate that the MFBVAR and the Markov-switching model for the confi-
dence index in industry deliver the most accurate real-time recession signals
in terms of calibration, sharpness and discriminatory skill, and that they per-
form more or less equally well.
4.7 Robustness
In the following robustness analysis, I first investigate whether the perfor-
mance of the MFBVAR described in section 2.4 is robust with respect to two
aspects, namely the variables that are included in themodel and the recession
definition used to compute the MFBVAR real-time recession probabilities.
Second, I assess the extent to which the performance of the linear opinion
pools can be improved by applying the beta transform proposed by Ranjan
and Gneiting (2010) and described in section 4.4.3.
Regarding the variables included in the estimation of the MFBVAR, the
results of section 2.4 suggest that the sentiment indices could be crucially im-
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portant for the accuracy of the model’s real-time recession signals. To verify
this conjecture, I estimate a version of the model that excludes the Economic
Sentiment index and the confidence indices in construction and retail sales
(MFBVAR(9)) from the list of variables in Table 4.2. Additionally, I assess
the performance of a version of the MFBVAR that includes only the most
useful sentiment index, i.e. the confidence index for the industry sector, and
quarterly real GDP (MFBVAR(2)).
To assess the robustness of the performance of the MFBVAR with respect
to the recession definition used to extract real-time recession probabilities
from the model’s predictive distribution, I consider the following alterna-
tives. First, I assess the performance of MFBVAR real-time recession signals
based on weak real GDP growth rates below 0.1%, rather than below zero,
over a sequence of at least two consecutive quarters (MFBVARslow growth).
This might increase the timeliness of the model’s real-time recession signals,
since at the onset of most recessions, the GDP decline is often quite muted
(see panel (b) of Figure 4.1). Second, I consider a multivariate approach that
is closer to the recession definition used by the CEPR (Artis et al., 2003), see
also section 4.2, and which, among others, also requires monitoring employ-
ment conditions and the state of the industrial sector in the euro area. In
particular, I use the MFBVAR’s joint predictive distribution of real GDP, in-
dustrial production, the unemployment rate, the Economic Sentiment index,
the confidence index in industry and the stock market index to compute the
odds that several of these variables simultaneously signal a deterioration in
economic conditions. I include the soft indicators so as not to run the risk
of the recession signals being delayed. However, since my previous results
suggest that the soft indicators are prone to delivering False alarms, I define
this alternative recession criterion as the odds that four out of the six above-
listed indicators deteriorate repeatedly for at least three consecutive months
(MFBVAR4/6). As a final alternative, I use the MFBVAR estimate for latent
monthly real GDP to assess recession risks in real-time, which I define as the
odds that real GDP growth in the current month is part of a three-month
sequence of negative growth rates (MFBVARmonthly GDP).
Table 4.6 presents the results of my robustness analysis for the performance
of the MFBVAR, while the corresponding real-time recession signals are de-
picted in Figure 4.6 in appendix A 3. The first row contains the results of the
benchmark model version as presented in section 2.4, while the results for
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the model versions that include alternative sets of indicators are presented
in the middle part of the table. Finally, the last rows contain the results for
the benchmark model including all variables listed in Table 4.2, but here, the
aforementioned alternative recession definitions were used for the computa-
tion of the real-time recession signals.
Table 4.6: Robustness of MFBVAR performance.
QPS ROC PS*
MFBVAR 0.11 0.06 0.75 (w = 0.1)
MFBVAR(2) 0.11 0.10 0.67 (w = 0.3)
MFBVAR(9) 0.15*** 0.13 0.59 (w = 0.2)
MFBVARslow growth 0.09** 0.06 0.72 (w = 0.5)
MFBVAR4/6 0.13 0.04 0.67 (w = 0.1)
MFBVARmonthly GDP 0.12 0.06 0.69 (w = 0.2)
Notes: The evaluation sample ranges from January 2004 until December 2013. QPS:
quadratic probability score, ROC: receiver operating characteristic, PS*: maximum Peirce
skill score obtained with the binary event classifier w.***(**,*) denote that the QPS is sig-
nificantly different from the QPS for the MFBVAR at the 1% (5%,10%) level. See the text
for the model abbreviations.
According to the entries in Table 4.6, the performance of the model clearly
deteriorates when all sentiment indices are excluded. The MFBVAR(9)
achieves a significantly larger QPS than the benchmark, while the ROC score
and the maximum PS score both decrease. The most important variable,
however, turns out to be the confidence index in industry. The MFBVAR(2)
that only includes this index in addition to real GDP achieves the same QPS
as the benchmark model, and only slightly higher ROC and maximum PS
scores.11
Regarding the alternative conditions for defining real-time recession risks,
only the version based on slow growth rather than negative growth rates
can significantly improve upon the benchmark in terms of the QPS, while
the approaches based on the joint deterioration of four monthly indicators
or the estimate for latent monthly real GDP perform just as well. Moreover,
the differences between the three alternatives in terms of ROC scores and
11An evaluation of the point and density forecasts of the different model versions can be
found in appendix A 1.
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maximum PS scores are very small. Hence, the performance of the MFBVAR
real-time recession signals turns out to be quite robust with respect to the
exact definition of real time recession risks.
Finally, it remains to be investigated whether the performance of the
Markov-switching linear equal-weight pools can be improved upon by ap-
plying the beta transformation proposed by Ranjan and Gneiting (2010) and
described in section 4.4.3. The upper part of Table 4.7 repeats the results from
section 2.4 for the linear equal-weight pools, while the lower part of Table 4.7
presents the results for the ex post best-performing beta transformed pools
in terms of the QPS score. These were obtained through a grid search over
alternative values for α, the parameter of the beta distribution. The real-time
recession signals of the original and the optimally transformed are depicted
in Figure 4.6 in appendix A 4.
As it turns out, the optimal beta transform can improve the performance of
the alternative pools relative to the untransformed linear equal-weight pool,
especially in terms of calibration. However, the overall gains in accuracy are
rather small.
Table 4.7: Robustness of the performance of the linear opinion pools.
QPS CAL SHARP ROC PS*
MSP-All 0.168** 0.057 0.056 0.16 0.58 (w = 0.4)
MSP-SI 0.154 0.100 0.090 0.09 0.68 (w = 0.5)
MSP-BICC 0.215*** 0.053 0.002 0.45 0.13 (w = 0.5)
MSP-All, α∗ = 3.4 0.151* 0.028 0.060 0.16 0.57 (w = 0.1)
MSP-SI, α∗ = 6.1 0.128 0.066 0.093 0.10 0.68 (w = 0.5)
MSP-BICC, α∗ = 1 0.215*** 0.053 0.002 0.45 0.13 (w = 0.5)
Notes: See the notes to Table 4.6. CAL: calibration score, SHARP: sharpness score. MSP:
combination of probabilistic forecasts fromÂ´univariate Markov-switching models for
ALL: all univariate MS models, SI: the Economic Sentiment index, the confidence indices
in industry and retail sales and the stock market index, BCCI: industrial production, the
unemployment rate and new passenger car registrations. Upper part of the table: linear
pools, lower part: optimal beta transform.
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Moreover, in comparison to the MFBVAR, the optimal pool that includes all
univariate Markov-switching models and the optimal BCCI pool in the spirit
of Anas et al. (2008) perform significantly worse still, while for the optimal
pool of models for the sentiment indices, there is no statistically significant
difference.
4.8 Conclusion
The evidence presented in this paper shows that the predictive distribution
of the back-, now- and forecasts obtained with a linear mixed-frequency
Bayesian VAR (MFBVAR) can be used to extract very accurate monthly real-
time recession signals for the euro area. Evaluated over the period from
January 2004 until December 2013, the probabilistic real-time recession fore-
casts of the MFBVAR outperform those obtained with the univariate regime-
switching models for a number of hard and soft monthly economic indica-
tors, their linear combinations and a real-time recession index obtained with
Google Trends data as measured by the quadratic probability score, the re-
ceiver operating characteristic and the Peirce skill score. Only the univari-
ate Markov-switching model for the confidence index in industry delivers
real-time recession signals that are more or less as accurate as those of the
MFBVAR.
The real-time recession signals obtained with the remaining soft indica-
tors, namely the Economic sentiment index and the indicator for confidence
in retail sales, are very poorly calibrated and yield a high number of reces-
sion signals in non-recession periods. This could suggest that these variables
are possibly driven by more than just economic fundamentals. The hard eco-
nomic indices considered here, i.e. industrial production and quarterly real
GDP growth, perform particularly poorly in terms of sharpness and thus
have no discriminatory skill to separate recessions from periods of economic
expansion in real-time. The reason for this is most likely the long publica-
tion lag of the respective data. The Google Trends real-time recession index,
which is obtained as a population-weighted mean of the query shares for the
word "recession" in the eleven largest euro area countries, accurately signals
the beginning of the Great Recession in 2008-09 and the end of the recession
related to the European debt crisis in 2011-13. However, in between these
two recession periods, its signals are not very clear-cut, possibly on account
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of the uncertainty prevailing at that time over the occurrence of a double-dip
recession.
The robustness analysis indicates that the inclusion of the confidence index
in industry is crucial for the good performance of the MFBVAR. Moreover,
the results show that considering a multivariate recession definition that re-
quires the joint monitoring of several soft and hard economic indicators does
not significantly increase the accuracy of the MFBVAR’s real-time recession
signals compared to the benchmark case, where only the evolution of real
quarterly GDP growth is assessed.
Further, the robustness analysis provides evidence that the performance of
the linear opinion pools of the probabilistic forecasts of the various univariate
regime-switching models can be increased if an optimal beta transformation
as suggested by Ranjan and Gneiting (2010) is applied. However, even the
ex-post optimized pools are not more accurate than the MFBVAR or the uni-
variate Markov-Switching model for the confidence index in industry.
Finally, the findings illustrate that the absolute values of the real-time re-
cession signals issued by the alternative approaches should be interpreted
very carefully. The size of the optimal binary event classifier used to trans-
late the probabilistic recession forecasts into binary signals for the occurrence
or non-occurrence of a recession varies considerably. In particular, the widely
used threshold of 0.5 turns out to be suboptimal in many cases.
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Appendix
A 1: Evaluation of MFBVAR and QFBVAR GDP Growth
Point and Density Forecasts
The following reports the results of the evaluation of the real GDP growth
predictions provided by the MFBVAR and the QFBVAR. The evaluation pe-
riod ranges from the first quarter of 2004 until the fourth quarter of 2013. To
compute the different evaluation measures, the first release of euro area GDP
growth is used to capture the real-time environment at the time the forecast
was made. In all tables, h∗ = 1 refers to the one-quarter-ahead forecast, while
h∗ = 0 and h∗ = −1 denote the nowcast and the backcast, respectively. IS
denotes the information set, i.e. the month of the current quarter, in which
the back-, now- and forecast is computed.
The accuracy of the point forecasts is assessed with the mean squared fore-
cast error, which is given as
MSFE =
1
T∗ ∑
T∗
t=1(yt − yˆt)
2, (4.17)
where yt is the realized value of variable y in period t and yˆt denotes the
respective point forecast.
The accuracy of the density forecasts is assessed with several measures.
The first is the logarithmic score, which is given as
LS =
1
T∗ ∑
T∗
t=1−log
(
F(yt)
)
, (4.18)
where F(.) denotes the predictive distribution.
The continuous ranked probability score (CRPS) is given as the average
over
CRPSt =
∫ ∞
−∞
{
F(u) − I(u ≥ yt)
}2
du (4.19)
or
CRPSt = EF|Y− yt| −
1
2
EF|Y− Y
′|, (4.20)
where EF denotes the respective expectations operator and Y and Y′ are ran-
dom draws from the models’ predictive cumulated distribution F(.) (see, for
example, Gneiting et al., 2007).
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Note that all evaluation measures reported in the following are negatively
oriented, i.e. the smaller the score, the better.
Table 4.8: RMSFE.
IS 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2
h∗ = 1 h∗ = 0 h∗ = −1
MFBVAR 0.51 0.32 0.36 0.26 0.25 0.19 0.16 0.12
MFBVAR(2) 0.45 0.37 0.34 0.30 0.32 0.24 0.24 0.28
MFBVAR(9) 0.48 0.34 0.41 0.34 0.27 0.26 0.19 0.14
QFBVAR 0.45 0.45 0.43 0.42 0.42 0.28 0.29 0.29
Table 4.9: Log score.
IS 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2
h∗ = 1 h∗ = 0 h∗ = −1
MFBVAR 1.26 1.14 1.13 1.08 1.07 1.03 1.00 0.97
MFBVAR(2) 1.22 1.16 1.13 1.11 1.12 1.07 1.05 1.06
MFBVAR(9) 1.26 1.16 1.16 1.12 1.08 1.05 1.01 0.98
QFBVAR 1.17 1.18 1.16 1.16 1.16 1.09 1.06 1.06
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Table 4.10: CRPS.
IS 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2
h∗ = 1 h∗ = 0 h∗ = −1
MFBVAR 0.35 0.28 0.29 0.25 0.24 0.22 0.20 0.18
MFBVAR(2) 0.33 0.29 0.28 0.27 0.28 0.25 0.25 0.26
MFBVAR(9) 0.34 0.28 0.31 0.27 0.24 0.23 0.21 0.19
QFBVAR 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.26 0.26 0.26
A 2: MFBVAR Prior Specification
For the parameters of the VAR A1, ..., Ap,C and Σ, I implement a normal in-
verse Wishart prior that retains the main principles of the widely used Min-
nesota prior (Kadiyala and Karlsson, 1997; Litterman, 1986). This prior im-
plies that A1, ..., Ap are assumed to be a priori independently and normally
distributed, while with respect to the constant C the prior is assumed to be
diffuse. The residual covariance matrix Σ is assumed to a priori follow an
inverse Wishart distribution with scale matrix S¯ and degrees of freedom α¯.
One of the main principles of the Minnesota prior is to center each equa-
tion of the VAR around a random walk with drift. Thus, the prior mean for
A1, ..., Ap is specified as:
E[(Aℓ)ij] =
{
1 for i = j, ℓ = 1
0 otherwise
(4.21)
Moreover, the prior also incorporates the belief that more recent lags of a
variable should provide more reliable information for the estimation than
less recent lags. The zero coefficient prior on more recent lags is therefore not
imposed as tightly as on less recent lags. This is captured by specifying the
prior variance as
Var[(Aℓ)ij] =

λ2
ℓ2
for i = j
λ2σ2i
ℓ2σ2j
otherwise,
(4.22)
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where ℓ = 1, ..., p is the lag length, λ = 0.2 is a hyperparameter governing
the importance of the prior beliefs relative to the data, and σi/σj is a scale
parameter adjusting the prior for the different scale and variability of the
data. For the implementation, σi is set equal to the standard deviation of the
residuals of a simple univariate autoregression for each variable.
Following Schorfheide and Song (2015) I augment the prior outlined above
to constrain the sum of coefficients of the VAR (Sims and Zha, 1998) as well
as to incorporate the belief that the variables in the VAR follow a common
stochastic trend.
I implement the prior outlined above using dummy variables YD and XD,
which are given as
YD =

diag(σ1...σn)
λ
0n(p−1)xn
diag(σ1...σn)
01xn
diag(µ1...µn)γ
ηµ1...ηµn

,XD =

diag(1...p)⊗diag(σ1...σn)
λ 0npx1
0nxnp 0nx1
01xnp c
P⊗ diag(µ1...µn)γ 0nx1
(P′ ⊗ diag(µ1...µn)η)′ η
 , (4.23)
where P is a (1xp) matrix of ones, c = 10−4 reflects the diffuse prior for the
constant C, µ1, ..., µn are the variable means and γ = 103λ and η = λ govern
the tightness of the sum of coefficients constraint and the common stochastic
trend prior, respectively.
With these dummy variables, the moments of the prior distributions for
the parameters A1, ..., Ap,C and the residual covariance matrix Σ can be com-
puted as
E[(A1, ..., Ap,C)] = A¯ = (XD
′
XD)−1XD
′
YD, (4.24)
Var[(A1, ..., Ap,C)] = V¯ = (XD
′
XD)−1, (4.25)
S¯ = (YD − XD A¯)′(YD − XD A¯) (4.26)
and
α¯ = TD − n(p− 1)− 1, (4.27)
where TD is the number of rows of YD.
Conditional on the most recent Gibbs draw i of the state vector Zi−1t ,
Ai1, ..., A
i
p,C
i and Σi are sampled from their respective posterior distribu-
tions. In particular, the (A1, ..., Ap,C) follow a multivariate t-distribution
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with mean A˜, covariance matrix S˜ ⊗ V˜ and degrees of freedom α˜, while
Σ ∼ IW(S˜, α˜). The respective moments of these distributions can also be
computed using the dummy variables outlined in equation (4.23). In par-
ticular, augment the state vector Zi−1t with the dummy variables to obtain
Y∗ = [(Zi−1t )
′,YD
′
]′ and X∗ = [(Zi−1t−1)
′,XD
′
]′. Then
A˜ = (X∗X∗)−1X∗Y∗, (4.28)
V˜ = (X∗X∗)−1, (4.29)
S˜ = (Y∗ − X∗ A˜)′(Y∗ − X∗ A˜) (4.30)
and
α˜ = T∗ − np+ 1, (4.31)
where T∗ is the number of rows of Y∗.
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A 3: Alternative MFBVAR Real-Time Recession Probabilities
Figure 4.5: Real-time recession signals for the euro area, MFBVAR robust-
ness.
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Notes: The monthly real-time recession signals displayed are computed as three-month
weighted moving averages over the original probabilities obtained with the alternative
approaches (see footnote 10). The shaded areas denote euro area recessions as dated by
the CEPR Euro Area Business Cycle Dating Committee. For the model abbreviations see
section 4.7.
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A 4: The Beta Transformed Linear Opinion Pools
Figure 4.6: Real-time recession signals for the euro area, Pool robustness.
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Notes: The monthly real-time recession signals displayed are computed as three-month
weighted moving averages over the original probabilities obtained with the alternative
approaches (see footnote 10). The shaded areas denote euro area recessions as dated by
the CEPR Euro Area Business Cycle Dating Committee. For the model abbreviations see
section 4.7.
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